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The

ANTIOCH REVIEW

Volume Four · · Winter 1944-45 · · Number Four

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CAN IT BE WORLD DEMOCRACY?
—Albert Guérard, Louis Fischer, Frederick Schuman

ARTHUR KOESTLER'S DILEMMAS
—Robert Gorham Davis

DEMOCRACY IN CITY PLANNING
—John T. Howard

ECONOMIC EQUIVALENT OF WAR
—Leo Barnes

THIS IS OUR GREAT UNEASINESS
—Paul Bixler

Other articles by Aaron Levenstein, Joachim Joesten, Nym Wales, Ray B. West, Jr., Albert G. Ramsperger, Murray D. Lincoln.

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Contents

EDITORIAL		483
CAN IT BE WORLD DEMOCRACY?	*Albert Guérard*	486
I AGREE	*Louis Fischer*	493
DR. GUÉRARD'S DELUSION	*Frederick L. Schuman*	496
AND IN REBUTTAL	*Albert Guérard*	500
THE SHARP HORNS OF KOESTLER'S DILEMMAS	*Robert Gorham Davis*	503
DEMOCRACY IN CITY PLANNING	*John T. Howard*	518
SUPERSENIORITY—POSTWAR PITFALL	*Aaron Levenstein*	531
BANDWAGON MOSCOW-BERLIN	*Joachim Joesten*	544
CAN CHINA RE-MOBILIZE?	*Nym Wales*	553
ERNEST HEMINGWAY: DEATH IN THE EVENING	*Ray B. West, Jr.*	569
THE MISPLACED MODESTY OF SCIENTISTS	*Albert G. Ramsperger*	581
THE ECONOMIC EQUIVALENT OF WAR	*Leo Barnes*	590
CO-OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS	*Murray D. Lincoln*	607
THE GREAT UNEASINESS	*Paul Bixler*	617
WE NOTE . . .	*The Editors*	633
THE READER WRITES		637
CONTRIBUTORS		639

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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

"Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"

—ABRAHAM LINCOLN

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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

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EDITORIAL

POWER POLITICS is now written across the face of Europe for all to see. In Belgium a parade of the underground is fired upon by British troops. In Italy the British insist on the formation of a weak, and to all intents and purposes, a puppet government. In Greece British troops promote and take sides in a civil war. All these offenses are British, yet Britain is one of the United Nations. So also is Russia, whose single-minded, bear-like grip has fallen upon the Balkans and upon Poland. When Ernest Bevin admits that Churchill and Stalin have agreed on their respective European spheres of influence, there is nothing to rejoice over beyond the slim fact that the agreement is now public and is not to be hidden away for fifteen years or more in the files of secret diplomacy. But America, too, is one of the United Nations. What, we have now to ask cynically, is our part in the division of the world?

The editors of this magazine have never believed that a basis for permanent world peace could be laid down short of a world federation renouncing national sovereignties. We have never believed, on the other hand, that power politics as a controlling force could bring the world more than a short armistice. If we conclude that neither Dumbarton Oaks nor anything else in the three years preceding it has disturbed, let alone seriously damaged, the idea of national sovereignty, we conclude also that a Big Three divided by spheres of influence is sheer anarchy. We would not, in Frederick Schuman's telling phrase, "make the best the enemy of the better," but we should like at a minimum to be certain that the "better" is not worse than Versailles and the League of Nations.

Our policy in Europe, according to Secretary of State Stettinius, is "hands off." Does this mean that the State Department has no positive policy for the present; that it is counting first upon the American people, through their Senate, entering a new League of Nations; and that the

new league will work out as best it may the interim agreements arrived at between governments during the war? Or does it mean that we acquiesce in British and Russian spheres of influence in Europe; that we have already traded them for our own sphere of influence in the Americas and in the Pacific; and that a new league will only make this arrangement official? Whichever the answer (and there could be degrees of both), the inevitable trend is toward a division of the world in which each "sphere" will be dominated by the power—economic, political, and military—of some one of the Big Three.

Is this what we want? If spheres of influence and power politics are to be the pattern of the new world, the reaction in America will be doubly bad. For we already are less sure of what we fight for than any other major belligerent in the world. Uncertainty about war aims has led to bad morale, and bad morale leads naturally to such incidents as the criminal participation of American soldiers in a huge black market in France and on the home front to a variety of foolish or illegal activities on the part of civilians. The recent crises in Greece and Poland had their most immediate reaction in renewed isolationist talk in the Senate and in the suggestion by at least one radio commentator that we should bring our soldiers home from the Western Front.

Because we failed to join the League of Nations, we in America have spent many of our wartime hours in thinking and planning about the makeup of a new organization for peace. But this could be all in vain. For if the peoples of the world, including the American people, become disillusioned over power politics, their urge toward postwar organization for peace can be seriously undermined, perhaps even destroyed. And if power politics does its worst during the war, the job of such an organization, whatever its final strength, will be enormously increased. We should seriously face the possibility that we might again repudiate a world organization *if the peace is bad enough*. Too much blame has been given Senator Lodge and his cohorts and not enough consideration to popular opinion, based on the ineffectiveness of the league, which throughout the '20's and '30's kept us out of it.

We do not want the peace hamstrung by power politics and spheres of influence. Poland may be of the greatest importance to Russia, Greece to Great Britain, the South Pacific to America. But no one nation, however big, is wise enough by itself to foster permanent peace in any of the

world's smaller areas. As the smaller nations are liberated, the forces of the United Nations have to take charge for an interim period. But the interference should be as small as is consistent with military security and the need for free elections, and it should be the responsibility of at least all three of the Big Three. So far have the United Nations strayed from this minimum principle and so vague have become America's own aims that we herewith suggest three steps in a program of action:

1. An immediate meeting of the leaders of the Big Three, not for more horse trading, but for an agreement on general policy. To depend solely upon agreement among the Big Three will be dangerous for the long run—this we must understand. But dependence upon their agreement is necessary now. For unless Britain, Russia, and the United States work together during the war, no peace and no international organization worthy of the name will be possible afterward.

2. The establishment of a wartime inter-allied political council, along the lines of the new Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill proposal, to handle such problems as those which have arisen in Italy, Greece, and Poland. Such a council would not only stem the trend toward power politics but would lead naturally into a sound postwar international organization for peace.

3. Most important of all, a statement of our peace aims by President Roosevelt. In World War I, President Wilson set up a program for the peace, lost part of that program to the forces of power politics in Europe, and lost the rest of it in the Senate. President Roosevelt has undoubtedly studied the Wilsonian failure, and one wonders whether he is trying to reach success simply by reversing the Wilsonian process. *Not* to announce a program for peace, *not* to make any demands on the Russian and British governments, and *not* to antagonize the Senate hardly spells out a sound peace either. In point of fact, the President has done a first-rate job in carrying the Senate along with him, but he should now carry the rest of us along too by letting us in on the secret of his peace aims. Not to do so will demoralize us and lose the peace.

CAN IT BE WORLD DEMOCRACY?[1]

By ALBERT GUÉRARD

ARE WE FIGHTING for a democratic world order, or for a new Axis? Our present confusion of thought is not merely annoying: it might easily prove tragic. I am unable to see any virtue in muddleheadedness. One never "muddles through" except into disaster: victory comes when muddling ceases.

Let us attempt rigorously, then, to clear up our own minds. What do we want, and what are we doing? As I see it, we are pursuing an international policy completely at variance with our traditions and with our professed principles. Mr. Hull, virtuously, and, I have no doubt, with unimpeachable sincerity, has asserted that there is no thought of coercion on the part of the Big Three.[2] The equal status of all peace-loving nations is formally recognized. But we have a series of secret conclaves of the Big Three, from Teheran to Dumbarton Oaks; and we must presume that they are not wholly futile. We may call such palpable contradiction "realism"; to the rest of the world, it looks strangely like hypocrisy.

I must make it quite plain that, when I am challenging the Big Three fallacy, I am not thinking of France's special claims. I am proud of my French origin; but I have never been a retained advocate for the shadowy political entity called France. In any case, the claims of France are bound to be recognized. Great Britain has given formal assurances that France will be restored to her position as a great power, and General

[1]*Editor's Note*: Dr. Guérard's article raises a question which is troubling many minds these days. Immediately following the article appear further remarks by Mr. Louis Fischer, Professor Frederick L. Schuman, and Dr. Guérard himself, and additional comment will be found in a letter from Miss Dorothy Thompson in "The Reader Writes" and in our Editorial.

[2]I shall constantly use Big Three instead of Big Four; our nominal inclusion of China is a bit of courtesy which does not take in anybody, least of all the subtle Chinese. Cf. Lin Yutang, *Between Tears and Laughter*.

de Gaulle is not the man to let that promise fade into oblivion. Marshal Smuts, when he wrote a curt epitaph on the tomb of France's greatness, reminded me of Balaam the Prophet: his intended curse turned into a blessing. For he was realistic enough to see that Great Britain could not preserve her position as a great power without continental allies. The logical, the indispensable ally is France; and France will never accept the position of a satellite. Already in the Bretton Woods proposals, France is acknowledged as the fifth of the Big Three or Four, just as d'Artagnan was the fourth of the Three Musketeers. But I have no desire that France should be included among the Great Powers: it is the Great Power idea that I impugn. Be it ever so civilized, a Great Power cannot help turning into a bully. Clemenceau was a man of vast and subtle culture. Yet when Belgium thought that her voluntary sacrifice and her heroism had earned for her the right to be heard, he said: "We have the backing of five million bayonets." This is the France I do not want to rise again, any more than the Poland of Pilsudski or the America of Richard Olney.

When Mr. Hull says that there is no dream of coercion on the part of the Big Three, the right lobe of his brain does not know what the left lobe is thinking. For if you abandon the thought of coercion ("Do as you are told, or else . . . "), the very idea of the Big Three dissolves into thin air. The Big Three happen to be the World Directorate because they are big, and, coincidentally, because they are right. But the Big Stick is the ultimate argument. President Benes had justice and common sense on his side, but Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, and Daladier were the Big Three of the moment, and the result was Munich. Only wilful blindness can deny that the privileges of the Great Powers form the very essence of Power Politics. If we renounce war as an instrument of policy, if we give up the thought of placing force at the service of injustice, then we are not more assured of having our own way than, say, Uruguay and Sweden.

"Placing force at the service of injustice! What blasphemy! Is it not plain that we, and Great Britain, and Russia, desire to rule only in the interest of righteousness?" And who shall judge of righteousness? If it is we alone, we shall have the classical argument between the Wolf and the Lamb. *"La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure"*: *ergo* Hongkong, the guerdon of the Opium War, must have been assigned to Great Britain by a special decree of providence. If, on the contrary, we are ready

to submit our cause to an impartial tribunal which cannot be coerced, then we give up the "realistic" notion of Great Powers; we revert to plain honesty, that is to say, I surmise, to Utopia.

Nor is it perspicuously candid to claim that the privileged position of Great Powers is compatible with the liberty and self-respect of the lesser breeds. There is no genuine liberty without full equality of status: we need not quote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in support of such a truism. The loss of liberty that is implied by inequality is made perfectly clear by a great publicist who was once a liberal: "The only hope of the survival of small states is in firm and friendly and beneficial agreements with the great power within whose orbit they live." If ever a country was "within the orbit" of a Great Power, it was Czechoslovakia. She was almost completely encircled by Greater Germany, and one-fourth of her population spoke German. Yet Czechoslovakia refused to accept the "orbit" principle. So did Poland and Yugoslavia. And Hitler smote them down, in accordance with the doctrine propounded by Mr. Walter Lippmann. And the world shuddered.

"But Hitler used force, and we are using persuasion!" Whom are we trying to fool, ourselves or the rest of the world? We may speak softly for a time—so did Hitler: he could woo with siren's voice. But we carry the Big Stick. If we throw it away, we cease to have "power": whenever the law is not the final authority, *power* and *force* are practically synonymous. And, if the resistance of the Little Fellows should annoy us, we might be tempted to speak not quite so softly. I remember a cartoon in *Punch*: it must have been around 1890. An irate John Bull is kicking a monkey-like Portuguese off the map of Africa, over which a Union Jack is spread; and he says: "Look here, my little fellow; I don't want to hurt your little feelings; but you get off that flag." We may not be so crude as dear, mellow old *Punch;* even Hitler would veil such brutality under a pseudoscientific theory. But I have heard some talk about "telling the so-and-so where to get off" and "showing them who is boss." A reputable statesman, irked by de Gaulle's uncomfortable stiffness, is reported to have asked: "Who is paying him, anyway?"

The demoralization of power politics goes deep. We cannot comfort ourselves with the thought that if the Big Three are drunk with pride, they form only a small minority of mankind, and the rest will remain sober. No: there may be a few wise people satisfied with their golden

mediocrity: perhaps the blameless Scandinavians and the bucolic Swiss. As a rule, every country, snubbed by its "superiors," will soothe its feelings by behaving atrociously to some lesser land. If insolence is bliss, wisdom consists in combining insolence with impunity. Be sure to kick only those who cannot kick you back. Italy, not absolutely convinced of her status as a Great Power, had to reassure herself at the expense of Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Albania, and Greece. Poland, denied a permanent place in the council of the mighty, consoled herself by oppressing White Russians and Ukrainians, browbeating Lithuania, filching Teschen from prostrate Czechoslovakia. It is great to be a beast of prey; and if the lion deserves the name, so does the jackal. Hungary and Rumania played ruthless power politics within their minor League. The Dutch, the Belgians, the Portuguese rejoice in their "imperial destiny." Even puppets love to strut and frown like veritable Alexanders. Cambodia asserted her greatness by recovering provinces from Siam. Siam, regenerated into Thailand, showed "power" by recapturing provinces from Cambodia, while Japan grinned bland approval. Who can fail to see the madness which struck, not Germany and Japan alone, but, impartially, Chile and Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay, Bulgaria and Greece, is *power?* And that, as long as we make *power* the supreme goal, the supreme reward, there can be no alleviation of the world's frenzy?

* * *

Let us examine more closely the implications of the *Might is Right* doctrine. We take it for granted that there are three Great Powers in the world today, and three only: Super-Powers, Mr. William Fox calls them. In an uneasy twilight, we might descry a Great Power by courtesy, China, a Great Power Emeritus, France, and two Great Powers in chains, Germany and Japan. From this realistic premise, we draw the unrealistic conclusion that the Big Three will remain the only Super-Powers, world without end. This is only the natural desire of those at the top to remain at the top. Austria in 1815, France and England in 1919, Germany and Italy in 1938 would have loved to make their supremacy eternal: but history gave a rude shake to the kaleidoscope. Those who are down will not stay down forever; those who are on the upgrade will keep climbing, and jostle those who have pre-empted the narrow summit. The mighty, eternal in their own conceit, may succumb to the mortal blight of power,

to wit complacency. To build upon power is to build on quicksand: ask the realistic shades of Napoleon and Bismarck.

Let us take our three, four, or five Super-Powers for granted. They have destroyed opposition: what are they going to do with their might? The logical thing would be: seek more power, since there is no higher good. To be one of the masters is splendid; to be the sole master is more splendid still. When Napoleon had divided the world with the Tsar, the next step was to make the Tsar his vassal. No sooner had Hitler achieved the mastery of continental Europe, thanks to the benevolent neutrality of Stalin, than he was impelled to turn against Stalin. World Empire is the natural end of the power madness: all Super-Powers could adopt the old Austrian motto: A E I O U. "We are free from any such taint"? Well, dreams of Anglo-Saxon world domination have flitted through many minds; they were expressed, not so long ago, with blazing indiscretion and soldierly candor, by a famous general. And, within this English-speaking condominium, we know definitely which is to be the ruling partner. One Representative clamors for unchallenged air control; another for undisputed naval supremacy. American banking, of course, is to rule the world; all the gold of the globe will find its way into Fort Knox, Kentucky; and who doubts that the universal language will, basically, be that of C. K. Ogden and Ogden Nash? Overlords? Perish the thought! We merely want to be *trustees*—with unlimited authority.

We have this madness in us, for we are men. But we also know that this way madness lies. We can not yet tell Russia "where to get off," much as some of us would love to do so. As soon as the Big Three fall apart, as soon as, following the advice of Marshal Smuts, they start watching each other with jealousy, their reign will be over. Let them establish "orbits" or zones of influence, let them seek minor allies to guard against the predominance of the other Super-Powers, and a clash becomes inevitable. For there is a stage when an "orbit" oddly turns into a chip on the shoulder. This is exactly the chance that Germany and Japan will be praying for.

* * *

For a while, at any rate, the Big Three are likely to remain united. But to be united with a limited number of nations, on the basis of power, means an alliance. Do we clearly realize what an alliance entails? I am

not appealing to the warnings of Washington and Jefferson: I admit the force of tradition, not the wisdom of prejudice. If a good case could be made for "entangling alliances," or for a fifth term, or for the selection of Presidents by lot, I should gladly fling authority and precedent to the winds. I am impressed by the words of the Founders, not because they were uttered some hundred and fifty years ago, but because they are good sense today. It is not un-American to seek international liberty *under the law;* it is un-American to give up our independence for entangling alliances.

For an alliance has only one possible meaning: "My ally, right or wrong!" If we tell Russia and Britain in advance that we shall stand by them only so long as we think their cause is just, if we formally reserve our indefeasible right not to condone injustice, they will consider us as very insecure allies. Allies should stick together through thick and thin, like "regulars" in a party machine. I have heard excellent Germans advance the plea: "Yes, Austria was manifestly wrong in 1914; but what could we do? We were bound to be loyal to our ally." France had hoped for collective security through the League of Nations; when we walked out, and England started hemming and hawing, what was left of the system became an alliance; and of that alliance, France was, not the ruler, but the prisoner. She could not afford to be overcritical of Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia: were they not indispensable allies? Later, when England and France needed Mussolini as an ally—the delusive Stresa front—they had to wink approval of his Ethiopian scheme. One must be "realistic"! A "little country," well within the Italian "orbit," should not be allowed to spoil the profitable friendship of Great Powers.

The masses of France and England rose against the "realism" of their governments: Hoare and Laval had first to offer a shameful compromise, then to accept a formal condemnation of Mussolini, and to apply, with paralyzing reluctance, sanctions which they hoped would be ineffective. And Mussolini turned against his fair-weather friends. No secret agreement, even if it be signed by the three greatest names in the world, will be binding for long on a free and democratic nation. "Realists" should learn to face this very palpable reality.

Nations can join an alliance under the stress of fear, and they may confirm it in a glow of enthusiasm. But both fear and enthusiasm pass away. All too soon, we shall forget that Hitler's land was once a menace;

all too soon, that his hordes were turned back by the RAF and the defenders of Stalingrad. Especially when the three great leaders have retired from the scene, and they are not young men. It did not take us many months to disown Wilson, or for the French to discard Clemenceau.

So an alliance is poised on a razor's edge. If we assert our determination to follow the right *only as we see it,* we relapse into isolation. If we intend to serve the right as determined, not by ourselves alone, but by impartial reason, we rise to genuine internationalism, even-handed justice, before whom there is no great or small.

The only justification of an alliance based on power, not principle, is the division of spoils. The Big Three in Eastern Europe, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, had a bond of union, which was martyred Poland. And Hess bore to England a very sensible proposal: "We have both proved ourselves to be Great Powers. Keep your magnificent Empire, and give us a free hand on the Continent." There spoke genuine realism. Already we are told that it is disloyal to express any sympathy for Indian freedom, for it might annoy Mr. Churchill; or that we must dismiss the thought of any European Federation, for Marshal Stalin frowns upon it. His frown is our law. We are in danger of selling our soul, and selling it cheap.

For the New Axis has nothing to bring us that is not already ours, if we choose to preserve it; and the same holds true of our British and Russian friends. To be sure, we all desire to have our cake and eat it too. We should like to be true followers of Christ, while dreading poverty and despising meekness; believers in liberty and equality for all men, while asserting overlordship; servants of justice, while defending privilege. But this is not the chief cause of our confusion. We are drifting into a Triple Alliance, not because of its alluring and questionable features, but because of the solid advantages it promises, which we see no other way of gaining. My plea is that these legitimate advantages, the just reward of our present effort, can be secured more directly and more safely. They are not conferred by Machiavellism; the Machiavellians, after the manner of all "tough guys," are contributing nothing: they are simply muscling in, after the "idealists" have done all the practical work. They offer to sell us security, just as Al Capone once did in Chicago.

The United Nations must remain united—thirty or forty strong. None should be humiliated, for every one has contributed its utmost. This has been a long war, and a global war. Many battles were lost, but

the stout-hearted never gave in; the Fighting French, the Poles, the Greeks, the Yugoslavs may look anyone in the face, and deserve a place among the victors. The spirit of Churchill's England was magnificent; but had we been able to help Reynaud as later we helped Churchill, had we been ready even to promise such assistance, Pétain, Weygand, and Laval would not have had their way.

We must not create a division between the Three seeking imperial sway, "aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise," and the rest of mankind. We stand a much better chance to remain united on a basis of liberty and equality than on a basis of power and prestige.

I AGREE

By LOUIS FISCHER

I think Albert Guérard is correct.

We are losing the peace because the Big Three powers are expected to make it and maintain it. Peace by the Big Three would be possible if they were exactly equal in strength and if this equality were permanent. Or if they were reconciled to their inequalities.

But the Big Three are not equal and they do not like the inequalities among them. They seek to correct the inequalities. That is the source of the present difficulties between Russia, England, and America.

On November 25, 1943, Field Marshal Smuts, Prime Minister of British South Africa, made an off-the-record speech in London which he himself characterized as explosive. It was. He simply said that after the war the world would be dominated by a trinity; but in the trinity Russia was "the Colossus of Europe," America had "wealth and resources and potentialities of power beyond measure," whereas Great Britain would be "poor" and "crippled materially here in Europe." Smuts objected to this situation. "I should like to have that trinity," he declared according to the official text published subsequently by the British government, "a trinity of equals; I should like to see all three of them equal in power and influence in every respect. I should not like to see an unequal partnership."

Here is the key to the inevitable rivalry within the trinity. For the Big Three are far from equal. The desire to be equal is a desire, literally, for a balance of power. Equal power, however, can only be achieved at the expense of other members of the trinity or at the expense of small countries and weak colonies.

Smuts urged two measures: first, hold on to the Empire, thus echoing Churchill's "England will hold her own. I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside at the liquidation of the British Empire." Second, the creation of "a great European State," consisting of the small countries of Western Europe, which would serve as a British sphere of influence.

This sphere of influence is today England's firm policy. On September 28, 1944, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden said in the House of Commons, "It will give us more authority with the other great powers if we speak for the Commonwealth and for our near neighbors in Western Europe. That seems to me the right concept of the structure we should try to build, and that is just the task on which we are now, in point of fact, engaged. . . . "

Note the motivation: Great Britain wishes to speak for the Commonwealth or Empire and for Western Europe in order to have "more authority with the other great powers," with Russia and America. Competition is the life of British foreign policy. That competition is caused by the disunity within the trinity, and will cause further disunity within the trinity.

To match Britain's sphere of influence in Western Europe, Russia is diligently carving her sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe. The Soviet government has, without American or British consent, annexed the Baltic countries which were independent nations between 1919 and 1939 and recognized as such by all the powers, including Russia. This Soviet step is in violation of the Atlantic Charter. The Soviet government insists on acquiring Polish territory up to the Curzon line and East Galicia, which never belonged to Czarist Russia, without consulting the populations in a free plebiscite. This is in violation of the Atlantic Charter. The Kremlin has set up its own puppet Polish government to rule postwar Poland. Poland is to be presented with large stretches of German territories. Thus exposed to German hate and vengeance, Poland will feel weak and menaced, and, as Pertinax put

it diplomatically in the *New York Times* of December 13, 1944, she "will need the lasting alliance of Russia." Poland will be a Russian colony after the war.

In the Balkans Stalin has said that he wants a union "of equal Slav states." These will nestle by the side of the big Slav brother, Russia.

Russia's sphere of influence which will, clearly, embrace the Baltic area, Poland, and all of Germany up to the Oder River, Czechoslovakia and the Balkan Peninsula with the exception of Greece, is subject to little outside pressure. Although no foreign journalist has been permitted to report freely from this huge domain, we know that no anti-Soviet political party operates within it. Russia's sphere of influence is safe.

In Western and Southern Europe, however, Communist parties make trouble for governments that are pro-British. Thus, the Brussels *Red Flag,* a Communist daily, said on December 11, 1944 that it was unalterably opposed to the idea of a Western European bloc of nations. The Belgian Communists are a thorn in the side of Premier Pierlot. The Greek, French, and Italian Communists likewise resist British designs. Churchill's reactionary ideology as applied in these countries is wind in the sails of the Communists.

This is the shape of the peace to come in Europe and it is emerging under the leadership of the Big Three, but particularly of the Big Two.

When ex-Secretary of State Hull returned from the Moscow conference he addressed Congress and declared that there would be no alliances or spheres of influence. He said so because he knows that alliances and spheres of influence have never prevented wars in the past and cannot. But Hull's prophecy was wrong; there are already two spheres of influence in Europe.

If Russia and Britain pursue the policies of alliances, spheres of influence, imperialism, and militarism, the United States will take the same road. Russia and Britain are depending on their own nationalistic security measures to bring them peace. They are not putting their trust in an international security organization. What choice will America have but to do likewise unless Russia and Britain desist? We will then want Pacific bases, Asiatic territories, a five-ocean navy, the biggest air force in the world, and military conscription. What then will be the function of the international security organization?

The alternative is between spheres of influence, alliances, balance of power politics, imperialism, dictation by big powers to small countries, and, on the other hand, real internationalism. Nationalistic security policies conflict with and thwart an internationalistic solution of world problems.

These are the reasons why I think Professor Guérard is correct.

DR. GUÉRARD'S DELUSION

By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

M. Albert Guérard has given voice, with his usual eloquence but with less than his usual clarity, to the moral and political dilemma of the society of nations in our time. His passion for liberty and equality, his lucid perception of the evils of power politics, his plaintive hope for a world order based on something more substantial than the ghosts of Machiavelli and Metternich must be shared by all forward-looking men and women. Yet his argument flows from several dangerous fallacies. The conclusions to which these fallacies lead are false and tragic. By making the best the enemy of the better, Dr. Guérard and those who share his view may well lose the good which can still be had from a victory of the United Nations—and in losing it may well condemn posterity to greater and more hideous paroxysms of blood and fire.

The basic fallacy in his thesis is the assumption that "power politics" is a drug or intoxicant which the wicked imbibe and the virtuous eschew. In truth, it is something quite beyond human will or choice so long as the fundamental design of the family of nations remains unaltered. That design, quite simply is a design for anarchy—i.e. for the absence of any effective world authority through which order can be preserved, law enforced and justice achieved. The design stems from the so-called "sovereignty" of the nation-states—an attribute which means no more and no less than that each is the theoretical equal of all others in the precarious enjoyment of the dubious privilege of "independence" from all outside authority. In a community committed to anarchy because its members reject government, all politics inevitably is power politics. Each member must depend for continued possession of its "sovereignty" and

"independence" upon its own power (i.e. its fighting capacity), since there is no organized power in the community upon which it may safely rely. In the society of nations as now constituted, every State must inexorably make the preservation and enhancement of its relative power the categorical imperative of all its acts. Not to do so is to risk extinction at the hands of those who do.

There is no final alternative to anarchy save government. And there is no democratic basis for world government in our time save the principle of federalism. As a convinced advocate and able champion of European federation, Dr. Guérard knows that federalism means the end of the sovereignty and independence and equality of *States* and the protection of the rights of *individuals* through a federal authority which enforces law on individuals through courts and not through the coercion of States by States or by the whole community of States. He also knows assuredly, if he would but face the problem instead of obscuring it, that there cannot possibly be any "democratic world order" save in the form of a World Federation.

What Dr. Guérard overlooks—and this is the real tragedy, albeit unmentioned, which sears his soul—is that this solution of the problem of world order has, alas, already been rejected by the governments and peoples of the United Nations, large and small. All have reaffirmed their loyalty to the concepts of the past. Not since Churchill's offer of Union Now to Reynaud in June of 1940 has there been even a hint of federation in official pronouncements, apart from the weird anti-Soviet schemes of reactionaries in a few of the governments-in-exile. On the contrary, the little along with the large among the United Nations have eagerly embraced the magic formula of the Atlantic Charter, Mackinac Island, the Moscow Conference, the Connally Resolution, and Dumbarton Oaks. The coming world organization is to be irrevocably based upon "the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States."

Dr. Guérard champions this principle (which is the nemesis of the federalism which he has on other occasions embraced) and fears that it may be qualified or attenuated. He assumes that "law" and "reason" will prevail if only the minnows and the whales among the nations are somehow made sovereign equals. But if he would reflect more deeply and read the Founding Fathers more carefully, particularly for the years 1787-1789, he would see that this formula is a snare, leading only to

more anarchy and power politics. No league of sovereignties ever has, or ever can, replace anarchy by government in the world community. A league is not a government and cannot be made to function like one. Yet the die is already cast and we shall get no more than a new league of nations. The fault is not in our stars nor in our leaders but in ourselves. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin have merely given expression to the conservative inertia of Joe Doakes, Tommy Atkins, and Ivan Ivanovich.

The new league of nations will be no more able to keep peace, enforce law, and achieve justice than the old, whether it has forty members or four. Indeed, the more numerous its members and the more ardent their devotion to "liberty" (for States) and to "equality" (for States), the more certain will be the inevitable failure of the effort. To expect or demand a "world order" on such a basis, to the tune of denunciations of the Big Three with an obligato of eulogy for the small nations, is to expect the impossible and to demand the unattainable. Joe, Tommy and Ivan want both national sovereignty and world government. They cannot have both. Precisely this is the cake which cannot be eaten and yet remain uneaten.

Ignoring this central issue, Dr. Guérard pleads for international "equality" and equates this with international "democracy." He wants States to renounce power and to become equals, which is much like asking for dry water or warm ice. He offers no suggestions for the international organization of power, for he thinks that power *per se* is evil and he supposes that peace is a problem of abolishing power rather than of organizing it in support of order and law. His admirable concern for the dignity and rights of men as individuals blinds him to the very obvious fact that States are not men, but only monstrous aggregates of men of sundry shapes and sizes. Because they are sovereign "equals" in theory and wholly unequal in practice in their fighting capacities, they cannot possibly be equal in fact. If they could be, the consequence would not be democracy or justice, but a travesty of both.

These cherished values can be served only through government of, by, and for *people* and never through pseudo-government of, by, and for *States*. Men as citizens under government can be roughly equal in power and therefore in rights and voting privileges. States as sovereignties living in anarchy can never be equal in power and can therefore never be equal in rights. Global democracy, equality, and peace are all defeated,

not promoted, by efforts to make States equal. I find it difficult to believe that Dr. Guérard would want Guatemala, Nepal, Luxemburg, Eire and Afghanistan to have the same voice in reordering the world as the United States, China, France, the British Commonwealth, and the Soviet Union. Still less can I imagine him believing that the result would represent "democracy" and "equality" in any meaningful sense of the terms. Democracy consists in counting people as equal participants in community decisions, not in counting States as equal. Four million Danes do not equal forty million Frenchmen or one hundred and forty million Americans or four hundred million Chinese. To treat States as equal is to treat people as unequal. The result is not government but merely an unstable and reckless confederacy. The result, moreover, is not "world democracy" but an irresponsible oligarchy of the impotent.

The victims of Dr. Guérard's fallacy are also disposed to forget a fact equally obvious in the world of the 1940's and 1950's. That fact is that there will be world peace if America, Britain, and the Soviet Union, joined by France and China, act together. In this event, peace will flow not from world government, which we have repudiated, but from a concert of power among those who alone have power to enforce peace so long as they use their power together. If the Great Powers do not act together, there can only be global anarchy unlimited and more world war. It may be painful for small and weak States to accept the hegemony of the Big Three. But it will be disastrous for the Big Three to abdicate in favor of the small and the weak. For if there is no hegemony of the Big Three, there will shortly be no small States at all. They will literally be trampled to death in the combats of the Titans. They will be utterly powerless in the face of a new struggle for power among the Super-Powers. In a world of power politics (and the world of tomorrow, with its new league of nations, will be a world of power politics), there is no middle ground between these stark alternatives.

The only remaining hope for an epoch of global peace is a long-term alliance among Washington, London, and Moscow. The merit of Dumbarton Oaks is that it offers opportunity for such an alliance as the nucleus of the new league. The danger of Dumbarton Oaks is that the alliance may be lost sight of while the league is reconstituted on the Geneva model. Those who oppose such an alliance among the political giants out of solicitude for the political pygmies are condemning the

giants to war and the pygmies to death. Pessimists assume that the allies will sooner or later drift apart into new conflicts. This may happen. Optimists assume that the allies can remain united and can use their power wisely in preparation for eventual federation. This too may happen —if the peoples demand it.

But the task of the hour is to build the alliance. Nothing better is now possible. Politics is the art of the possible. Politics is also a choice between evils. An alliance by the Big Three is a lesser evil than world chaos and more global war. Those who reject it in quest of a good now out of reach are but making certain, for the second time in a single generation, that "all our yesterdays have lighted fools the way to dusty death."

AND IN REBUTTAL

By ALBERT GUÉRARD

I have read over my critique of the Big Power Fallacy; so help me God, I find nothing to retract or alter. In the course of many discussions, the following objections were raised:

a) "The thesis is purely negative." Granted. I know the practical mind abhors a vacuum. I am offering constructive solutions, if not actual blueprints, in *The France of Tomorrow* and in *Europe Free and United* (in press).

b) My "criticism is based on Idealism. We must be realists and not expect a new heaven and a new earth by three o'clock on Armistice Day." *Answer*: I yield to no man in my contempt for futile idealism—the "Excelsior!" or Kellogg Pact kind. It consists in believing that you can dispose of evil by denying it. Realism recognizes the full force of evil, but in order to fight it; for, as M. de la Palisse once remarked, evil is not good for us. I am no Utopian. I am fully ready for the World State myself: I know that our country is not. I am satisfied with an inch at a time—provided it be in the right direction. I shall be duly thankful, not for half a loaf, but for a crumb—if it is not poison. I have no faith in the innate goodness of man and in the magic virtue of democracy. "Human nature being what it is," as George F. and Irving Babbitt would put it, even such virtuous peoples as the Russians, the British, and our-

selves can not be trusted with unchecked privileges. The Big Three conception is power politics pure and simple. Power, to be effective, has to be translated into military force; and the sole test of military force is war. Q.E.D.

c) "It is preposterous that Iceland or Liberia should have an equal vote with the British Empire or the United States." So it is. Equality of status does not imply material equality. We admit that men are created equals—in the eyes of the law; but Jefferson will never induce me to believe that I am the equal of Mr. Joe Louis in the ring or of Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. in the auction room. They are "great powers" and I am not. But the essence of our civilization is that they are debarred from using their mighty arm or their millions against my rights. This is democracy in the plainest sense. The first aim of the law is not to strengthen the hand of the Big Fellows, but to prevent the Big Fellows from taking advantage of their bigness. And it is for the Little Fellows to decide what is to their benefit or to their detriment: we do not want any despot to be "beneficent" at our cost. Unless there be such a law, we are still in the jungle.

We accept the rule: One man, one vote, crude as we know it to be, simply because, so far, no safer criterion has been devised. But there is no reason why we should adopt the manifestly absurd rule: One state, one vote. Individuals are, presumably, immortal souls and images of the Divinity; as such, they may be entitled to their fundamental equality. States have only a thin metaphorical soul, and to consider them as divine is blasphemy. Some day, we shall have all men vote directly for the World Parliament, *as men,* not as Kalmuks or Hottentots. In the meantime, it would be unimpeachable democracy to give each State a vote proportional to its population: then there will be no fear that Lichtenstein might offset China.

No doubt this method creates a scale or an order among the States. But it recognizes no hierarchy; there is no sharp invidious distinction between the privileged few and the rabble. Under the Dumbarton Oaks scheme, the Big Three share a reality; the other fifty divide a shadow among themselves. The method I advocate is genuine realism: it faces the facts with all their fine shades, and does not force upon Nature a wholly artificial scheme of Super-Powers. Just because the test is purely quantitative, it does not hurt anybody's pride: we are outnumbered by

China, India, Russia, and do not feel humiliated. Man for man, our vote is as good as theirs, and Haiti's as good as ours. The word *Great* on the contrary has a false qualitative ring: it seems to imply: *better*. Then the purely pragmatic arrangement I propose is constantly adjustable. It does not seek to "freeze" the world as of 1945. With each world census, representation will alter. Brazil will soon outstrip Great Britain, just as Chicago has grown larger than Philadelphia or Boston. Sane Bostonians take it very philosophically.

In my solution, the giants will not be outvoted by the pigmies, the pigmies will not be the vassals of the giants; the rights of pigmies and giants will rest on exactly the same democratic basis. This is not Utopia by any means. It does not guarantee the rule of the best served by the most expert. It is frankly *Democracy,* a rough-and-ready affair. But it implies a decisive renunciation of what has been the cause of all wars in the past: special privilege secured by the use of power.

If I oppose the autocracy of the Big Three, it is not because I am afraid it will be effective and permanent; it is because I am certain it will fail. It may be adopted tomorrow: but with reservations in every heart that will forebode disaster. If the whole plan is based on the constant unity of the Big Three, it will crash. And we shall be haunted with the lamentable ghost of another League.

THE SHARP HORNS OF KOESTLER'S DILEMMAS

By ROBERT GORHAM DAVIS

ARTHUR KOESTLER'S *Scum of the Earth* describes the resentful apathy into which the French fell after the declaration of a war for which the country was neither spiritually nor materially prepared. One action, however, the French authorities did carry out with vigor and determination. They promptly imprisoned the enemies of their enemies, the antifascist refugees from Germany, Italy and Spain. Among them was Koestler himself, a Hungarian journalist of some renown, who landed for a time in the concentration camp of Le Vernet.

At Le Vernet, because of their race, or because they had wanted a better world, the exiles suffered tortures and humiliations that differed only in degree from the regimens at Dachau or Oranienburg on the other side of the inactive front. These men were the broken survivors of the successive tragedies of the Left, but even after Spain and Munich, after the Moscow trials and the German-Russian pact, even after hope itself, which is the essence of politics, had died, the need to be right politically persisted, and the old arguments went on.

Koestler, who thought he had reached the depths of disillusionment the August before, when he saw Stalin and Ribbentrop smiling together in the newspaper photographs, was moved to new protest by a letter that reached him in prison. It said that Communists in the United States, supported by refugee fellow-travelers, were opposing American help for the Allies and the blockade of Germany. In fury he confronted a man cleaning the latrine near his barracks, a man whom he knew to be a member of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party. The argument that followed was curt, decisive, and unsatisfying.

The Communist, F., declared the war was not in the interests of the working class, and explained the Russian tactics. "Everything he said," Koestler wrote, "sounded utterly convincing. One could almost see the well-oiled cog-wheels turn in his brain." Under F.'s questioning Koestler admitted he thought the Communists should be imprisoned,

since they played into the hands of the Nazis. F. asked him why he did not, then, give his information about the Communists to the police. Koestler answered that he was not an informer, a lame and inconsistent answer which F. scornfully rejected.

"Because I have ceased to believe," Koestler tried to explain further, "that the end justifies the means—and that is why I have left the Party."

"Petty-bourgeois liberalism," said F. with finality, and went on sweeping the latrine with his slow, thorough, dignified movements. "I never argued with him again," Koestler wrote. "He had all the advantages of his passionate error against my shabby truth."

Of course Koestler did not think his "truth" was shabby, and, for that matter, the Communist was not passionate. But Koestler apparently did have a sense of coming off badly, of not being able to find the terms in which his truth could prevail against the cool logic of the party-liners. In his works he rehearses this argument again and again, with a compulsive need to win it. In a sense he never does. But as he repeats it, it becomes clearer and simpler and sharper, the antitheses nicely balanced and behind them marshalled all the significant elements in modern experience. The argument takes many forms. He projects it dramatically into the Moscow trials or the gladiatorial revolt of 71 B.C. He personifies its opposites in Gandhi and Lenin, in the Yogi and the Commissar, in Jesus Christ and the Procurator of Judea. He invents for it a series of flashing metaphors of slopes and detours, of the ultra-violet and the infrared, of the pan of hot water and the open window.

When this two-valued orientation, as the semanticists call it, this dilemma of ends and means, of humane individualism and utopian inexorableness, first became dominant in Koestler's thoughts is hard to determine. His best book, *Darkness at Noon,* presented it just at the right moment to capture the unhappy enthusiasts of the popular front or the "anti-fascist mystique" who had been left spiritually homeless by Russia's apparent defection, her selling out to the enemies of the human race. *Darkness at Noon* had been written after Koestler left the Communist Party in February, 1938, just before the trial of Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda and the others in Moscow. But Koestler had clearly been concerned with this question some years before that.

Koestler joined the Communist Party around 1931, after a precociously successful career as a journalist. Born in Budapest in 1905, he

was educated in Viennese schools during and just after the last war, and then roamed, in the early '20's, through the Near and Middle East, doing all sorts of strange jobs, and spending some time in Palestine, working on Jabotinsky's paper, even preparing crossword puzzles in Hebrew, although he was not himself a Jew. Then he was made, at 21, Middle East correspondent for the Ullstein chain. In 1929, when he was 24, he became their Paris correspondent, and soon after went to Berlin as foreign editor. In the summer of 1931, as science editor of the *Voissische Zeitung,* he was the only journalist carried by the Graf Zeppelin on its exploration of the polar circle. The curious can find daily dispatches under his name in the *New York Times* of that period.

Although Koestler joined the Communist Party soon after the Zeppelin trip, and spent a year traveling widely in the Soviet Union, there is in none of his work published in English any description of what he *did* as a Communist. Circumstantial evidence suggests that his Communism was considerably less than whole-hearted. In 1935, as a result of the Italo-Abyssinian war, according to the *Wilson Library Bulletin,* he began his first attempt at a "pacifist" novel. He was at work on the second attempt of this nature when the Franco revolt broke out in Spain. Now Communists do not describe their opposition to imperialist war as "pacifist." We might suppose that the term was used inexactly of Koestler's first creative project if we did not know that one of the most dramatic incidents in *Darkness at Noon* is conflict between Rubashoff, agent of the International, and ardent dock-worker Communists over the very question of Russia's sending ships loaded with oil to Italy during the Abyssinian campaign. Apparently in 1935, before the days of greatest pro-Soviet enthusiasm among European and American intellectuals, Koestler was already troubled by disparities of ends and means in the *Realpolitik* of the Worker's State.

And when Koestler went to Spain in August, 1936, still nearly two years before he says he left the Communist Party, he had certainly begun, and perhaps completed his historical novel about Rome. *The Gladiators,* a study of the idealist in action, is completely inconsistent with Marxism both in theme and emphasis, even though Spartacus himself was frequently mentioned during the '30's as an ancestor of later proletarian revolutionaries.

The gladiatorial revolt broke out in Italy in 73 B.C., and lasted two years. The rebels, their forces constantly augmented by escaped slaves and impoverished farmers, roamed freely up and down the peninsula, defeating army after army sent against them, and threatening at one point to seize the capitol itself. Their leader Spartacus, vigorous and resourceful in battle, was humane in his treatment of prisoners, and tried to control the violence of his more brutal followers. But dissension broke out in the ranks, and after an attempt to flee Italy put the gladiatorial forces in an untenable position, the movement was finally destroyed piecemeal by Crassus and Pompey.

Since surviving accounts of the revolt are very meager, Koestler's novel is almost entirely a fiction, the filling-in of a thousand-word outline. Nor does it draw heavily on the knowledge historians have provided of the social, economic, and cultural conditions in Italy at that time. As a historical reconstruction, the novel is not impressive. Any good student could have worked up the material in a few weeks. The most striking details are of physical suffering in its most intense and particular aspects, the motives of torture and execution that run through all of Koestler's work. Physical anguish transcends time even more readily than spiritual conflict. In some forms of gladiatorial combat, sixty per cent of the participants were killed. The book begins with men facing death in the arena, and ends with men facing death on the crosses that Crassus erected for them at fifty-foot intervals all the way to Rome.

The Gladiators is not a proletarian novel as that term was used during the '30's. Its central interest is not in the situation and struggles of the masses, of the men from the farms, mines, and factories who gave the revolt of Spartacus its great strength; and the effect of the book is not to move the reader to active identification with the mass struggles in his own time. On the contrary, it makes him sharply aware of the readiness with which such movements may defeat their own ends, and of the basic incompatibility of humane individualism with revolutionary leadership.

There are a good many "types" in *The Gladiators,* rather thinly rendered: demagogic lawyers, religious prophets, stoics and epicureans, clearly intended to suggest similar types of our own times. And there is an interesting portrait of the big-businessman, Crassus, who answers young Cato's talk about discipline, order, and the ancient Roman virtues

with a strictly economic analysis of the difficulties into which the Roman Empire had fallen.

And to Spartacus, himself, in a confrontation scene toward the end of the book, Crassus points out the impossibility of a successful agrarian or populist revolution in that stage of the empire's economic development.

But *The Gladiators* is primarily devoted to a study of Spartacus himself as the utopian reformer put in a position of power. The gladiatorial chief grows with events, and as his character develops he is more and more troubled by the actions which his course requires. When some of the more violent men under him, who have "greed in their bellies rather than wrath in their hearts," commit despoilation and massacre in the captured towns, the slaves and common folk in neighboring towns become fearful and hold out against the revolution. Spartacus then lets this uncontrollable faction go unsupported to certain destruction by the Roman legions.

When he defends this shearing off, an old friend, the Essene, who had called him Son of Man, replies that of the curses that beset man, the worst "of all is that he must tread the evil road for the sake of the good and right, that he must make detours and walk crookedly so that he may reach the straight goal."

But Spartacus, with the vision of founding a Sun State, a communal brotherhood, always before him, perseveres. He deals hardly with dissenters, and when the State is actually established, a town as well ordered as a Roman Legion's encampment, with work for all, and an equal division of goods, he finds that even sterner discipline is necessary if all they have gained is not to be lost through factionalism, through longing for home or the old way of life, and through the outbreaks of violence among brutalized men.

> As Fulvius the lawyer explained it: Spartacus' development, then, soon made him rise above the level of his companions, and made him realize that the latter acted like blind men or ignorant beasts, who must be watched and forcibly guided upon the right road. . . . For he must defend their interests against their own want of reason, which attitude will often force him to inflict measures which may appear as arbitrary as they are difficult to understand. He will have to make detours whose point is lost on others: for he alone can see while they are blind.

But when Spartacus actually began crucifying some of his lieutenants, the reaction came, both from his followers and from within Spartacus'

own soul, for he was genuinely humane and genuinely an idealist. He let his men go where they would, even though he knew it meant their defeat and the destruction of their movement, and he served loyally with them to the end which was starvation, butchery, and miles of crosses along the high road.

The historic or political import of this parable is not fully clear. The German Communist with the broom would have said, "Exactly! Because Spartacus did not continue to act with the firmness the situation demanded, because he permitted himself selfish sentimental indulgences, he let his movement, his followers, and himself be destroyed." And it is just in these terms that the debate is continued in *Darkness at Noon.* But as self-expression it is quite clear what *The Gladiators* represents. It dramatizes the conflict in Koestler himself who went along with the Marxian movement intellectually, found it incontrovertible in its own terms, and yet fell away from it emotionally because as an individual he could not find it in his heart to do what the Marxist line required. Spartacus was not Lenin, who shot his opponents with serene certainty that the situation required it, but a projection of Koestler's own dilemma.

If we read *Dialogue with Death,* the next book in order of inception, as an account of a Communist's experience in the Spanish Civil War, it seems very strange indeed. If we read it as a continuation of *The Gladiators,* its emphases become understandable. Koestler had gone to Spain at the very beginning of the rebellion for the *News-Chronicle,* and there he found important evidence of German and Italian aid to Franco. He fled the country after a young Nazi, the son of Strindberg, told the authorities he was a Red. Koestler published his facts and learned that the Franco press chief Bolin had sworn to shoot him as a spy if he ever caught him.

Koestler returned to Spain, this time to the Loyalist side, and was in Malaga just before its fall. Everywhere he saw disorder, inefficiency, unreality. The campaign seemed not a succession of battles but of disasters. In Malaga he spent most of his time in conversation with an old Englishman, Sir Peter Chalmers-Mitchell. When the city's doom seemed near, Koestler started to flee with the Loyalist officials, but instead, for reasons not made clear, he returned to be with Sir Peter. One reason may have been the same obscure need for punishment to relieve guilt feelings that he attributes to his hero in *Arrival and Departure.*

In the best plot tradition, the first Franco official to arrive at Sir Peter's villa was Captain Bolin with a pistol in his hand. A series of novelistic chances and mischances saved Koestler for the moment, but he was sent to jail, condemned to death, and lived in daily expectation of death for a couple of months until he was finally exchanged through the mediation of a young lady phalangist of the Hearst press.

The end of *The Gladiators* described the captured rebels trying to prepare themselves for their protracted death by crucifixion. In *Dialogue with Death* the author himself faces a similar fate. In his introduction he says that the primary purpose of the book is to study such an experience psychologically, and the secondary purpose is to show the suffering of prisoners, for civil war is "ten per cent action and ninety per cent passive suffering."

As a result this account of his intensest personal experience has the least political interest of all his books. Having to a high degree the closed quality of all Koestler's writing, it is in another world from such accounts of the Spanish Civil War as *Man's Hope* or *For Whom the Bell Tolls*. Koestler worked out the equation for a parabola on his cell wall, imagined debates between Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx (an anticipation of *Arrival and Departure*), tried a hunger strike and a false heart attack, heard his fellow prisoners going to their deaths, and when he was released from solitary confinement was able to study them with a detached unpolitical interest that let the conclusion of his book have the kind of Christian suggestion that is common in all of Koestler's work. Here the formula was, "Not *Ecce heroes,* but *Ecce homo!*"

Above all he was preoccupied, of course, with the imminence of his own death. He had no sense of dying for a cause; the impulse that had led him to his capture was politically meaningless. He had to find within himself a technique for mastering fear. Since he could not do this by identifying his fate with any significant and hopeful movement, or even individual idealism or a personal point of honor, he accomplished it by identifying himself with the passive misery that existed throughout the world, by "merging that stark image of the firing squad with the general problem of life and death, of merging my individual misery with the biological misery of the universe; just as the vibrations and tensions of a wireless-receiver are conducted to earth, where they disperse, I had 'earthed' my distress." This was the "oceanic" feeling that Rubashoff

discovered in himself in *Darkness at Noon,* and is the same combination of pessimism and mysticism that was to cause such a sensation in the *New York Times* articles five or six years later.

After his release from prison, Koestler lived principally in Paris, in the midst of the violent controversies among Left factions over the situation in Russia. In February, 1938, just before the trial of Bukharin and the others in Moscow, Koestler made his strangely delayed break with the Communist Party. Then he began writing *Darkness at Noon,* and with Willy Muenzenberg edited an anti-Nazi, anti-Stalin paper called *Zukunft.*

Darkness at Noon was bound to have a tremendous impact, coming at the time it did in 1941. What was said at the trials themselves was staggering enough to the imagination, but it was made even more fantastic and incomprehensible by the flood of polemical elaboration in the Left and liberal press. Furthermore, a middle-class audience read *Darkness at Noon* against a background of Russia's action in the first year of the war, and as part of a literature of anti-Soviet "revelations" dating back to books like Tchernavin's "I Speak for the Silent," and proceeding through those of Ciliga, Souvarin and Krivitsky, to its culmination in the best seller *Out of the Night* which also appeared in 1941. This literature, often questionable in its facts and motives, was undoubtedly reactionary in its effect. But the most shocking and revealing of its material is precisely that which Koestler, with his journalist's flair, uses to reconstruct Rubashoff's past, the accounts of the cellars of the GPU, the way in which political prisoners were coerced and corrupted into becoming "novelists" or writers of confessions, the way in which the underground operatives of the Third International worked in Western Europe, the way Stalin ruthlessly wiped out the leaders who had been identified with each phase of the zigzagging Stalinist policy. But all this material, carefully selected, was given further intensity by Koestler's own memories of waiting for death in prison, and given great thematic unity because it lent itself so perfectly to the problem that already had occupied him in his previous work.

Rubashoff is an old Bolshevik being worked on in prison by two examiners who want him to produce a typical confession, damning himself as an unprincipled traitor and criminal. In between the hearings he reflects on the implications of his past. Although Rubashoff is a

composite character, and is given a career that suits the particular purposes of the book, he bears a good deal of physical resemblance to Christian Rakovsky, a dignified, bearded old man who, it was reported in the press at the time of the trial, had been questioned by the GPU for as many as ninety hours at a time under the hypnotic glare of special spotlights. In the trial itself Rakovsky testified that in the middle '20's, when he held important ambassadorships from the Soviet government, he became a member of the espionage service of Great Britain, and that when he left Tokyo years later he had "the credentials of a Japanese spy in my pocket."

When Rubashoff, in *Darkness at Noon,* finally yielded to the demand for a confession, the younger of the two examiners told him,

> The policy of the opposition is wrong. Your task is therefore to make the opposition contemptible; to make the masses understand that opposition is a crime and that the leaders of the opposition are criminals. That is the simple language which the masses understand. If you begin to talk of your complicated motives, you will only create confusion amongst them.

And in the real trial when Rakovsky began from habit to use language that suggested a principled and political opposition, the Procurator Vyshinsky demanded sharply that he "keep closer to the substance of the treasonable crimes which you have committed, to speak without philosophy and other such things which are entirely out of place here."

In his discussion with the examiners Rubashoff was very much in the position of Koestler at Le Vernet, talking to the Communist with the broom. If Koestler believed the Communists dangerous to the allied cause, why did he not denounce them to the police? If Rubashoff thought the Stalinist leadership un-Marxist and dangerous to the revolutionary future, then necessarily he as a Marxist—a monist who did not separate thought and action—must have intrigued against it with all means at his disposal, and if a mass base were lacking, then the conspirators would have to depend upon sabotage and the support of foreign powers. Rubashoff had, as a matter of fact, talked with a representative of Germany, but the talks, though dangerous, had been casual and not intended to lead anywhere. The GPU had learned of these conversations, and drawn its own conclusions. The linear projection of these conversations would necessarily lead to crimes against the state. Why had the crimes not occurred? Rubashoff could give no satisfactory answer.

And when he finally confessed in court to these crimes that did not occur, there were two reasons for his action. The first was the reason that Rakovsky, Bukharin, and the others gave at the trials. The oppositionist intrigues had come to nothing; they had no base inside or outside Russia. Meanwhile Stalin had successfully built socialism in one country. That country was now being threatened by the rise of the fascist powers and by the hesitation of the democracies. Since these discredited former leaders could not be restored to positions of power, the one service they could do socialism was to unify the country by defiling utterly all oppositionist tendencies.

The second reason was psychological, a reason repudiated in suspiciously similar terms by defendant after defendant in the real trial. "This repentance is often attributed," Bukharin said in court, "to the Dostoyevskian mind, to the specific properties of the soul *(L'ame slave* as it is called), and this can be said of types like Alyosha Karamazov, the heroes of the *Idiot* and other Dostoyevsky characters, who are prepared to stand up in the public square and cry, 'Beat me, Orthodox Christians, I am a villain.' "

But repentance is an important motive for Rubashoff, the need for punishment, not for the crimes he said he committed against socialism, but for the crimes he actually committed in the name of Marxism and historic necessity. He had ruthlessly destroyed devoted, effective party workers, workers underground in Germany, for instance, when they resisted one of the baffling reversals of the party line. He had let his mistress-secretary be taken off to prison on the vaguest charges, had not lifted a finger to save her from death, because it would have compromised his own political position. For these crimes against humanity, he felt the need of expiation.

And yet when he brought up this question in discussion with the older examiner (who was later himself shot), the latter defined sharply the antitheses with which Spartacus had been faced. "There are only two conceptions of human ethics, and they are at opposite poles." One is Christian, human, Gandhi-esque, sanctifying the individual. This is wonderful for the individual conscience, but it plays politically into the hands of reaction. Gandhi has done more harm to progress in India than the British themselves. It is an anti-vivisectionist morality; out of pity for the dog it prevents the development of serums against cholera,

typhoid, or diphtheria. The other is the course, the logic, that Rubashoff had himself originally followed. Every objection he now made he had heard long ago from others, and answered decisively, and at the end the young examiner refutes all his points with passages from his own work. All that is different is a new feeling of the "I" instead of the "we" in Rubashoff, an oceanic feeling of mystic identity with the universe. But it is not enough, logically, and in the end he confesses.

Like Rubashoff, Koestler apparently still felt, when he finished *Darkness at Noon,* that the most hopeful future lay with the Soviet Union, even though as an individual he had broken with it on moral grounds. There was still room, then, for overwhelming disillusionment when he learned of the German-Russian pact. He came finally to the conclusion expressed in *Scum of the Earth,*

> that a well-meaning dictatorship of the Torquemada-Robespierre-Stalin ascendency was even more disastrous in its effect than a naked tyranny of the Neronian type; that all the parties of the Left had outlived their time, and that one day a new movement was to emerge from the deluge, whose preachers would probably wear monks' cowls and walk barefoot on the roads of a Europe in ruins.

This same idea was developed even more boldly in the article in the *Times* in November, 1943, "We Need a Fraternity of Pessimists." There he declared that a whole historic period, the period of Galileo, Newton, and the ascendancy of reason over spirit had come to an end, and that the enlightened could hope only to preserve oases where the seeds of a new global mood, a new horizontal ferment, could come to birth.

After a succession of adventures and sufferings, told in lively diary jottings in *Scum of the Earth,* Koestler escaped to Portugal, and then, after a period of uncertainty, was admitted to England. Released from brief internment, he went to work for the British government. His new dilemma, foreshadowed in the letters to Colonel Blimp and Comrade Blump at the end of *Scum of the Earth,* finds dramatic expression in *Arrival and Departure.* What springs of action were left, now that he was spiritually alienated from all parties in the world struggle?

Once again Koestler writes a novel that is a fiction, that does not represent his own experience but is a highly selective geometrical demonstration of his antitheses. Where some of the material came from is suggested by his article, "Birth of a Myth," printed in *Horizon* in April, 1943, an account of his friend Richard Hillary, aged 23, the author

of the remarkable novel, *Falling Through Space.* Hillary was one of the group of Englishmen, effete and unpatriotic, disillusioned pacifists or leftists, who in tremendous air battles defeated the young Nazis of Goering's air force, and saved England. Although terribly burned and grotesquely patched together—he is described as Mr. Andrew in *Arrival and Departure*—with his hands mere claws, Hillary continued clumsily to fly until he went down to his inevitable death. "This is the myth," Koestler concludes sententiously, "of the crusade without a cross, and of desperate crusaders in search of a cross. What creed they will adopt, Christ's or Barrabas', remains to be seen."

In *Arrival and Departure,* Koestler takes a young middle-class revolutionary, Peter Slavek, and removes, one after another, his two main reasons for his action. They are the two motives that have already been examined in Rubashoff. The first, the Marxian logic, he had already begun to lose faith in when he was dragged up before the police chief of his Balkan country, an old friend of his father. The chief, talking like Crassus to Spartacus, gave a brilliant analysis, in its own terms, of the weakness of the Communist movement, showed what lay behind the Moscow trials, described the work of his own agents within the party. Still Peter did not yield, did not betray his comrades, not even after prolonged and agonizing tortures.

But in Portugal, after his escape and when he is in conflict over going to join the British army or going off to America with the girl Odette, he suddenly finds his right leg paralyzed. Doctor Sonia, with whom Odette has had a Lesbian relationship, psychoanalyzes him. She discovers that his ability to endure torture grew out of the need for punishment and expiation, which in turn had originated in a forgotten attack with a boathook on his younger brother. With the analysis successfully completed, Peter recovered the use of his leg, and was free at last of the impulses that drove him to action against his beliefs and feelings. He books passage to America.

But still Peter is uncomfortable. He comes off badly—as so often happens with Koestler's heroes—in an argument with a young Nazi. And the wounded British flier remarks to him that to have a completely perfect cause to die for was more of a luxury than anyone could expect. On board the boat, Peter sees a vision of a young proletarian revolutionist he had known in his own country, and rushes ashore just as the boat is

about to leave. Committed to the British cause, he writes a parable on the conscience, and a letter to Odette in which he says you have to act as if you had a faith, even if you haven't, that the age of reason is over, and we must give praise to the unborn God.

Reason has served Koestler's heroes so badly, it has seemed so consistently opposed to their deepest needs and feelings, that his denial of it is understandable. But is it reason that he is discussing, or the narrowing logic of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin? For the Communist of the later Stalinist period, the only function of reason was in applying the line handed down from above to the situation in which he found himself or to the tasks that were assigned him. If he used reason to question the line politically or to modify it so that it would better serve socialist ends or be more consistent with his individual principles, he was ruthlessly excommunicated, tossed not only out of the Party, but out of history itself.

Although he was no longer a Communist, Koestler continued to accept Communism as the political ultimate of this period of history. If you can't be a Communist, then you must swing over to an antipodal individualism, mystic and unrational, and you must wait patiently for a new historic period in which a new kind of game can be played. In the article, "The Yogi and the Commissar," Koestler elaborates the same polar concept that he put in the mouth of the older examiner in *Darkness at Noon*. Either you represent the infrared of Communism or the ultraviolet of mysticism. An attempt to combine them results only in muddle and betrayal of either the cause or the self.

But actually most of the hues in nature and most of human history, of human goodness and achievement lie between. The real task of human reason is not to accept a political line at the expense of all human qualities, but to analyze complex situations, to isolate significant factors, to relate the past to the future, to avoid previous mistakes, to find the right means for achieving the right ends, and above all to mediate, to compromise, between the many and conflicting impulses in the individual and in society.

But in this constant, difficult, "non-committed" use of reason Koestler is not interested. In an article on literature he said that the representative Left novel had length (politics), width (sex), but no depth (the irrational or mystical). And so he puts the irrational into his books, the "oceanic"

feeling of Rubashoff, the praise of the new God by Peter Slavek. But in the rich interplay of multiple elements within the character that makes depth in great novels Koestler's work is deficient. If we forget the relevance of their problems, and look at the human content of these books, we realize how very sparsely furnished they are. Although *Dialogue with Death* is a psychological study, we learn almost nothing from it of Koestler himself, his childhood, his education, his friendships with men and women, his significant memories. And although Peter Slavek is supposed to be undergoing psychoanalysis, in which the whole past is lived through again, we learn of him even less. Koestler's heroes are men uprooted from society, cut off from work, family relationships, nonpolitical associations, and then further separated, as were Spartacus, Rubashoff, Peter Slavek, from their political fellows. Even what comes into their minds is economically selected for its relevance to the question under debate. The irrational does not break out arbitrarily, but takes its well-behaved place in the rational scheme.

Seeing how geometrically bare Koestler's novels are as human experience helps us to realize their historical limitations. Koestler does not feel that the richness and drama of individual experience consist in maintaining, even from hour to hour, a tense balance between the conflicting demands of ever-changing impulses and possibilities, mediating between the self and others, between present and future. And he does not want to see that reason operates historically in the same way. He prefers the polarity of abstractions, of the mutually exclusive. He is not interested in showing that the failure of international communism in the period between the two wars came from its political and philosophic limitations, and that with wider perspectives and more searching use of reason we can profit from its failures in the period ahead.

Koestler's polarities may seem final for a Rubashoff in a Moscow prison, but they are utterly inadequate for an approach to world history. They have meaning for Spartacus in his Sun State, but were these the terms in which Brutus thought, or Augustus, or the Antonines? And how do they apply in American history? Are Jefferson, Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt Yogis or Commissars? Or do they think in terms of both ends *and* means, maintaining a compromise that is never perfect, of course, but that permits them to work within a historical complex to which Koestler's criteria simply do not apply?

It is by no means clear that this is the end of an epoch. It may, on the contrary, be the beginning of a period of world unity, a unity growing out of the international experience of the post-Napoleonic period, and established only with great difficulty and only by drawing fully and rationally on the lessons of that experience. In this significant past the Communist "mystique" was an important element. Koestler's reaction to Communism is understandable emotionally, as is its appeal to those who shared his experience, the burnt-out Marxists, and the fellow-travelers now fallen into political apathy. After the intoxicating vision of complete truth that Communism gave them, they want an equivalent truth, equally final and absolute, which is to be found, of course, only mystically. They do not want to go back to the difficult realm of the complex, the imperfect, the conditional, which is human history. Because he dramatizes so effectively an experience which was significant in our time and may recur again, Koestler is an important figure. But in his abnegation of reason at a moment when we need it most, when we are entering an international period of great danger and great possibilities, he is, I think, a harmful guide and teacher.

DEMOCRACY IN CITY PLANNING

By JOHN T. HOWARD

THE FLURRY OF CURRENT INTEREST in city planning has missed the point—except in some little-read technical magazines. A certain New York parkway-builder screams at the long-haired foreigners and the theorists who dream comprehensive visions of "organic urban living" without regard to American institutions. Their academic defenders reply with "politician," "city-patcher," "Philistine," and charge short-sighted expediency. The public gets the impression that city planning offers either utopias fifty years from now—with no way to get from here to there—or piecemeal-built public works, without any real answer to the human problems of city living.

A useful concept that helps put things in their place has been outlined in *Fortune* articles: city planning needs both "strategy" and "tactics." The strategy is the outlining of broad objectives, long-range goals—the job of the theorists. The tactics is the working out of the step-by-step approach to the goals—the job of the front-line officials who have to act, one way or another, *now*. Sound planning obviously needs both strategy and tactics, and in neither line do we lack *technical* know-how. Saarinen and Moses; Wright and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Mumford and Kaiser—we have plenty of thinkers and plenty of doers in the field of city building.

But still our cities rot and fester. The thinkers think too far ahead; the doers build (the right things and the wrong things indiscriminately) on too small a scale to make much difference. And gradually it is dawning on some of both, that this is a democracy we live in.

The bottleneck in effective city planning is people. Planners make the plans, strategic or tactical; the people build them—or don't—by their votes, and by their individual private decisions. Cities are for people, not the other way round. Cities are also of and by people.

We are gradually coming to realize that, since this is so, people ought to have more to say in the making of city plans. If they can take

a real part, the plans are more likely to be good—and far more likely to get built!

* * *

It's easy to plan a city. All you need is paper, pencils, certain technical skills, a lot of information, and an ivory tower. You lay out a "pattern of land use and population distribution," and design to fit it a series of overlying "systems of utilities and services"—streets, transit, parks, schools, water lines, fire stations. And there you have it—a "guide to the orderly future development of the community"—good or bad, according to the quality of your skill and information.

It's easy to build a city according to a plan, too. All you need is bulldozers, bricks, dirt, space, manpower, money, and organizing ability. In a dictatorship, that is enough. From Egypt down through history to Soviet Russia, cities have been built this way—good or bad, according to the quality of the planning.

In a democracy, fortunately on the whole, it is harder to get either a good or a bad plan built. Your American planner finds that his scheme, thought out as an integrated whole, must be subcontracted for building to a variety of independent responsible agents—park departments, highway departments, school boards; home builders, speculative subdividers, industries, store builders, public utilities. They fall into two broad groups: public agencies, and private individuals and corporations. The first group can be fairly effectively persuaded or dragooned into following a city plan, under our normal machinery of local government—the planning commission with its mandatory referral power and limited veto, the capital improvement budget, and, most important, the planning-conscious mayor and council which are becoming more and more prevalent. The second group presents the real problem. And this is the basic problem; for the private land and development *is* the city—the public works and facilities are only service auxiliaries.

How can we get private citizens—be they home owners, businessmen, industries, or banks—to go along with our city plannnig? Their daily decisions—where and when to build, remodel or move, to subdivide land, to plant trees, even to cut the grass—these things *are* the growth and development of the city. If they can be guided in the direction of a long-range goal, we may achieve the vision of a Saarinen or a Wright.

If they will not be guided, all the parkways of a Moses cannot make a city good to live in.

Three tools have been devised to accomplish this purpose: call them compulsion, education, and participation.

Compulsion is the most direct, and the least successful by itself. This is democratic, self-imposed self-discipline, but compulsion none the less as it affects the individual citizen. Its major city-planning use is zoning, a negative control which prohibits industry in business areas and business in residential areas, limits the height and bulk of buildings and the spaces between them, and sets maximum population densities for different districts. There is no doubt that zoning has done a lot to prevent bad situations from getting much worse, but it has not been effective in promoting positive improvement. Another negative control is subdivision regulation, which sets minimum standards for new allotments. These are both municipal controls; for a number of years, the federal government has also exercised a measure of regulation over new residential construction, through the FHA. This, however, is a lollipop kind of control—your reward for adherence to the standards set being the insurance of your mortgage loan. It has had a remarkable influence toward improved quality of building, which is now far better than what most speculative builders gave us before. But this influence is limited to those builders who choose to ask FHA help.

Compulsion, then, has been a helpful tool in a negative sort of way: it has checked further disorder, set a floor under the standards of certain kinds of development (which has too often become the ceiling), and to some extent channelized development in the right—or planned—direction. But the mild kind of compulsion that is acceptable in a democracy, though it can prohibit the flagrantly wrong things, cannot —and should not—compel private individuals to do whatever a handful of public officials might decree as the only right things.

Education is the second tool on which planners have placed heavy reliance. Since the Wacker Manual of the Chicago Plan was credited with getting Chicago's lakefront built when the schoolboys who studied it reached voting age, planners have been fumbling with the unfamiliar techniques of salesmanship. They are gradually getting more skilful. But results to date are fragmentary and piecemeal.

This approach is an effort on the part of public officials to influence public opinion toward a preconceived objective. Like compulsion, it is fundamentally a procedure from the top down—an attempt to impose by propaganda those features of an ivory-tower plan that cannot be imposed by fiat.

By and large, educational efforts by the planners have not had the results that were expected. Grand plans have been prepared, and lavishly published. Newspapers have said "Oh!" Chambers of Commerce have said "Ah!" Everyone has agreed that the plans were very fine. But somehow they never really belonged to the community; they were too much the private product of the planners. So in cities throughout the country, plans—often good plans—mildew in the files, with only a few popular projects carried out.

But though a generation of propaganda has not caused the building of any complete city plans, it has accomplished something else. The words and some of the concepts of city planning have become familiar to a lot of people. They agree that it is a "good thing"; that it is "much needed"; that it is American and "respectable." The stage is pretty well set for action.

Participation, the third tool, is now appearing—in experimental form, unsure as to technique, but spontantously being tried out in a dozen cities. It is not a substitute for the first two, but a complement. Fundamentally, it is the attempt to bring democracy into city planning: that the people of a community, adequately informed by technicians as to possible alternatives, may choose their own city planning policies, may decide how far they will submit themselves to the self-imposed discipline of legislative compulsion, and how far they will act as individuals and private groups in accordance with their own plans.

There is an important new element in this approach. Before, the *plan* was decided upon *first,* by the technical planners. Then it was brought to the people. It was modified and compromised, of course, in the process of selling it, of persuading the city council to enact parts of it. But this isn't the same thing as helping make the plan in the first place. The new element is to put the *problems* up to the people, *before* the plan is developed. The designing of the plan on paper can then proceed on the basis of their judgments, with the technician comparatively assured that it will be approved and acted on.

This participation technique was not, of course, suddenly invented this morning. It has been maturing for some time. Its germ is evident in the tradition of assigning the planning job not to a solo full-time public official, but to a commission of citizens. We are now recognizing that one reason this form has failed to produce more results is that the citizen participation was not broad enough. What is new is the giving of first place among the tools of planning to the democratic process.

* * *

It's hard to make democracy work. That point needs no laboring. It is particularly hard in big cities, where lie our most acute city-planning problems. They are aggravated by the fact that our metropolitan communities are made up of many independent municipalities, to whose boundaries the planning problems pay no attention.

The greatest difficulty, however, lies in the complexity of the problems, and the fact that plans to meet them must themselves be very complex. They must cover things big and small, property private and public, periods of time from tomorrow to the next century. A City Plan is really a bundle of plans, some in drawings, some in words, some in figures—held together not by a rubber band around the outside, but by a strong cord of related thinking running through them all.

To illustrate: major highways must be planned as a metropolitan network, to handle efficiently great traffic volumes. The system must be keyed to other transportation systems, mass transit, railroads, airports. It must be designed to serve industry, business, residential concentrations —where they are now, and where they will be in the future. The new highways must be straight and broad—freeways, expressways, parkways —veritable auto railways. But they must be so laid out that they don't smash neighborhoods, the vital cells, the subcommunities of the city; so that they don't spread blight, but check it; so that they don't wastefully drain people out of older areas beyond the need to relieve excessive crowding.

Other systems of region-wide facilities and services likewise need a combination of over-all and localized co-ordination. These, the dramatic products of city planning that make the best rotogravure pictures, are public responsibilities, built by public agencies. It takes merely the normal operations of political democracy to get them planned and built. Not

that the process is automatic, or always gets good results—but it is a familiar process and needs no elaborate descripton.

The organic parts of the city that are nourished by these "systems" of public services present entirely different planning problems. These are the industrial areas, the business districts, the residential neighborhoods—made up of thousands of individual properties, each the kingdom of its owner. It is in conforming this chaos to a plan that compulsion has been negatively helpful—that education has been useful in preparing the way—that participation is proving the primary essential.

Here, city planning operates at two "levels": city-wide, and neighborhood. There is the over-all scheme of development, allotting the different sections of the city to the different functions: industries of varying types where they best belong, business in the right spots, houses and apartments in appropriate locations. Then each of these districts, the cells that make up the body of the city, needs its own development-scheme. So the "bundle of plans" consists of comprehensive plans for each neighborhood, co-ordinated by the city-wide plans.

Participation in the planning, then, must also operate at two levels. Both in the city-wide and in the neighborhood planning the planner must pull into the process each of the interests which will have a part in carrying out the plans.

In the city-wide job, the participation has to be through representatives. Public officials—city councilmen, suburban mayors—represent geographical areas throughout the metropolitan unit. They have to be in on the ground floor, in the broad geographical decisions (to be given authority through the zoning laws that they will enact) that such and such an area will be heavy industry, or single-family houses, or apartments. The interests, the pressure groups, that will directly benefit or suffer from such decisions have to be in on them too. Because, properly enough, elected officials pay serious attention to the wishes of those who elect them as well as to those whom they hire to advise them on technical matters.

So representatives of special interests have to be given a share in planning counsels. This has never been easier than today, because never before have so many of these groups been aware of their stake in city planning. Every organization has its planning committee: real estate boards, chambers of commerce, professional societies of architects and

engineers, retail merchants, bankers' associations, women's clubs, labor unions, social workers, churches, parent-teacher associations. And to take in those individuals whose interests don't fit into any of these, most big cities have citizen organizations whose sole concern is city planning or housing, as such.

It isn't enough for these groups to hear speeches on planning, to pass resolutions and attend public hearings. It isn't enough for them merely to pass judgment on the work of the planning technicians. They each have a genuine contribution to make. They *know* what they will or will not do to carry out a plan. They may be "wrong" about what "ought" to be done. But a practical plan has to be in terms of what can be done.

If investors won't make loans for new apartments in a slum area under any conditions, under any plan, then there is no point in "planning" to have that area cleared and rebuilt by private enterprise. But if they can be led to say under what conditions they will make loans, and the plan of the slum area can be made to meet those conditions, then that plan becomes practical.

This is an oversimplified—but actual—example of the give-and-take that leads to effective planning. What is "practical" for a given investor in a given small area for the next five years may not be "practical" for the entire community over the next twenty years. Stuyvesant Town (a large-scale private slum-clearance project to be built postwar in New York) is charged with being such a case—good tactics, based on bad (or no) strategy. The answer is not "purer" planning, but a broader give-and-take, on strategy as well as tactics; more democracy, not less.

The method worked out for Cleveland was formally to set up a citizen Advisory Committee, as a working adjunct to the Planning Commission. Its membership is representative. Every civic, business, or professional group named a member. It is not a rubber stamp, hand-picked to endorse the Commission's proposals; it is expected really to advise, and its advice carries weight. Its subcommittees on special subjects are self-constituted, and they really work. Plans are presented to them, studied, torn apart, revised. When a proposal—like the one above for rebuilding a certain slum area—after much revision finally gets the nod from the Advisory Committee, it has been thoroughly aired in the newspapers, thrashed out in meetings of individual organizations, sub-

jected to the widest possible discussion and understanding. It can be adopted by the Planning Commission with some assurance that it is practical and realizable. It doesn't please everyone, but it comes as near as possible to being the community's own answer to one of its own problems.

A city-wide, comprehensive development plan takes a long time to put together this way. In fact, it will never be "finished"; as long as the city is alive, its view of the future will keep changing as yesterday's future becomes tomorrow's present. And it is still just the general framework, the fitting together of the plans for each of the city's neighborhoods. Each of them requires the same kind of democratic operation.

* * *

The machinery for neighborhood participation in neighborhood planning is usually not ready to the planner's hand, as it is for city-wide participation. In fact, when he goes looking for it, he runs head on into the conditions—sociological, economic—that have made a mess of our cities. The very things that are wrong with our neighborhoods get in the way of effective planning.

The first difficulty is to find the neighborhoods. It is convenient to theorize about the organic cellular structure of a city, but when you come to try to pin it down on a map it just isn't there. The theoretical neighborhood unit, a social community with distinct physical boundaries and all the local facilities for good living, is a city-planning objective; but not even its extent on a map is clearly defined as a starting point.

Your planner takes all the measures he can find of likeness and difference—ward lines, nationality groupings, economic classifications, school districts; major streets, railroad lines, and other physical boundaries. By juggling these enough, he may arrive at the vague outlines of what may some day be a rational organization of the city area into neighborhoods. But he can't be sure till he's tried. That means getting together with neighborhood people, and working with them on their planning problems.

The trial cannot be approached the same way for all of these potential neighborhoods. In fact, a rough analysis sorts them out into four different types, each requiring a different kind of planning. The four types tend to be arranged in concentric rings around the downtown center. Counting

from the outside inward, they can be identified in homely language as coming, arrived, going, and gone.

The "coming" neighborhoods are the suburban territory which is in process of being converted from country to city. If they can be caught in time, before the farms are cut into lots and the houses built, they can be designed in advance as neighborhoods of a modern standard. But participation from the future inhabitants is impossible, because the planning must be done before they move in. The effective responsibility lies with city and village governments, working with the developers.

Except in rare instances, such planning is not being done today. These "coming" areas are usually outside the boundaries of the central city, beyond the reach of the revitalized city planning agencies that have been scared into action by intown blight. We face the sad postwar prospect of a splurge of suburban fringe development, badly planned or unplanned, wasteful of public services and utilities, wasteful of private development funds, insecure of investment values, poor in quality of living conditions. The seeds of blight two decades hence are being built into our "coming" neighborhoods.

The "arrived" neighborhoods are sound according to average standards; they have been built up since the last war, and are still "new" —though far from "modern." It is too late for drastic replanning. Their need is for protection. These are the districts for which zoning has done the most; they are free from scattered industries and stores, fairly uniform in character. Already they are being attacked by demands for lowering zoning standards. But an active vigilance can meet their problems.

These are areas where "neighborhood protective associations" are easily formed, or are already in existence. They are often in small suburbs, where the municipal government is itself not much more than an official neighborhood association. The people are generally awake to what helps or hurts living conditions and property values. It is not too difficult to fit into the city-wide plan the "arrived" neighborhoods and their plans—which are usually plans to stay the way they are.

The "going" and "gone" neighborhoods present our cities' greatest planning problems. What to do about "gone" areas has filled popular and technical magazines with spectacular schemes. Stuyvesant Town in New York is one answer; public housing is another. The common denominator is the clearing of the slums that have deteriorated beyond

saving and the building of new housing on a large enough scale to establish a new *neighborhood* pattern. This means big operations, backed up with authority and large amounts of capital.

In this job, neighborhood participation is out. People who live in hopeless slums are at the bottom of the economic ladder. There is no way that they can take, or be given, a direct hand in planning the clearing and rebuilding of their neighborhoods, which has to be done either by big private money or by government, or by a combination of the two. Citizen participation in such action can only be through political action. To the extent that city, state, and federal public action is necessary, all citizens have a responsibility to see that proper political steps are taken; for the economic and social health of the entire city require this job to be done. And it is generally agreed that the people who live in these areas must be helped to provide themselves with decent housing, as a part of the rebuilding plan, whether on the same spot or somewhere else.

The "going" neighborhoods remain—the forgotten areas, not bad enough to warrant clearance, not good enough to keep people living there by merely protecting existing conditions. The going neighborhoods cover most of the area of our American cities and house most of the people. Yet most of the talk and writing on city planning leaves them out entirely.

This is not strange, for they are the toughest problem of all—and the least dramatic.

They are technically tough; the making of the plans is difficult. The task is not designing from scratch, as in "coming" areas, nor redesigning practically from scratch, as in "gone" areas, nor mere maintenance of tolerably adequate conditions, as in "arrived" areas. It is remodeling, on a neighborhood scale—saving most of what is there, houses, stores, pavements, utilities; modernizing and patching in new facilities to bring an obsolete environment up to date.

Added to the sheer difficulty of designing a workable plan to do this, is the fact that it is the most difficult kind of plan to bring to realization. You are not dealing with big suburban developers or intown redevelopers, the best of whom recognize the importance of planning to safeguard their investments, nor with individual owners who know they have something good and want to keep it. You are dealing with many individual owners who think what they have is not so good, whose

tradition is to move out to something better when they can afford it; with absentee landlords, milking their property as they see values go down, instead of trying to save their investments. Yet it is in these very areas that the participation of individual owners—in doing as well as in planning—is absolutely essential.

Now picture your planner, going out to find somebody to "participate" in what he is trying to do. He has the neighborhood pattern of the city marked out, and classified into the four pigeonholes. In three of them, his approach to neighborhood planning is fairly clear, even though he may not be succeeding too well in all of them at the moment. But in the fourth, he flounders.

He is looking for neighborhood leaders. He is probably looking for you; if you live in a city, the chances are 4 to 1 you are in a "going" area. He often doesn't find any neighborhood life, any sense of community. People don't know their neighbors. They don't feel any common problem. Home-ownership is rarely as high as fifty per cent. People have no roots; they are ready to move across town or out of town in an instant. Other than a vague dissatisfaction, they don't know what is wrong with their neighborhood. And worst of all, they don't realize that it may be possible to make it better, to make it worth settling into.

This instability is both cause and effect. People don't care, so they let houses run down. They don't care enough to insist that they get good public services like rubbish collection, let alone good public facilities like traffic-safe streets and adequate playgrounds, or proper public protection against blighting invasions through strict zoning. And the cause of their unwillingness to accept community responsibility is the effect of past generations of irresponsibility.

So your planner finds himself turning into a combination YMCA secretary and Chautauqua lecturer. He gropes for any evidence of neighborhood leadership; he experiments, and finds a different handle to grasp in each part of town. In Cleveland, we have been groping for a year, and a few of the matches we have struck have kindled small hopeful fires.

Vague generalities about "neighborhood improvement" get nowhere. If you can get a group to listen, it is easy to rouse a flash of dissatisfaction by pointing out what needs doing—a playground; a bypass to keep trucks off streets of homes; protection from nuisance industries. But to

maintain the steady heat that will lead owners to put real money into house repairs, or follow through on a petition to the city council, you have to show some results, quickly. It doesn't matter what, but you have to prove that neighborhood co-operation can really mean neighborhood improvement.

In our furthest advanced experiment, this worked. We picked an area, a few blocks set off by main streets, peopled by a strong nationality group. The local councilman told us with whom to start. We got the Civilian Defense leaders, who had been very active and wanted something to go on with, to call a meeting. The parish priest caught the idea quickly, and has been the spark plug. The people, slow to respond, decided juvenile delinquency was their problem, and a playground the first answer.

A petition to a co-operative city recreation department brought the lease, equipment, and supervision of a vacant industrial site. This was in June. Later, signs were put up warning trucks off their streets. Only now, in November, are we beginning to talk zoning (the area needs drastic changes). But the picture is beginning to unfold; the people are grasping the idea that the future of their district is in their own hands. They are recognizing the help city planners can give, but see too that the plan—their plan—is also theirs to carry out. And they are proud to be our first experiment in neighborhood conservation.

Other areas take different methods. The local priest or minister is a good bet; in some neighborhoods, he can be especially helpful in getting people to listen. Civilian Defense machinery clicks in one district, and is weak in another. A councilman with vision will seize on the whole program as a sure-fire way to perpetuate himself in office through genuine neighborhood service. Another will resent what seems like an intrusion into the political affairs of his private bailiwick. A parent-teachers association may be fruitful ground, or a local businessmen's group. Nationality organizations, service clubs, settlement houses—any *local* group may hold the leader who will be the spark plug, the man who will have the time and capacity to develop and sustain effective local activity.

Rarely, there will be an existing community organization that can assume the job as a going concern. We have one, fostered for several years by a branch librarian, whose area includes the five blocks recently devastated by a gas-tank explosion and fire. It is functioning now, as

the channel for ideas back and forth between the city planners and the burnt-out families. It is our main assurance that we can make a rebuilding plan that will work.

The material is there. We have found an astonishing capacity to grasp long-range, complex concepts where we least expected it. We have met a vitality and initiative that has made us take neighborhoods out of the "gone" pigeonhole and promote them, with real hope that they can be saved by the people that live there. Local leadership is waiting, to be uncovered, to be shown how. We are at the beginning of a long pull, with not much yet to show; but we are convinced that our "going" areas can come back. It takes education; it takes compulsion; but most of all it takes participation.

* * *

The bottleneck in effective city planning is people. That bottleneck can be broken. But not by splashing superhighways across the newspapers, or dreaming visions of the Ideal City of 1970. The problem of city planning lies where people live. They can be led to the solutions of the problem—in its big aspects and its little aspects—only by making city planning come alive to them, making it literally come home to them.

Most city people live in old houses, in old areas. This will be so, as far ahead as we can see. Be as optimistic as possible about new houses in the suburbs, new homes in cleared slums. At the best building rate conceivable, in 1960 three out of every four families will still be living in houses from 20 to 60 years old and older. City planning stands or falls by its success in making these neighborhoods good places to live. Stable investments, property values, costs of public service, tax rates, efficient business and industry, all hinge in succession on our ability to remodel our cities. Good neighborhoods—good "old" neighborhoods—are the blocks with which we must build.

City planning can be effective. But not with the planner as a prima donna. He is just one of the newer mechanics on the crew that makes the machinery of democratic government produce results. Though some of his tools are still unfamiliar, he is fast learning that democracy works.

SUPERSENIORITY—POSTWAR PITFALL

By AARON LEVENSTEIN

WE ARE ACTING OUT the prologue to what is likely to be one of the major tragedies in American history. Our natural instincts of gratitude inevitably lead us to promise the veteran everything from jobs to college degrees — we are signing blank checks against the future though our account is already heavily overdrawn. That would be serious enough, but we are magnifying the disillusionment inherent in an inadequate system of veterans' re-employment rights by twisting it completely out of shape in order to use it as a weapon against part of our civilian population, the trade unions. Our position is rendered even more desperate by the fact that any word of criticism, any suggestion for establishing a sound re-employment law, is promptly misrepresented as an attack on veterans.

The plain fact is that the present law applies only to a small percentage of the veterans and that, as interpreted by Selective Service, it may even result in discrimination against many veterans. We shall pay a heavy price in terms of social disunity as a result of the blundering.

Seemingly, Selective Service's Division of Re-employment is going all out for the veteran. By omission and commission, it has put itself on record as favoring every possible extension of the veterans' right to re-employment. Thus it has refused to give precise definitions of what veterans were "permanent" employees and therefore entitled to their old job; but one effect is to make it easier for servicemen to be considered "temporary" employees, not protected by the re-employment provisions of the act. On the other hand, it has interpreted the law to mean that veterans must be rehired without regard to seniority — even if that necessitates firing a worker with greater seniority. Apparently Selective Service is not aware that, by destroying the seniority of civilian workers, it has also destroyed the seniority accumulated by veterans before they entered the service.

It is not hard to understand how this happened. In fact, it is almost possible to date the beginning of this strange development. In January, 1944, the leading newspapers of the country carried full-page advertisements inserted by the Timken Roller Bearing Company with these bold titles: "THEY OFFER THEIR ALL! CAN WE OFFER TOO MUCH? The Timken Roller Bearing Company proposes seniority rights to every employee for double the time spent in military service."[1]

Seniority is an old institution in American industrial relations. The courts have come to acknowledge it as a property right, subject to protection by legal process. This right, which workers acquire by length of service with their employer, may be used, for union and nonunion workers alike, as one of the factors in promotion and layoff. But it is not an abstract, absolute right; it is measured only in relative terms. An employee's seniority is valuable only in relation to the years of employment that his fellow workers can show. To change the status of one employee on the ladder of seniority may push every other worker down one rung. Timken could not have been unaware that its generous gesture to the veterans was to be paid for by its employees.

Cynics who read the advertisement saw in it an attack on unionism. Obviously, the application of double seniority, in a period of postwar employment contraction, would mean the substitution of veterans for union members. All this was on the theory that veterans would be antilabor, under the influence of the propaganda that had been spurred by the small number of strikes that have occurred. There was—and is—reason to believe that the propaganda has had its fruits. Indeed, the Army itself, in the interests of morale, has found it necessary to counteract the effects. "Fact Sheet No. 29," sent out to Army Orientation Officers, emphasizes the following:

> Two opinions rather widely held by soldiers are responsible for considerable "anti-civilian" feeling. They are: (1) That war production is being seriously hampered by labor disputes. (2) That war workers are living in luxury on huge wages. The serious thing about these opinions is that they are misconceptions based probably on inadequate access to factual material.
>
> This Fact Sheet contains material which will help the Orientation Officer to clear up any misconception his men have on this matter and direct their hatred against the enemy instead of the home front.

The Fact Sheet reports mildly that "the prominence given in the press

[1] *New York Times*, January 8, 1944.

to accounts of strikes has sometimes tended to overshadow the positive achievement of labor in the war effort."

Conflict between veteran and civilian is one of the inevitable by-products of war itself. Obviously war entails unequal sacrifice, a fact which by itself would explain hostility between the returning ex-serviceman and the folks who stayed behind. In an economy which does not have room for both, the conflict is likely to become deep-rooted and may even be fatal to the nation's domestic peace. The veteran is certain to come back with a sense of grievance against the world and against his countrymen. The civilian, no matter how much he contributed to the winning of the war, will not be able to escape his own sense of guilt in relation to the veteran. That does not mean that the civilian will give way graciously to the veteran. More likely, his sense of guilt will only serve to stiffen his resolve to defend his own and his family's economic interest. It would be unrealistic not to recognize that those who are determined to launch an assault on unionism have a ready instrument in this potential conflict between the veteran and the worker. During the war, we have experienced comparative industrial peace; with the coming of peace, we shall witness a resumption of industrial warfare. It may well be that in the long run the veteran will turn against industry which does not give him a job, but his first feeling is likely to be hostile to the civilian worker who has a head-start in the race for postwar jobs.

Sound national leadership must seek to minimize the points of friction between the 15,000,000 who will have seen military service and the 55,000,000 who have rendered economic service.

But far from doing that, Selective Service has picked up the Timken plan, though industry very wisely rejected it, and has magnified its advice by multiplying "double seniority" into an absolute or "super-seniority." Instead of attempting to reduce the intensity of the inescapable conflict between veteran and civilian, it has chosen needlessly to bring about a head-on collision right at the nation's most tender spot—employment. In doing so, it threatens not only the national peace of mind but injures the civilian and the veteran alike, and consequently the people as an entity.

II

Section 8 of the Selective Service Act as passed in 1940 provides that any person who left a job in order to go into service must be re-employed

if these conditions are met: (1) if his job was other than temporary; (2) if he was not dishonorably discharged; (3) if he is still qualified to perform the duties of his position; (4) if he reapplies for the job within 40 days after his discharge. But this does not hold if the "employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to rehire."

The terms on which the rehiring is to take place are fairly explicit: "If such position was in the employ of a private employer, such employer shall restore such person to such position or to a position of like seniority, status and pay." Congress' purpose is further clarified by an additional paragraph which says:

> Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions [of the act] shall be considered as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of training and service in the land or naval forces, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer, pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time such person was inducted into such forces, and shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration.

On this language, Selective Service bases its ruling that employers must discharge senior workers to make room for returning veterans. Thus it has formally declared in Local Board Memorandum 190-A, issued May 20, 1944: "A returning veteran is entitled to reinstatement in his former position or one of like seniority, status and pay, even though such reinstatement necessitates the discharge of a non-veteran with greater seniority." But in the same memorandum, Selective Service makes this contradictory statement: "In the administration of the Act, the Selective Service system takes the position that the seniority of a person in the service accumulates during such service *to the same extent and in the same manner as if such person had remained in continuous employment.*" It is difficult to see how an individual can acquire super-seniority—seniority beyond that of all civilian workers no matter how long they have been in the plant—and at the same time be defined as having acquired seniority "to the same extent and in the same manner" as if he had remained in continuous employment.

The fact is that as between the two positions taken simultaneously by Selective Service, there can be no question as to which was intended

by Congress when it enacted the law. The legislative history of the Congressional discussions demonstrates that Congress never intended any such policy as Selective Service has announced. Originally, the Selective Service Act contained no provision at all for re-employment. When first presented to Congress, the conscription law contemplated only a year of peacetime service, after which the individual selectee would return to his job. At that time Congress did not foresee that selectees might be away from their jobs for four or five years. Even so Congress was hesitant. After the Austin-Wadsworth Bill was introduced, an amendment was offered which provided for an expression of opinion by Congress that veterans ought to be re-employed. This was merely the voicing of a hope and contained no compulsion whatever.

The testimony presented by the sponsors of the legislation reveals a completely different outlook from that now expressed by Selective Service. For example, General William E. Shedd, Assistant Chief of Staff, appearing for General Marshall, was questioned about job protection under the law:

> *Mr. Smith.* Does the War Department feel that there should be any provision attempting to give any preference in re-employment of men who have gone through military service of this type; that is, an attempt either as applied to Government service or any attempt to protect employment of men in private industry?
>
> *General Shedd.* Yes; we do. In this conference that I spoke about, where we arrived at certain changes in the bill, we introduced in that proposed bill—which I shall be very glad to put in the record—a section which provided that it was the intent of Congress or the sense of the Congress that the man should be re-employed upon completion of his year's training.[2]

A committee member pursued the matter further. Representative Clason asked: "Now, as I understand it, the amendment which you are about to suggest is merely a statement of desire, and has no legal value, is that right?" General Shedd replied: "That is correct; yes, sir." Representative Wadsworth, co-author of the bill, declared: "The authors of that amendment reach the conclusion, first that the Congress has no power to compel an employer to employ any given person. It cannot reach that far into the Constitution, as I understand it." Chairman Andrew J. May of the House Military Affairs Committee thereupon stated: "The Chair agrees with you." Mr. Wadsworth continued:

[2]Hearing Before the House Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 10132, p. 78.

"Congress can, however, express its hope and intent, and while some may regard that merely as a sop, I think it is far more than a sop."

But sop it was, and public pressure continued to insist that the amendment which called for veteran re-employment merely "as the purpose and intent of the Congress" be scrapped and mandatory legislation enacted. The result was the provision now in the law which has been quoted above. And in the few decisions that have been handed down by the courts, the constitutionality of the law has been upheld.

The Selective Service officials charged with administering the law point to these court decisions as authorizing their own peculiar interpretations of what the law means. Thus, Colonel Paul H. Griffith, chief of the Veterans Personnel Division of Selective Service, cites the following judicial language as justification for superseniority: "Every consideration of fairness and justice makes it imperative that the statute should be construed as liberally as possible, so that the military service should entail no greater setback in the private pursuit or career of the returning soldier than is unavoidable."[3] Nothing in that language says that the law is intended to give the veteran greater employment rights than he would have enjoyed if he had not been drafted. Colonel Griffith has based his interpretation on the idea that Congress intended to give the veteran added advantage. Addressing a meeting of the National Industrial Conference Board, he has said: "Congress thought a veteran ought to have more than he would have had if he had stayed at home. . . . I think everyone will agree that the man who offers his life in the service of his country is entitled to superseniority."[4] But already the courts have expressed themselves on just what Congress intended:

> The whole context of the statute and the purpose for which it became the law was to minimize, insofar as possible, the sacrifices of those who were required to enter the military service by assuring them that their jobs, their pay, and their status with their employers would be held inviolate and secured to them *in order that they might return to the status quo* if they made application within 40 days after they severed their connection with the military forces.[5]

As a matter of statutory interpretation, there is no validity in the attempt of Selective Service to read superseniority into the re-employment

[3]Kay v. General Cable Corp., CCA-3, 144 F. (2d) 653.

[4]"Seniority and Re-employment of Veterans." Studies in Personnel Policy, No. 65. National Industrial Conference Board, p. 7.

[5]Hall v. Union Light, Heat and Power Co., E.D.C., Ky., 53 F. Supp. 817.

provisions of the act. The phraseology is clear enough. The Law Committee of the Association of American Railroads points out that Selective Service's position "is not supported by any direct language of the statute," and adds:

> The use in the statute of the verb "restore" lends support to our position. The statute provides that the employer "shall restore such person to such position or to a position of like seniority, status and pay." The use of the word "restore" is hardly appropriate if the Congressional intent were that the veteran should be established in a position of superior seniority or status. The words "position of like seniority" cannot mean "of superior seniority." The statutory provision "to a position of like seniority" is ineptly worded in that seniority does not attach to a position but to the individual. Since "like" is used in the sense of "equal," the statute should be considered as though it read "to a position equal to that to which his accrued seniority entitles him."

But even if there is no legal justification for the Selective Service interpretation, it might well be that it is grounded in good social and economic reasoning. In that case, it would be proper for Selective Service to address itself to Congress and call for amendment of the act to grant superseniority to veterans. The nation could examine the facts and determine whether it is desirable to revise the law. In any event, the attempt of Selective Service to legislate for itself should not lightly be ignored—particularly on an issue so heavily charged with emotion and so dangerous to the nation's desire for national unity in meeting the challenges of postwar life.

III

An examination of the social and economic factors involved in superseniority is certainly now in order, particularly since every segment of the national community has expressed opposition to the whole concept —industry, labor, and the academic world. Briefly, their argument is that the consequences will be disastrous when measured in social and economic terms.

Mention has been made above of the conflict already brewing between veteran and civilian. Come what may, there would be smoldering, unfocused mass resentment against those who stayed home, but it is superseniority that can concentrate the heat and rouse the flames. As originally written by Congress, the re-employment provisions were intended to assure the veteran that he would get his own job back; as

interpreted by Selective Service the law would give the veteran someone else's job. No other conclusion is possible from the fact that, under Local Board Memorandum 190-A, the veteran walks in and the worker, who was in the plant years before the veteran ever applied for a job, must walk out to make room.

The danger lies in the fact that this is the promise of Selective Service, but on the basis of its own figures only a comparatively small number have any re-employment rights. "We are talking about only 19 or 20 per cent of ten or twelve million men," says Colonel Griffith. That means that at most two and a half million have re-employment rights. In itself this is a sorry confession of inepitude in the law. To a large extent, the tragically low figure is due to Selective Service's interpretation of the term "temporary" which denies rehiring to many who gave long service to their employers. For this deficiency, Selective Service has attempted to compensate with superseniority. In public discussions, Selective Service spokesmen have implied that the unions are seeking to keep veterans out of jobs—and this despite the fact that veterans are in many cases union members. On the contrary, the unions have been demanding that Selective Service follow the definitions of "temporary" as contained in collective bargaining agreements. If anything, the effect would be to enlarge considerably the number of veterans who would be eligible for re-employment. Furthermore, the history of recent collective bargaining negotiations shows that the unions are trying to expand the reinstatement rights of veterans. The files of dispute cases before the War Labor Board show that unions are attempting to expand the reinstatement rights of veterans. In one case, for example, the board, on the insistence of the union, increased from 40 to 60 days the time allowed for the returning serviceman to reapply for his former job.[6] In another case, the union demanded that returning veterans who report for work within 60 days after discharge but who are physically unable to take up their duties be given a special "rehabilitation leave" up to one year, renewable at the end of the year. Provision was made for full seniority unless the veteran takes a job elsewhere. Significantly the board disregarded the company's objection that this approach goes beyond

[6]Retail Grocers Association, San Francisco RWLB, Case No. 111-3182 (10-D-253), March, 1944.

prevailing Selective Service rules.[7] In many cases, the unions have demanded that disabled veterans, no longer fit for their old jobs, be assigned to more suitable work, if available.[8] Selective Service simply has no provision for the re-employment of these most deserving veterans.

The unions have in fact gone a long way to aid the veterans. But the AFL and the CIO joined with the Veterans of Foreign Wars in a formal agreement supplementing the Selective Service Act to the advantage of servicemen. Veterans will be credited with seniority rights corresponding to the length of their military service after September 1, 1940—even in new jobs. Under Selective Service's superseniority, the veteran who takes on a new position—and Colonel Griffith's figures show that this covers the overwhelming majority—has no seniority rights at all. To any unjaundiced eye, it is apparent that the unions are proving to be more effective in protecting veterans' job rights than Selective Service, the governmental arm.

In terms of the number of veterans benefited by the two approaches, it is obvious that superseniority has less to offer. Yet the unions remain the target of superseniority as Selective Service goes about the mischief of ranging veteran squarely against civilian worker.

In still another way, superseniority is a direct danger to the veteran himself. Where a veteran has re-employment rights, he automatically has uncontested seniority rights. But by nullifying seniority through the device of superseniority, Selective Service has destroyed seniority as between veterans. If the number of jobs has shrunk in the plant and there is room for only one in a given job classification, the first veteran to return must be rehired without regard to seniority (according to Selective Service) and the veteran who comes back later, even though he has greater seniority, may be left out in the cold. Local Board Memorandum 190-A reads: "A veteran who has been reinstated to his former position cannot within one year be displaced by another, on the ground that the latter has greater seniority rights." In place of the seniority principle, Selective Service thus substitutes accident and does an injustice to the men who stay on longest in military service. In the

[7]Toledo Pipe Threading Machine Company, Cleveland RWLB, Case No. 111-4596-D (5-D-473), March 7, 1944.

[8]Columbia Machinery and Engineering Corp., Cleveland RWLB, Case No. 111-7191-D (5-D-750), August 22, 1944.

case of World War I veterans, a similar injustice is done: employers are ordered to discharge them if necessary to open up jobs to World War II veterans with less seniority.

Such considerations have led to considerable dismay among all sections of the community concerned with the veterans' welfare. Omar V. Ketchum, National Legislative Representative and Rehabilitation Director of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, has declared bluntly that the superseniority ruling "would wreck existing union seniority systems —and in the end veterans would thus be left with practically no protection at all. The best and fairest method is that provided for in union contracts—under which returning soldiers regain their former seniority, plus accumulated seniority for the time they were in uniform. That means a square deal all around."

But by far the most serious consequence to the veteran himself is the fact that superseniority will cause dislocation in the economy and may even reduce the total number of jobs available after the war. Anything that interferes with the goal of maximum employment must necessarily be a direct blow to the job-seeking serviceman. A study of the problem prepared by the Industrial Relations Section of Princeton University, not altogether sympathetic to the idea of seniority itself, declares:

> In their effort to assure adequate protection of the discharged veteran, the Selective Service Administration has developed a notion of "absolute seniority" which goes far beyond the concept of relative rights based on accumulated service which has grown up in industry. If this notion prevails, many mature and competent employees will lose their positions by legal fiat. It is questionable whether the veteran group, as a whole, will gain as much in security as the wage earners they displace will lose.[9]

When the superseniority provisions were issued by Selective Service in May, 1944, there was silence from industry. It was not until September that business circles finally began to express themselves. Their criticisms came haltingly, largely because they feared the accusation of being anti-veteran. Finally, the *Journal of Commerce* opened up discussion with a front-page story under the headlines: "Superseniority For War Veterans

[9]"Seniority Problems During Demobilization and Reconversion" by Frederick H. Harbison. Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics and Social Institutions, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., 1944. The language quoted is from the foreword by J. Douglas Brown, Director.

Held Unworkable. Concern as to Soundness of Selective Service Rule Voiced by Industry." The article challenged "the workability of the policy of Selective Service in granting superseniority to returning war veterans." It pointed out that in some industries "application of the superseniority rule will deprive employers of the service of many skilled workers, for want of whom reconversion and re-employment may be retarded."[10] What disturbs industry is the fact that in order to make room for the veterans, it may be forced to surrender the very men who were deferred as "irreplaceable" by Selective Service itself. The result would be a reduction in total operations with a harmful effect on total employment.

The question has come up in a different form before the Shipbuilding Commission of the War Labor Board. Ironically, it was a union which raised the issue by calling for wider veterans' re-employment rights. The union's request was denied on the following grounds:

> The requested provision might well result in the displacement of all employees other than military veterans (assuming that by the end of the war total inductions of former employees will at least be equal to the number of positions which will thereafter be available in the yard). Moreover, many of the re-employed veterans would be employed in classifications in which they had no experience and for which they might have little aptitude, thus seriously affecting the efficiency of the working force.[11]

The same factors are likely to operate in the case of superseniority. While the veteran may be qualified for the job, his skills will be rusty and the relative effect on output will be heightened as men with greater seniority are forced out.

This is hardly an academic question. The West Coast aircraft industry is confronted with a serious problem. Before the war, it employed some 30,000 workers; since the war about 100,000 men have passed through the plants into the armed forces. The industry estimates that the veterans who will return with full employment rights may amount to twice as many workers as were found in the plants during the peak prewar year of 1940. In view of the industry's anticipated drop in production, only veterans can be employed in the West Coast plants, if Selective Service has its way.

But Selective Service is not without a reply. Up its sleeve it has the the provision, contained in the act itself, which makes it unnecessary to

[10] *Journal of Commerce*, September 20, 1944.

[11] Sullivan Drydock and Repair Corporation, Case No. 111-3156-D, February 25, 1944.

rehire if "the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do." Those circumstances have been left undefined, and Selective Service declares that it will pass upon the problem only on a case by case basis. This lack of clarity, however, and the failure of Selective Service to act where clarification is necessary must inevitably result in disillusionment for veterans who are ultimately barred from reinstatement by "changed circumstances."

IV

The origin of the superseniority issue raised by Selective Service in its Local Board Memorandum 190-A lies in an anticipation of unemployment to come. It is based on the assumption that America's economy, despite its vast resources, cannot absorb both civilians and veterans once it has returned to "normalcy." The truth is that if we assume there won't be enough jobs—if plants are allowed to close down or decimate their working force—the veteran will be out of luck, just the same as his civilian brother. It is impossible to build an island of security for the veteran in the midst of depression. The only fundamental answer is to bring the veteran home to an economy in which there are jobs—not to a setup in which he has superseniority on a job that isn't there. The basic solution is full employment—for civilian and veteran alike.

Failing that, we are certain to see a civil war between the veteran and the civilian. It is not a mere figure of speech to say that the returning serviceman will be fighting his father, his older married brother, the widow of his former buddy. That is literally true in one-industry towns where the returning veteran can directly displace his father or brother who worked side by side with him before the war. That would indeed be a fine reward for the veteran after his military service: a grateful country gives him the privilege of disemploying others.

But even if we show ourselves lacking in the wisdom needed to create a full employment economy, there is no reason to make the veteran the victim of a re-employment program that is economically unsound, confused in its definitions, and lacking in sound administrative machinery. To begin with, whatever benefits Selective Service can achieve are durable for only one year; the veteran needs more permanent protection such as he can achieve only through unionism. Far from undermining union organization, the would-be benefactors should seek

to strengthen and uphold it in its efforts to extend, not narrow, legislative protection for the veteran.

The most immediate steps that must be taken to strengthen the law are these:

1. The veteran must be given more time than the present 40 days in which to protect his re-employment rights by applying for reinstatement. Legislation along this line is probable, with Selective Service itself urging an extension to 90 days.

2. The real loopholes in the law must be closed: the terms "permanent" and "temporary" must be defined and there must be a careful description of the so-called "unreasonable circumstances" which justify a refusal to rehire.

3. There must be a strict insistence—made necessary by the confusion created by Selective Service—on the maintenance of seniority for veterans and civilians so that the reabsorption of returning employees can take place without injury to production.

4. A well-geared machinery for enforcing re-employment must be created by establishing a Veterans Re-employment Board with regional offices and tripartite representation for management, labor, and veteran groups.

5. The Board must be empowered to issue reinstatement orders—comparable to those of the National Labor Relations Board—which can be enforced through court decree, instead of requiring suit to be brought in the name of the individual veteran.

Instead of pursuing a course that is baneful to management and labor alike, constructive action is available.

Yank, the Army weekly, reveals that some of our servicemen are beginning to worry about the future of our national unity. "It is going to be tough enough reconverting to full civilian production without starting a fight among the men who will do the producing. And if you begin by setting veteran against civilian, you will end by setting Protestant against Catholic, Catholic against Jew, white against Negro—and you will wind up by having the very thing we are fighting the war to destroy."[12]

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[12]Quoted in *Labor,* November 25, 1944.

BANDWAGON MOSCOW-BERLIN

By JOACHIM JOESTEN

WITHIN FIVE WEEKS from the start of the 1944 summer offensive, the Red Army had bagged twenty-two German generals. On July 17 all but two of them marched meekly at the head of a huge prisoners' parade through Moscow as 57,000 captured Nazis were taken to concentration camps in the rear. It was probably the greatest mass humiliation ever inflicted on the proud officers' corps of the German Army.

But it was merely the beginning of the most extraordinary chapter in the history of the German Army. In the next few days, the most conservative and exclusive clique in the world would see all its cherished traditions trampled underfoot: honor, loyalty, birthrights, *esprit de corps* would be dragged in the dust. A count and colonel would hurl a homemade bomb at his commander-in-chief; barons and generals would openly make common cause with Bolsheviks; a field marshal, bearer of one of Germany's proudest names, would be stripped of his uniform and hanged like a common criminal, along with three generals and four other staff officers; and a Reich minister would publicly abuse the German nobility as "blue-blooded, idiotic swine."

Still footsore from the forced march through Moscow, one of the unhappy officers, Lieutenant-General Edmund Hoffmeister, sat down in a rustic *dacha* on the outskirts of the city and wrote a statement for the press. Scathingly and at length he denounced Hitler and his conduct of the war. The statement appeared in all Moscow papers on July 19.

Even as an astonished world read and discussed General Hoffmeister's frank attack on the Führer, Count Klaus von Stauffenberg, a young colonel who had been seriously wounded in Tunisia and was now attached to the General Staff, gave vent to the same feelings in more immediate and drastic fashion by throwing a bomb at Hitler at his own headquarters. Though the attempt was a failure, it was the spark that fired the political tinder that had long been accumulating between the intuitive Führer and his hardheaded generals. A memorable explosion resulted.

While Heinrich Himmler's Gestapo was dealing effectively with the disgruntled generals at home who had been exposed by the bungled assassination attempt, sixteen of the newly captured German generals in Moscow agreed to follow General Hoffmeister's example and write a joint statement for the Soviet press. It was a scorcher, bluntly denouncing Hitler's "adventurist political and strategic leadership" and openly calling on the Wehrmacht to stop fighting and to overthrow the Führer.

The sixteen's handwritten appeal was prominently displayed in the Moscow press on July 25 over the signatures reproduced in facsimile. Then the mighty Russian propaganda machine swung into action. By short-wave radio, by front-line loudspeakers, by thousands of leaflets showered from Russian planes over enemy territory, despondent German soldiers were told and retold the message from their own generals: "Don't wait until Hitler dooms you. The fight against Hitler is the struggle for Germany."

II

What had happened to the German Army to make possible such an extraordinary outbreak of defeatism and insurrection in the highest ranks? Lowered morale, the inevitable result of an endless succession of defeats, could not alone be responsible for this reversion of all Prussian military traditions. In 1918, the rank-and-file rebelled, but the officers stood by the Kaiser, even though they had to ask him to leave the country. Any general of the Imperial Army doing what the sixteen in Moscow did in July, 1944 would have been outcast and outlawed by his caste.

Two other factors, besides an indubitable crack in morale, account for the strange comportment of the sixteen—or, with Hoffmeister, seventeen—German generals. One is of Hitler's own making. By systematically weeding out the old-school professionals like von Brauchitsch, Halder, von Bock, and filling the gaps with upstarts from his praetorian guards, the Führer himself disrupted centuries-old bonds of tradition and diluted the Army's *Korpsgeist* (esprit de corps). He deliberately created a profound and irreconcilable antithesis between the old officers, whose loyalty belonged primarily to the country and to the army as such, and the new elements who were blindly devoted to the party and the Führer.

But even more important and doubtless decisive was that masterly stroke of political warfare accomplished by Marshal Joseph Stalin when,

in 1943, he permitted the setting up on Soviet soil of the Free Germany National Committee. Indeed, when the final balance of this war is drawn up by future historians, it may well be found that no other political move by any of the Allies has exercised such a far-reaching and profound influence on the outcome of the struggle. Regardless of what Stalin's true intentions were—only time can tell—he achieved his immediate objective which was to split the core of the Wehrmacht from within.

Let us retrace the various phases of this process of disintegration. On October 8, 1941, the "First Conference of German Prisoners of War, Privates and Non-Commissioned Officers in the Soviet Union" was held at Camp 58 in Russia, under the auspices of Walter Ulbricht, former Communist deputy to the German Reichstag and a member of the Comintern. This rally, at which no officers were present, smacked strongly of a typical Communist Party attempt to separate the rank-and-file from the officers' corps. At that time, it will be remembered, the reconversion of Russia from a revolutionary, internationalist country into the self-seeking, strongly nationalist, and even conservative state of today was still in the incipient stage.

Next, a group of twenty-two captive officers—none of them above the rank of major—established contact with each other and publicly repudiated Hitlerism. The two groups got together and, with the tacit approval of the Soviet government, began to lay the groundwork for major action.

The great opportunity came with the mass entrapment and surrender of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad. In the final stages of the campaign, the Russians skilfully bombarded the German lines with leaflets and broadcasts in German, and after surrender the prisoners' ranks were carefully combed to separate the diehard Nazis from potential renegades and genuine antifascists. Three leading members of the Officers' Group, headed by Captain Ernst Hadermann, a former university professor, and a number of former German Reichstag deputies now living in the U.S.S.R. took an important part in these operations.

There can be little doubt that the organizers of the anti-Nazi movement among German prisoners of war in the U.S.S.R. had hoped immediately to win Field Marshal Friedrich von Paulus for their cause. If they had succeeded, and a man of Paulus' rank and reputation had placed himself at the head of the movement as early as February, 1943, the

decisive split in the Wehrmacht would probably have occurred much earlier and the war might have ended by now. However, in spite of his little love for Hitlerism, the Marshal refused and so did, at that time, all the generals captured with him. But many lesser officers, noncoms and privates joined the ranks of the fast-growing anti-Nazi movement in Russia.

Then, on July 12, 1943, the "National Committee of Free Germany" was set up in Moscow. The constituent meeting was attended by thirty-four delegates representing, in about equal strength, the German political emigration in Russia and the prisoners of war. It was an odd assembly in which orthodox Marxists and internationalists, mostly in the middle-age brackets, rubbed elbows with young and ardent soldiers who despite their bitter experiences and their renunciation of Hitlerism had lost none of their faith in Germany. There were Junkers and workers, professors, writers, professional military men whose names were known the world over, and others totally unknown outside of a very limited circle.

Among those who attended the conference were the former Reichstag members Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, Wilhelm Florin, Erwin Hoernle and Martha Arendsee, all party-line Communists; radical intellectuals like the satirical poet Erich Weinert, the revolutionary mysticist Johannes R. Becher, the playwright Friedrich Wolf, and the journalist Willi Bredel; Junkers like Count Heinrich von Einsiedel, a great-grandson of Bismarck, and Bernt von Kügelgen, whose father had published the *St. Petersburger Zeitung* before the last war; and a variety of soldiers and officers, the highest-ranking of whom was Major Karl Hetz.

One might have thought that in a mixed company of this sort the politically wise, ideologically well-trained, and didactically expert Marxists would have easily won the upper hand over the military element. This seemed the more natural as the former were free men, while the latter were prisoners of war and the meeting was held on the soil of Communist Russia. Yet, in appearance at least, the opposite happened: when the committee was formed, with Erich Weinert as president, Major Hetz as first vice-president, and Count Einsiedel as second vice-president, it adopted a program of action that smacked strongly of good old German nationalism, with only the slightest overtones of social revolution and not even a hint of Soviet institutions.

Indeed, the Free German Manifesto, first published in the committee's official organ *Freies Deutschland* and reprinted with great fanfare, on July 21, by the Moscow *Pravda,* called on the German Army and the German nation to do these things: overthrow the Nazi regime; withdraw in orderly fashion to the Reich frontiers; make peace with the Allies; set up a strong, democratic regime, with restoration of political rights and civil liberties for all.

More interesting than the positive aspects of this manifesto, is its negative side. It did NOT: call for unconditional surrender; urge the soldiers to turn their rifles against their own officers, as in 1918; demand dissolution of the German Army and total disarmament of the Reich; incite to revolution, or advocate drastic land reforms.

The drafters of this manifesto made it perfectly clear that they did *not* contemplate a simple return to the "helpless Weimar regime" (*sic*). Nor did they go in for the destruction of the German Army, breeder of two world wars. Major Herbert Stoesslein, a leading member of the Free Germany Committee, was quite explicit on this point. "We are opposed to fomenting demoralization in the Wehrmacht," he wrote in *Freies Deutschland.* "We do not intend to incite the soldiers to abandon their arms and retreat in disorder. . . . We must avert at all costs any repetition of the events of 1918. We must avoid all anarchy and undisciplined behavior. . . . Our slogan is reconstruction, not destruction. . . ." This theme has been repeated many times since in other pronouncements made by the committee.

Now, it is of course an axiom that nothing happens in Moscow these days without at least the tacit approval of Stalin. Hence one would have been fully justified in assuming that the Free German Manifesto roughly corresponded to the Kremlin's plans for Germany even without the emphatic publicity given it by the Soviet press, rather obviously for foreign consumption.

One may be quite certain, also, that the Bismarckian atmosphere which surrounds all doings of the Free Germans in Moscow is not a matter of chance. Even before the committee was launched, Soviet propaganda made skilful use of the opportunities offered by Count Einsiedel's descent from Bismarck. Leaflets dropped by Russian airplanes over the German lines showed Einsiedel, in the Luftwaffe uniform in which he was shot down over Stalingrad in August, 1942, holding a poster on which

a masterful Bismarck sternly points at a little Hitler with the legend: "This man is leading Germany toward catastrophe." And the Count is quoted as saying: "A war of Germany against Russia is stupid and without chance of success. This my great-grandfather, Otto von Bismarck, said again and again, and every soldier must daily become more convinced of its truth."

Nor is it an accident that the propaganda of the Free Germany Committee continuously recalls the Napoleonic period when Russian armies lifted beaten Prussia from her greatest humiliation and all the German *Freiheitskämpfer* were fervently pro-Russian. Says the manifesto: "One hundred and thirty years ago, when German troops still stood on Russian soil as enemies (under Napoleon), it was precisely from Russia that the finest sons of the Germans—von Stein, Arndt, Clausewitz, York, and others—appealed to the conscience of the German people over the heads of their traitors, the German rulers, and called upon them to wage a liberation war."

It fits into this pattern that the Free Germany Committee has adopted as its banner *not* the red flag under which Pieck, Ulbricht, Weinert, and Becher once marched; *nor* the black, red, and gold of the Weimar Republic—but the red, white, and black of Bismarckian Germany, symbol of a strong, conservative, and originally pro-Russian state. Even though the committee undoubtedly goes in for a greater amount of political democracy and social equity than existed in Imperial Germany, there can be no question that its sympathies go out to the Reich of Bismarck rather than to the Weimar Republic with its strong Social-Democratic influence.

III

Is all this to say, then, that Stalin is committed to a revival of Bismarck's Germany in a more democratic garb? Not necessarily. History shows that Stalin never commits himself irrevocably to anything. But there can be no question that this is the blueprint for postwar Germany which he has been holding out to his anti-Nazi prisoners of war. In doing so, Stalin pursued two great political objectives, one of immediate, the other of long-range importance: to drive a wedge between the traditionalist, intensely patriotic, old school of German officers and the Nazi Party upstarts in the Wehrmacht; and to win a potential future ally.

Even a potential ally, of course, is not much good without an army and Stalin, it should well be noted, has consistently opposed the idea of emasculating the German state by completely destroying its army. In his speech of February 23, 1942, the Soviet leader denounced as "a stupid lie and a witless slander" the suggestion that the Red Army has "the idiotic aims" of exterminating the German people and destroying the German state and he went on to say: "It would be ridiculous to identify Hitler's clique with the German people and the German state. History shows that Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state remain." And a few months later, in his great address to the Moscow Soviet on November 6, 1942, Stalin explicitly stated: "It is not our aim to destroy all military forces in Germany, for every literate person will understand that this is not only impossible . . . *but it is also inadvisable from the point of view of the future. . . .*" (author's italics).

When the German generals captured at Stalingrad read the Free German Manifesto—and they realized, of course, that it must have official Soviet endorsement—they cocked their ears. Here, it seemed, was a chance to salvage at least something of the German Army so dear to their hearts. And, besides, why shouldn't a German officer co-operate with men who raised the black, white, and red standard and proclaimed Bismarck, Arndt, von Stein, and Clausewitz as their patron saints?

Marshal von Paulus still stood aside, but several of his subordinate generals now changed their minds. On September 11-12, 1943, a new prisoners' convention was held in Moscow, this time for officers only. More than 100 delegates, including five generals and six colonels attended the meeting. Erich Weinert, as president of the Free Germany Committee, was the only civilian present.

In his opening address, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Bredt, the oldest officer present, thanked the Soviet authorities for having authorized the convention "in accordance with Article 129 of the Soviet Constitution, which grants the right of asylum to those waging a war of national liberation." General Walther von Seydlitz, the highest-ranking officer, pointed out that "an honorable peace will be granted only to a nation whose army is intact." The meeting ended with the establishment of a "Union of German Officers," which in a body joined the Free Germany Committee. General von Seydlitz, elected president of the union, also was made first vice-president of the committee.

IV

Theoretically, thus, the authority of the aristocratic General von Seydlitz was subordinated to that of the Communist civilian Weinert. Subsequent developments, however, proved this to be a fiction. Indeed, the officers' union soon took the leadership of the combined movement from the committee. And more and more the accent shifted from the revolutionary to the patriotic aspect of "saving Germany."

This trend became even more marked after the mass surrender of German generals in the 1944 summer campaign. Most of them rallied to Seydlitz' union just as fast as they could get to Moscow. General Hoffmeister, the 16 signers of the July 25 appeal, and nearly all newcomers joined it. By mid-December, 30 out of 70 German generals in Russian captivity were members of the officers' union.

From the start, the officers' union was able to make and maintain contacts inside Germany which the original committee did not have. A high-ranking Nazi leader, Gauleiter August Eigruber of Linz, stated explicitly on July 21 that Marshal von Witzleben and his accomplices had been in secret touch with the Seydlitz group. The exact role which the German generals in Moscow played in the abortive attempt on Hitler's life will probably not be known until after the war, but that its part was considerable has been admitted on all sides.

Heinrich Himmler's gruesome revenge on the rebels undoubtedly did away with some of the officers' union's contacts in Germany, but it also brought a new and most valuable member into the Seydlitz fold. Embittered more by the calculated degradation than by the mere death of von Witzleben and the other generals hanged after July 20, Field Marshal von Paulus, highest-ranking of all German prisoners in Russia, finally broke with his past and joined the officers' union early in August. True to form, von Paulus at the same time wrote an open letter which was published in *Pravda* on August 14. In it, the once haughty marshal roundly declared that "continuation of the war has become for Germany a senseless bloodletting," and that "Germany must get rid of Adolf Hitler." And on October 28 von Paulus, in a broadcast over Radio Moscow, heatedly attacked Hitler and Himmler for spreading "infamous lies," committing "countless bestial atrocities," and "recklessly driving the German nation to suicide." The marshal also revealed that "hundreds

of thousands" of German soldiers and "thousands" of officers in Russian captivity had rallied to the Free Germany Committee.

Thus there can be no question of the weight and impetus already acquired by the "Free German" movement in Russia and both are likely to increase in the final stage of the war. A report that von Seydlitz has begun recruiting an anti-Nazi army from the more than 1,000,000 German prisoners now in the U.S.S.R. still lacks confirmation but in any event the Free Germany Committee, with this vast manpower potential behind it, has become a formidable instrument in Stalin's hands.

How will he use it? No one can answer that question at this stage and perhaps the Russian leader himself has not yet fully made up his mind. For the time being, the committee and the officers' union serve principally as instruments of psychological warfare. Three times daily, the "Free Germans" have radio time in Moscow, urging trapped Nazi units to surrender, others to revolt. There is ample evidence that their appeals are heard, and their leaflets are read, by their German comrades on the other side of the fence. This propaganda weighs like a nightmare on the Nazi High Command which is unable fully to counter its effects.

But there is no saying as yet how Seydlitz and his "army"—potential or real—will intervene in the final German crisis and in the postwar period. That they will act in accordance with Moscow's policy one may take for granted. Thus, for the Western Allies, the Free German problem is really one with the larger problem of American-British-Russian relations. In the last analysis, this problem can only be settled at the highest level.

In the meantime, however, British and American experts in psychological warfare might profitably study Stalin's Free German experiment. Even though it seems unlikely that it could be repeated here, the propaganda methods employed and the results achieved by the Free Germany Committee deserve keen attention. This side of Germany much can still be done in the field of psychological warfare. The Russians have shown the way.

CAN CHINA RE-MOBILIZE?

By NYM WALES

RECENT EVENTS IN CHINA have raised many questions in the American public mind as to the actual situation there. A fast-moving Japanese advance was accompanied by a collapse of negotiations between Chungking and the Chinese Communists, after four and a half months of fruitless discussion. Then in September President Roosevelt sent Major General Patrick Hurley and Donald M. Nelson to Chungking to help increase China's participation in the war against Japan. After two months of suggestions and counter-suggestions, General Joseph W. Stilwell was recalled, Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss resigned and was later replaced by Major General Hurley. On November 20, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek reshuffled his Cabinet. These were the more dramatic incidents; others have followed since.

It seems difficult for the average American to visualize the background of these happenings, to find a pattern in the complicated general picture. If it is possible to reduce the issues to the barest and simplest terms, I think one might say that the fundamental and urgent problem in China today is whether or not a new mobilization is to be carried out against the Japanese. On this question a head-on collision has already occurred between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell; and this is the underlying cause of friction between Washington and Chungking. On this question the Chinese are divided into strongly opposing groups; this is the root of the conflict between the Communists and Chungking and also between Chungking and the people in its own territories. This is the dividing line between the progressives and reactionaries in China. On the solution of this question a well-informed public opinion both in China and the United States can have considerable influence.

If Chungking were willing and able to carry out a new mobilization, its critics would disappear. The Americans are asking merely that Chungking do all in its power to improve resistance to the Japanese; that it show its willingness to co-operate in every possible way with all forces that are now fighting the common battle. The Chinese in general are

demanding that dictatorial restraints against a new patriotic mobilization be lifted to permit this to rise spontaneously; they have little confidence in either the willingness or ability of the government as constituted at present actively to lead this mobilization without a thoroughgoing democratic reorganization. The Communists in November called for a coalition government to carry out "thorough military, political, economic and cultural reforms as a basis for united front warfare against the Japanese."

In the meantime, the Communists are carrying out successfully in their guerilla areas an effective mobilization program which they claim now extends to a population of eighty million. Because of this they become stronger daily and win new admirers in government territory, while Chungking crumbles and becomes more and more fearful of what impends. The Communists have been able to recruit an army of half a million on a volunteer basis and some two and a half million guerillas, and morale in their territories is at its highest since the war began. On the other hand, Chungking's conscript armies are deteriorating rapidly and both civilian and army morale is at its lowest ebb, while the government is weaker than it has ever been since 1927. The Communists are eager to encourage the fullest co-operation with America, Britain and the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the general United Nations program. Chungking is terrified of the U.S.S.R., is having bad relations with Britain, and is unable to reach the best possible working arrangement with Washington. Though the Americans are Chungking's best friends, they want our support on the basis of giving little in return, of keeping the internal situation intact and not being obliged to mobilize further against Japan, while receiving lend-lease to keep up their strength for postwar power.

It comes as a surprise to most Americans to find that China has carried out only a partial mobilization, that her full war potential is not yet developed. Yet for Chungking the implications of full mobilization are tremendous. Ruling groups believe their government would be drowned in the flood. In other words, they are as much afraid of their own people as of the Japanese—a situation that has not been uncommon in other countries during this war against the Axis. The patriotic movement has by this time become identified with the need for democratic changes. Many Chinese are now in prison and concentration camps without trial accused as Communists and Leftists but really for the crime of trying

to rouse the people to organize themselves and fight against Japan—this is because an organized people would also be strong against their own government dictatorship. A widespread network of police and secret police is constantly busy silencing the voices demanding reform and criticizing government policies.

It is not too much to say that the pattern of Chinese history during the next generation depends upon whether or not mass mobilization is carried out in time to help drive the Japanese out of China. If it occurs, China will emerge from the struggle as a rising democratic power, united within and growing strong without, capable of quickly using foreign capital to rebuild. If not, the democratic process will occur anyway through civil war and temporary chaos, leaving China relatively weak and helpless in relation to outside pressures when the war is over. In the meantime, however, neither the Japanese nor Chungking will be able to prevent the Communists from carrying out at least a partial people's mobilization in the present Japanese-occupied territories. Sun Fo has stated a similar proposition: "The one thing we can do now is to prosecute the war with all we have until victory is achieved. This alone can give us any future, and a glorious one at that; without it, extinction."

Full mobilization would mean great changes, such as organizing guerilla warfare and economic resistance to Japan on a wide scale and creating various kinds of organizations among the population to support this, similar to the pattern developed by the Communists. The people in all provinces have the same ability, and General Chu Teh told Brooks Atkinson in an interview on September 30 that: "In areas where we are able to work with the people we can arouse support in three months. In six months we can organize them enough to fight Japanese garrison forces without the help of the regular army." It would mean releasing political prisoners and permitting the students and intellectuals to rouse the people, which they are now prevented from doing. It would mean coming to a real working arrangement with the Communists, so that troops on both sides can be released to fight Japan instead of maintaining an armed truce on a border hundreds of miles long. It would mean thorough reforms in the armies, government, and economic structure. Chungking would not have to do this organizing; the people themselves can do it as demonstrated in Japanese-occupied areas. But Chungking would have to give orders to its troops not to prevent this mobilization.

The organs of repression such as the tens of thousands of secret police would have to be either disbanded and sent with their guns into the armies to fight Japan, or ordered to cease illegal arrests and executions of patriotic Chinese. Open legal trials must be held, and legal protection given to those who are engaged in anti-Japanese activities. Of course, the present government would never consent to these policies; it regards them as suicidal, and Communistic. Only a representative, constitutional government would be willing to permit such mobilization in the territory under its control.

The anti-Japanese movement, however, has deteriorated to the point where the minimum changes required for any new mobilization at all are these: reorganization of the Central Government armies; reorganization of the Chungking government; reorganization of the industrial effort. These three steps are not impossible; they have not yet been taken but are being tentatively considered, with encouragement from the Americans. If this three-point reorganization does not take place, the Chungking government may simply rot on the vine before long; it is already four years overdue. American policy is in favor of this type of change and hopes to strengthen Chungking by broadening its base and improving its efficiency. It is the job of Hurley, Wedemeyer, and Nelson to give aid and advice in these three directions, and they seem to feel optimistic. The raw materials are at hand; the political opposition, however, is up in arms and no matter what surface changes are conceded, may continue to sabotage all attempts. Certainly there is plenty of room for improvement. Little will be gained, however, by merely a shake-up at the top, though once the camel has his nose under the tent, more will inevitably follow. That is why the opposition is so fearful even of the camel's nose.

Every American family with a son in the Pacific services is vitally concerned in these Chinese problems. So is every American taxpayer. Tens of thousands of American casualties may depend upon whether or not this new mobilization is carried out in China to build up the Chinese front against Japan. Billions of American dollars are involved both in the prosecution of the war and in the postwar development of China. As we are the chief external support of the Chungking government, we are responsible for seeing to it that the most effective use is made of our money and supplies. As one minor example, we are imme-

diately concerned with the safety of American airmen who are obliged to land in North China or on the coast, after bombing Tokyo or Japanese bases in China. We need an underground in these areas to conduct them to safety, and so far nothing reliable has been built up except by the Communists. Their guerillas have already saved thirty American flyers. Later when our troops make landings on the China coast, they will need organizations among the Chinese for espionage and transport. The sooner this underground is widely organized the better for us, and we can ill afford to antagonize the guerillas by adopting an anti-Communist attitude. A few months ago an American military mission went to the guerilla regions for the first time, and about the same time a group of newspapermen went to Yenan—the first permitted to go in since 1939. Previously Chungking had prevented any official American contact with these areas whatsoever. Americans in China are becoming very impatient with the stalemate there. One American flyer, for instance, commented: "How long are we going to go on beating a dead horse in Chungking? Why don't we get on with the war?"

As to reorganizing the Central Government armies: No one understood this problem better than General Stilwell. He believed in the potentialities of a reorganized army and is a great champion of the common Chinese soldier. His efforts to train and equip Chinese forces in India showed fine results; however, everything he tried to do inside China met with insurmountable obstacles from the entrenched high command, partly due to the fact that few of the generals were anxious to risk their troops in battle, so as not to lose personal power. Chiang Kai-shek was hardly in a strong moral position to command them to do so, as he set the example himself. His personal army, the First Army of some half-million of the best fed and best equipped troops in China, commanded by Hu Tsung-nan and known as "Chiang's own," was sent to the far northwest early in the war and has done hardly any important fighting against the Japanese since the first year. Instead they are used to maintain the long blockade against the Communist regions and to threaten them with civil war, which has occasionally occurred. Following Pearl Harbor there was a general attitude that America and Britain would eventually defeat Japan anyway, so the primary consideration was to retain power internally. This attitude demoralized and strangled the anti-Japanese movement. In the meantime each regional general set up

his own domain and became a war lord in his own right. The only way to restore Chiang's authority is obviously for him to activize the fighting against Japan, as his mandate to rule both in the army and among the people was conditioned upon his willingness and ability to lead the war effort. That mandate expires just to the extent that he refuses to do so. The Communists, for example, can hardly have full confidence in him as Commander-in-Chief under present circumstances.

Stilwell arrived in China in 1942 as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, and tried to get him to correct some of the worst abuses in the armies. His advice went unheeded. As the Japanese advance required definite action, Hurley was sent in September, 1944, to help solve the problem. The exact nature of the negotiations has not been officially disclosed, but it is generally assumed that among the American recommendations were these: (1) that an American general be given command of the Chinese operations not only in Burma but also in China, under Generalissimo Chiang. This idea has to be viewed against the background of distrust, dissension, and divided loyalties in China's armies; it was hoped that an American, being removed from local rivalries and politics, might help to unify the over-all command and to increase Chiang's real authority as Commander-in-Chief. For example, he might have been able to bridge the gap between the Communists and Chiang, as the Communists were willing to accept such an arrangement. Brooks Atkinson reported in the *New York Times* on November 26, that "the Communists, under General Chu Teh, would accept an American commander to co-ordinate their army with the Central Government's armies."

This suggestion, of course, met with failure; instead Stilwell was recalled, upon Chiang's insistence, and his former command over the China-Burma-India sector was divided in two. Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan took over command of United States Army forces in India and Burma. Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer was given command over only the United States Army forces in China, though he also took Stilwell's place as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek. Stilwell's recall was a great loss to the campaign in China at a critical time, but Chiang Kai-shek's insistence left Washington no alternative apparently.

(2) The Americans made certain informal suggestions about reorganizing Chiang's Cabinet, with the idea of eliminating the worst obstructionists and reactionaries who have in the past made American

co-operation with Chungking very difficult. Chief of these was replacing General Ho Ying-ching by General Chen Cheng as Minister of War, which was agreed to by Chiang and is an important step forward even though General Ho retains his post as chief of the Chinese general staff and much of his influence still remains.

(3) There were also discussions on improving industrial production, and Chungking has agreed to permit Donald M. Nelson to assist in setting up a new War Production Board. This is an advance in Sino-American co-operation, as in the past Chungking has taken a dog-in-the-manger attitude and refused to invite American industrial experts to assist in China.

(4) The Americans brought up a delicate subject, explaining to the Generalissimo that there was much disappointment over the failure of the Central Government to come to an agreement with the Chinese Communists. As a result Chiang Kai-shek consented to permit Major General Hurley to serve temporarily as an informal go-between in discussions with the Communists. He flew to Yenan and brought General Chou En-lai back to Chungking on November 10 to reopen negotiations with the Generalissimo. In this connection, there has been much speculation about whether or not Russia may enter the war against Japan; a prerequisite to this would seem to be a working agreement between the Chinese Communists and Chungking and an understanding on this subject with the Americans and British. Only a thorough reorganization of Chungking would make this possible. The Russians cannot be expected even to send supplies to the Chinese armies when there is constant danger of their being piled up for use in civil war. As one example, Russian bombing planes sent to fight Japan have been used to bomb revolting peasants in Kansu; other supplies have been used in attacks on the Communists.

In view of the emergency in China caused by the rapid Japanese advance, it becomes urgent that the government (and its policies) be reorganized to the point where it can receive whole-hearted support from the Americans, British, and Russians alike, as well as from all anti-Japanese forces in China. Such reorganization is already overdue several years, and if Japan takes Kunming or threatens Chungking so that the government is obliged to remove to Sikang or elsewhere, there will be nothing left worth the bother of trying to reorganize. The Russian

official press in December made it clear that in their opinion Chiang's Cabinet reshuffle "gave no hope of improvement in internal unity or the war effort in China."

In connection with Major General Hurley's negotiations, it is useful to quote the *New York Times* dispatch of October 31 from its correspondent, Brooks Atkinson, which was passed by the War Department in Washington. He reported that Chiang Kai-shek

> announced his personal ultimatum to Americans who were pressing him for military and governmental reforms. He declared that General Stilwell must go, that the control of American lend-lease materials must be put in his hands and that he would not be coerced into helping to unify China by making terms with the Chinese Communists. If America did not yield on these points, he said China would go back to fighting the Japanese alone, as she did before Pearl Harbor. . . .
>
> The decision to relieve General Stilwell has the most profound implications for China as well as American policy toward China and the Allied war effort in the Far East. It may mean that the United States has decided from now on to discount China's part in a counter-offensive.
>
> Inside China it represents the political triumph of a moribund, anti-democratic regime, that is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese out of China. . . .

One of the sorest points in the whole controversy is the control of American lend-lease supplies. Fortunately during the past two years this has been largely in the hands of General Stilwell, though future policy is not yet indicated. The real issue here is this: it is absolutely essential that American direction and control be exercised over the use of lend-lease supplies, for we shall be held responsible by the Chinese for their use or misuse no matter who handles them. It would be a catastrophe to Sino-American relations for us to give up this control during this period of tense political relations and intra-militarist rivalries in China. There is a long history behind the decision of the American authorities in 1942 to keep some control over these supplies, which I have no space to go into here.

One highly important factor in the Chinese picture, is the re-election of President Roosevelt, reaffirming the authority of administration policy in China, so that hopes in Chungking of playing Republicans off against Democrats in Washington will be lessened. The reactionaries in Chungking have depended upon certain Republicans in this country to

strengthen their hand in resisting pressure from Washington, chiefly on the basis of maintaining a strongly anti-Soviet, anti-Communist position in China. Perhaps it was not an accident that Roosevelt chose a Republican as the new Ambassador; and also, as Major General Hurley is a military man, he may be able to carry more weight in Chungking than a career diplomat.

To explain further the problem involved in reorganizing the Chungking government: the basic difficulty is that no machinery for change by democratic methods exists. Changes are usually brought about in China by armed force or *coup d'etat*. Until officials are made responsible to an electorate of some kind there is no leverage for bringing about a basic reorganization; changes in personnel merely shift around in circles. The personnel changes on November 20 were in this category, although they were a step in the right direction. Since the Sian Incident, progressives in China have demanded a thorough reorganization of the central government—and the change is not yet. Last year they demanded that constitutional government be instituted; Chungking promised to do this a year after the end of the war. (Similar promises are made every time the demand is raised which is almost every year.)

Chungking's power at present rests chiefly on three legs like a tripod: the armies, the Kuomintang dictatorship, maintained primarily by a network of secret "party police," and American support. Chiang Kai-shek combines in his person a liaison between these three forces. American support in the past has been unconditional; at present, however, we are trying to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to rebuild and restrengthen his government by adopting more progressive policies and making certain changes essential to his own continuance in power. Chiang, however, is a man with very limited understanding of large political forces, especially in the international field; he is essentially what the Chinese call "feudal-minded" and has never learned to reason in really modern terms. He has been given every opportunity to measure up to the stature required of him, and is still being given that opportunity. Whether he is big enough for the big job ahead remains to be seen.

The control of the Chungking government is divided among several political cliques, both military and civilian, and its policies are dominated by the most reactionary of these cliques. Each clique is usually in rivalry with others and none represents a popular following or democratic

tendency. There are, too, important liberal individuals with nominal offices but without real power except in so far as they have unorganized popular sympathy behind them, such as Sun Fo, Feng Yu-hsiang, Yu Yu-jen, and others. There are also many professors and experts dependent upon one clique or another for jobs, but unable to have any control in policy.

The two arch-reactionary cliques which have been dominant, and are still in control, are the civilian *CC P'ai,* named for the brothers, Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu, which controls the Kuomintang party machine; and General Ho Ying-ching's followers in military affairs, consisting of the older army officers whom he has appointed during his fifteen years as Minister of War. These two cliques are strong because they are able to work together and because they are able to work closely with Chiang Kai-shek. Their three leaders have been among Chiang Kai-shek's closest friends and most trusted advisors since 1927 when they were instrumental in putting him in power. They are the most anti-American, anti-British, anti-Soviet, antiliberal elements in the government and the least anti-Japanese. The progressives want to root out these two cliques entirely from the government and believe that no reorganization can mean much until this is done. Ho Ying-ching was replaced on November 20, and Chen Li-fu's position as Minister of Education was given to Chu Chia-hua, but real power is always *sub rosa* in China and they still retain power through the elaborate machinery built up over fifteen years. The *CC P'ai* has held power chiefly through a large network of secret party police, and these and their Kuomintang machine are financed by government funds. Other Chinese have demanded the withdrawal of such funds for several years; this withdrawal would probably result in the disappearance of this whole setup. As the United States provides the chief financial backing for the government, we have some responsibility for acquiescing in this state of affairs. In a reshuffle in May of 1944, the *CC P'ai* increased its power and since then has taken enough rope to hang itself.

Another Kuomintang clique, which is, however, practically identical with that of the Chen brothers in political principles, is that headed by Chu Chia-hua, formerly considered very pro-Nazi and a great admirer of Hitler's methods. Chu Chia-hua has now gained some power at the expense of the Chen brothers.

A partly non-Kuomintang clique is the Cheng Hsueh Hsi, headed by General Chang Chun, which has considerable control over provincial governments, and is more liberal than the three mentioned above. Wang Shih-chieh, now Minister of Information, belongs to this, and also Wong Wen-hao, recently appointed to head the new War Production Board.

There are also in Chungking what are called "Chiang Kai-shek's men," meaning they are close to the Generalissimo but not well organized into political cliques of their own. One of these is Dr. H. H. Kung, now replaced as Minister of Finance by the former Vice-Minister, O. K. Yui, which would appear to be only a nominal change unless the financial machinery is also reorganized, for Kung still controls the four government banks. O. K. Yui is regarded as a "Kung man."

The transfer on December 4, of Dr. T. V. Soong from his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs to that of acting Premier is a significant move in the right direction, though whether or not Dr. Soong will be strong enough to bring about important changes is a question. In the past this has been merely a rubber-stamp position.

In military affairs, the chief rival to the Ho Ying-ching clique is the Whampoa *P'ai,* made up of officers graduated from Whampoa Military Academy. The "Big Four" of this clique are Generals Chen Cheng, Hu Tsung-nan, Ku Chu-t'ung and Hsueh Yueh. Ku Chu-t'ung, however, works closely with Ho Ying-ching; these two were responsible for the attack on the Communist New Fourth Army in 1941. Chen Cheng is considered the most progressive of these. As the new Minister of War he may now be able to influence the more reactionary Whampoa *P'ai* members, and to replace some of Ho Ying-ching's appointees with more efficient and patriotic commanders.

The Whampoa *P'ai,* however, like other cliques, is actually controlled *sub rosa* by secret terrorist police, headed by Tai Li, who is responsible only to Chiang Kai-shek and has a free hand in making arrests without trial. Tai Li is said to have 100,000 armed secret agents operating under the Military Affairs Commission, while the armed gendarmes, commanded by Ho Kuo-kuang, are said to have been increased to 800,000. These two bodies are responsible primarily for maintaining loyalty and discipline in the armies, but they also have a free hand in civil matters especially in military zones. Tai Li's police are modeled somewhat along the lines of the Nazi S.A.

All these cliques revolve around Chiang Kai-shek as around a passive pivot in a delicate balance of power. Chiang's policy is to play one off against the other in order to keep his own position secure, taking no initiative until pushed into it. Then he shifts personnel to restore the balance of power, by a policy of divide-and-rule, thus always keeping a stalemate.

It is therefore very difficult for a turnover of power to occur in Chungking, as the whole machinery is designed to prevent it. Only outside forces seem to be able to take any initiative, such as American influence if we chose to exert it, for our influence is also unavoidably a part of the balance of power. Another method would be for the Communists to insist upon coming into a coalition government; in the wake of this event the liberals and progressives would be able to come to some power, for the whole balance would be shifted and the stalemate broken, thereby giving them an opening that does not now exist. A kind of national liberation front would then be formed, including the Communists, as in several European countries, which would have a healthy voice in the government even though it might not be dominant at first, inasmuch as the existing cliques would combine in opposition to it.

There are many angles to the Communist-Chungking impasse, but the urgent one today is the military phase: what can be done to release all available manpower and equipment for use against the Japanese? One method would be to create a neutral zone along the border of guerilla areas and Central Government territory, by withdrawing all troops on each side of the line and throwing them against the Japanese. This would not remove the economic blockade but it would put an end to any active armed hostilities. Brooks Atkinson reported in the *New York Times* on November 26 that: "When I left Yenan in October, General Chou gave me a personal message to General Joseph Stilwell. He wished me to say that, if the Central Government wanted to use the troops then blockading the Communists in the defense of other parts of China, the Communists pledged themselves not to take advantage of the situation by expanding into Kuomintang China." This is only an affirmation of past policy, for the Communists have expanded only into Japanese-occupied territory. However, when they have established new bases there, government troops have frequently attacked them in the rear—for the latter are opposed even to this expansion at the expense

of the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek feels that the Japanese will be driven out of China eventually, but that it will be much more difficult to drive the Communists out—which is true, for these so-called Communists are the local inhabitants of these territories and are merely fighting for their own homes.

If each side pledged not to attack the other for the duration of the Japanese war, on this understanding the Russians could send in supplies to the guerillas through the northwest and Americans could land other supplies to them along the coast. Thus the troops and guerillas in north and coastal China would be enabled to improve resistance against Japan and to divert larger bodies of Japanese troops. Until the recent Japanese attack, about half the enemy troops were used to garrison guerilla areas. The guerillas, for example, badly need such equipment as nitric acid plants for the purpose of making demolition explosives; lack of high explosives has handicapped their demolition activities along Japanese lines of communication. Improved demolition work would help to break the "land route" which the Japanese are establishing from north China to Singapore, and enable the hit-and-run guerillas to capture more supplies from Japanese supply trains and trucks. In the past most of their guns have been seized from the Japanese anyway. The effect of instituting a policy of aiding the guerillas would tremendously stimulate the underground movement in all Japanese-occupied areas and help to weaken the Japanese puppet regime in Nanking. Thus far no foreign power has given any aid whatsoever to the guerillas, including Russia, because of the strong opposition of Chungking. Communist troops have had no ammunition from Chungking since October, 1939, and no pay since December, 1940.

An important by-product of an American policy to give supplies impartially to all forces actively fighting Japan, including the guerillas, would be to force the government to compete actively for such supplies by demonstrating their ability to use them as effectively as the guerillas.

Hopes for a real working agreement between Chungking and the Communists rose with the appointment of Dr. T. V. Soong as acting Premier, as his attitude on this is known to be "moderate." Recent reports are optimistic that some agreement might be reached at least in principle, though on December 7, General Chou En-lai stated to the press that Chiang Kai-shek had rejected the Communists' proposal for a coalition

government and had made counter-proposals which remain secret thus far. Chiang, however, agreed in principle that individual Communists might hold government posts. This they would probably reject as a form of window-dressing, unless other conditions made it possible for these individuals to carry real authority. An interesting comment from the Associated Press in Washington on December 4 stated that it is

> generally assumed that any settlement would be along the line insisted upon by the Communists from the very first:
>
> 1. Central Government recognition of the Communists as a legal party, ending the one-party control of the Kuomintang.
>
> 2. Autonomous status of the Communists in their own areas in Northern China.
>
> 3. Arrangements for co-ordinating the Communists' military power with the forces of the Central Government in the war on Japan.
>
> 4. Agreement by the Central Government to facilitate the sharing of whatever munitions are available.
>
> 5. Recognition by the Communists of the full authority of General Chiang over their own part of the country in matters of national policy and military and foreign affiairs.

In view of the reluctance of Chungking actually to co-operate with the Communists, however, one must not be too sanguine of results. It is one thing to reach an agreement on paper and quite another to carry it out. In the meantime, any sincere attempt to reach an understanding either on a temporary or permanent basis is a gain. Chungking has already moved, to the Kweichow front, some of the troops which have blockaded the guerilla areas for six years—a concrete indication that a real improvement in relations may follow. However, the Communists appear to have little faith either that an agreement can be reached on paper or carried out in practice until the Chungking government is reconstituted. On December 18, their spokesman, Mao Tsê-tung, was quoted in the *New York Times* as saying that negotiations "had not attained the least result," and appealing for a "national convention" of all parties to obtain a "democratic coalition government." He also "called on the people of China to support 'democratic patriotic movements' in the area under Chungking's control in their efforts to 'suppress any reactionary authorities.' " This latter was apparently an attempt to strengthen the hand of the progressives in Chungking in insisting firmly on a com-

plete reorganization of the government by eliminating obstructionists from office.

China is peculiarly an American problem during the present stage of World War II, as we are the only foreign power in a diplomatic or military position to take initiative there. Everything that we do or fail to do cannot avoid influencing the situation, no matter how we pussyfoot over touchy toes.

The word "Communist" creates a great blind spot in American understanding of this movement in China. In Chinese, however, the name is "Kungchangtang," literally "Share-Production Party," meaning that producers must share in the fruits of production. This is a mass party of 800,000 members and its leaders are Marxists, but they have never tried and have no idea now of instituting socialism or communism in China. Their theory is that now and for many years to come the task before them is to complete the democratic revolution in order to transform China from a semicolonial, semifeudal status to that of a modern, independent, industrial nation, with or without the co-operation of the Kuomintang. The Kungchangtang is actually, as they declare, carrying out Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, which were the program jointly formulated by the two parties in 1924. During the war they have even given up the policy of re-dividing the land among the tillers, and have instead merely reduced rents, taxes, and interest rates. This was found to be a minimum necessity for mobilizing the people. In their areas, universal suffrage has been instituted and local self-government has been created among a population of 36,000,000, they claim, in addition to many mass organizations such as the North China Trade Union Federation which has nearly a million members.

Fortunately, neither the Russians nor the Chinese Communists are opposed to American influence so long as it is directed toward improving mobilization against Japan; their only criticism is that it is not strong enough. American policy is in favor of strengthening the Chinese war effort by encouraging more unity and democracy and our relations with China as a whole are improving just to the extent that we make this clearly and openly known to the Chinese public. On this basis we have the respect of the reactionaries and the confidence of the progressives in Chungking territory and are also winning the confidence of the people in guerilla areas and those still under control of the Japanese and puppet regimes.

We must not forget that, including Manchuria, the majority of the Chinese population is either in Japanese-occupied or guerilla territory and that it is here the final battle will be fought. These Chinese must understand clearly that we are not competing with Japan for control of their country and the proof we can offer is to show support for all forces engaged in liberating their country. There can be no charge of "imperialism" so long as our efforts are directed toward strengthening the historical trend toward democracy and full national liberation; this is not imperialism but liberation and is recognized as such by the Chinese. Every Chinese knows that China cannot be strong until her people are freed not only from Japan but from the bondage of their semifeudal past. Liberation is a two-edged sword and it is not the job of Americans in the Far East to prevent the Chinese people from wielding it, if we want to retain their friendship and co-operation. We will gain the enmity of the population of China only if and when we try to block the natural historical process toward progressive change. Our prestige is so great and our future influence will be so overpowering that we cannot escape responsibility for its effect on the internal balance of power in China. We must defeat Japan politically as well as militarily.

ERNEST HEMINGWAY: DEATH IN THE EVENING

By RAY B. WEST, Jr.

> *The first thing you found out about the dead was that, hit badly enough, they died like animals. Some quickly from a little wound you would not think would kill a rabbit. . . . Others would die like cats; a skull broken in and iron in the brain, they lie alive two days like cats that crawl into the coal bin with a bullet in the brain and will not die until you cut their heads off. Maybe cats do not die then. They say they have nine lives. I do not know, but most men die like animals, not men.*
>
> —A Natural History of the Dead

WE CAN PROBABLY ACCEPT THIS as a sincere belief of Ernest Hemingway at the time it was written, and reaffirmed as late as 1938 when it was included in his collected short stories. It is a statement which today, probably, neither shocks nor converts, though when it was first written it was directed at Neo-Humanism, obviously designed to shock some of the more squeamish followers of Irving Babbitt — a curious fact since the most recent of Hemingway's works would indicate that he is undoubtedly nearer to the position of the Humanists at the present time than he is to his own position as stated in the essay.

That is not to say that Mr. Hemingway would yet accept the conclusions of that "persevering traveller, Mungo Park," whose experience with death is the starting point for the article (and which experience has its present-day analogy in the arrival of the gull in Eddie Rickenbacker's recent Saga of the South Seas), but if we accept this article as a clear statement of the author's final opinion on the subject of death, we are missing the main point of Mr. Hemingway's more substantial writings. Ernest Hemingway has, of course, from the beginning thought of himself as the spokesman for the "lost generation" of World War I, and he has, no doubt, felt a public responsibility toward the nihilistic philosophy of the postwar era, which he did so much to publicize. On the other hand, as an honest craftsman, he has obviously found his

ground shifting beneath him. More than once he has been thrown almost completely off balance, only to recover and return seemingly stronger than ever. Such resiliency in an American author is uncommon enough and would seem to deserve closer attention than it has been given in the past.

I

Mr. Hemingway began to write during a period in which, to use the words of a contemporary, "Nineteenth century morality was suspect; ideals were placed daily under the microscope." His first novel, *The Sun Also Rises,* was in many respects just such an examination. The hero, Jake Barnes, an American newspaperman and veteran of the war, is in love with a girl who reciprocates, but with whom the final, physical consummation is impossible because of a peculiar injury gained at the front. Oddly enough the author makes little attempt to resolve this difficulty, none whatever on the action level, though there is occasional talk about it; and the situation remains simply a pathetic fact, heightening the tension, no doubt, but subordinated to the examination of morality in general. "We'd better keep away from each other," Jake is made to say at one point. "But, darling," Brett replies, "I have to see you. It isn't all that you know." "No," Jake replies, "but it always gets to be."

Even the obvious implication that society is responsible is not labored in this novel. Brett seeks her pleasure elsewhere, notably in two attempted love affairs, the first of which leaves her, as she explains to Jake, feeling as though she had been soiled. Her second is with a young Spaniard whom she deserts finally out of the recognition that to remain would be his ruin. "You know," she explains, "it feels rather good deciding not to be a bitch." Her whole attitude is made explicit later in *Death in the Afternoon* by the author's comment that "morals are what you feel good after."

The examination continued in the second novel, *A Farewell to Arms.* In this volume the two lovers are given every possible opportunity to make a go of it. Frederick Henry, an American soldier in the Italian army, is sickened by the brutality of war, confused by the anarchy of the retreat at Caporetto. Nothing could be better, he imagines, than the stability and order of a life with Catherine, a nurse who treated him for minor wounds, so he risks desertion from the army, rows a small boat thirty miles across a lake into Switzerland, and settles down in a

life which promises the most commonplace of prewar ideals: a wedding trip to Niagara Falls when they are free to leave Europe. But the force which was ever present in the war and in the bull ring, the force which had appeared prominently in the early stories of the Michigan woods, appeared with a precision that only the *deus ex machina* can provide to destroy any idealistic illusions that might have remained with Frederick. Catharine was taken in childbirth:

> That's what you did. You died. You didn't know what it was all about. You never had time to learn. They threw you in and told you the rules and the first time they caught you off base they killed you.

Hemingway's whole philosophy of futility is expressed in the image of the ants on the burning log of the campfire as seen through Frederick Henry's introspection:

> As it commenced to burn, the ants swarmed out and went first toward the center where the fire was; then turned back and ran toward the end. Where there were enough on the end they fell off into the fire. Some got out, their bodies burnt and flattened, and went off not knowing where they were going. But most of them went toward the fire and then back toward the end and swarmed on the cool end and finally fell off into the fire.

A Farewell to Arms might be called "The Wasteland" of prose.

> *Burning burning burning burning*
> *O Lord Thou pluckest me out*
> *O Lord Thou pluckest*
> *burning*

Frederick Henry thinks how he might have been the Messiah and redeemed the condemned insects, but he didn't stir. Inaction is the fruit of futility. Men live and die like insects at the caprice of nature. With *A Farewell to Arms* it looked as though Hemingway had reached the end of the line, and it continued to look that way through the eight years that followed. *Death in the Afternoon* and *Green Hills of Africa* were studies in death and morality that had been foreshadowed earlier both in the short stories and the novels. "Nobody ever lives their life all the way up except bullfighters," Jake had been made to say. He might have included hunters, fishermen, skiers, and prize-fighters, participants in any activity where man or animal pitted himself against death. Death was under the microscope, but neither of these experiments away from the traditional art forms added anything except the explicit statement to what the author had already written on the subject.

The next novel, *To Have and Have Not,* is unimportant, but principally as an æsthetic model. The best explanation of its failure is given by Robert Penn Warren and Cleanth Brooks, who point out that the typical Hemingway hero is a gentle, sensitive character in a chaotic world. If he plays at being tough, as do Jake Barnes and Frederick Henry, it is to protect his tender skin. The clash of character and setting (best exemplified in the short story, "The Killers," where the inexperienced Nick is for the first time confronted with the violent world of the gangster) results in a tension that gives body to the completed work. However, Harry Morgan, the hero of *To Have and Have Not,* is outside this general tradition; he is as tough as the forces against which he battles. This despite the fact that much of the situation is simply a reversal of *A Farewell to Arms*: the husband is killed and the wife is left alone to ruminate on the futility of life divested of the physical presence of her mate.

But despite the æsthetic ineffectiveness of *To Have and Have Not,* despite the moral vacuity of the earlier novels, an interesting fact stands out in all of them: it is that for the characters who face it, death is not all defeat: it is at least a partial victory. Even Catherine is made to say: "I'm not afraid. I just hate it." So in the case of Harry Morgan, it is his failure to wipe out, single-handed, a whole gang of bank robbers and revolutionists that confirms him in a belief that no man can fight the evils of the world alone, and it is in an expression of this discovery that he expends almost his last breath. This is a realization which must be studied further, for it is similar to the discovery of John Donne, which made such an impression upon Hemingway, that "No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe." It represents an initial movement, slight though it may have been, against the subjectivism and impressionism of his novels, and while it was accepted as a thorough-going conversion to Marxism by most critics of the time, and though it may even have seemed so to the author himself, it appears now to have been a step in the opposite direction: toward conservatism and a broader literary tradition.

II

Oddly enough, it is primarily as a novelist that the public thinks of Ernest Hemingway. Perhaps it is because American readers take their novels more seriously than they do shorter fiction. A certain type of

short story has a wide circulation in the popular magazines, but during the past twenty years (a period of great advancement in the short story), no collection of short fiction has come anywhere near having the popularity of the best-sellers among the novels. A few Hemingway stories have been anthologized widely, but collected fiction is known primarily to schoolmasters and librarians, so that Hemingway's popularity still rests upon his novels, and particularly upon those that have been made into moving pictures. Best known of the short stories are notably "The Killers," "The Undefeated," "Fifty Grand," and "My Old Man" from the early volumes; "The Short and Happy Life of Francis Macomber" and "The Snows of Kilimanjaro" from among the recent works. It is doubtful, however, if the total number of readers who have read them with genuine pleasure during the past ten years would equal the subscribers to the Book-of-the-Month Club for the single issue which circulated *For Whom the Bell Tolls.*

Despite this fact, there is a reasonable certainty that the final estimate of Ernest Hemingway as an important author will depend, ultimately, upon his shorter works, for it is in them that emotion is more completely integrated with technique (about which enough has already been written), and it is in them that character is more completely expressed in action rather than moralizing. The ironic discovery that many men achieve their greatest victories in the face of death is clearly and completely demonstrated by the author in some of his earliest short stories. In "The Undefeated," for instance, Manuel Garcia, a climacteric old bullfighter and a former favorite of the ring, stays with the bull until he is mortally injured, remains even when the spectators have begun to jeer and to throw cushions at him, because he must convince himself that he is "going good."

In a later story, "The Short and Happy Life of Francis Macomber," Hemingway achieves an almost perfect integration between his theme and action on a simple and straightforward dramatic level. The principal character, an American sportsman hunting with his wife in Africa, has earned the contempt of his wife through a display of cowardice. The wife's contempt is, however, not unmixed with pleasure, since it offers her the advantage over him which she desires — a kind of "moral" advantage which is accepted even by their guide, who allows her to share his bed even though this would normally have been considered

a breach of his strict, professional code. When Francis Macomber redeems himself by standing up to a charging water buffalo, his wife, under the pretense of shooting at the animal, sends a bullet into her husband's brain. That the game was already lost, however (what Edmund Wilson calls Hemingway's war between men and women), is indicated by the fact that the wife did not even bother to contradict the ironic accusation of the guide.

> "That was a pretty thing to do," he said in a toneless voice. "He would have left you too."

This is but another example of the victory of the dead in Hemingway's fiction, and a strange contradiction of the views expressed in "A Natural History of the Dead." There is, of course, no *natural* distinction between the man, Francis Macomber, who lay dead in the jungle, and the water buffalo just a few feet from him. They both died fighting, and it might be said that they both died like animals. But there is one obvious distinction: for the buffalo, death was neither victory nor defeat — it was simply extinction. The courage of the human being was a rational discipline of his uncontrolled urge to flee, a conscious subjecting of himself to danger in order to prove his manhood. *Hubris* it may have been, an excess of courage or what Aristotle might have termed foolhardiness, but it is in the classic tradition and arouses pity and fear, emotions which remain singularly unstirred by the vapid complaints of a Frederick Henry or a Marie Morgan.

Even more traditional in many respects is Hemingway's latest important piece of short fiction, "The Snows of Kilimanjaro." The hero of this story (which was written about the time of *To Have and Have Not*) might have been Nick Adams, or it might have been Jake or Frederick of the early novels. In any case, it is a writer who has lost himself through drink and through marriage with a wealthy widow. He has returned to Africa hoping to regain the clear perceptiveness of his earlier days, but an infected leg causes his death, and it is from the reflections of his past and through the painful awareness of the things he might yet accomplish that Hemingway weaves his story. If it is less successful than "The Short and Happy Life," it is so because the literary device (symbolism) with which the action is resolved is probably less satisfactory to a modern reader than action resolved upon a strictly realistic level.

But it is the type of symbolism itself which is most amazing. Aside from the complex flashbacks in the mind of the central character, the final section of the story is made up almost entirely of an imagined flight in an awaited rescue plane, but it is not until the last page that the reader knows that the actual plane has not really arrived. The flight of the plane carries the dying man toward the east, toward the western summit of the mountain Kilimanjaro, the meaning of which is explained in a note:

> Its western summit is called the Masai "Ngaje Ngai," the House of God.

Though the clear, and somewhat trite, imagery of the symbol is tempered slightly by the irony of the remainder of the note:

> Close to the western summit there is the dried and frozen carcass of a leopard. No one has explained what the leopard was seeking at that altitude,

still, a reader may justifiably stand amazed at the use of religious mythology as a symbol for death by the author of *A Farewell to Arms* and "The Natural History of the Dead." It is a far cry from the nihilism of the ants on the burning log, the futility of Jake and Brett Ashley, the lusty despair of Marie Morgan, and while it does not constitute evidence of the author's conversion to the concepts of Christian mysticism, it does tempt one to ask what Ernest Hemingway is seeking at that altitude.

III

Hemingway's final novel, and still his most recent work, *For Whom the Bell Tolls,* would appear at first glance to be little more than a variation upon the theme of death as played in his earlier war novel. Again we have an American soldier fighting as a member of a foreign army. We have a love affair between that soldier and a girl whom he meets behind the lines. We have again the inevitable struggle between the hero's conflicting duties as a soldier and a lover. It is typical of Hemingway that in neither book is this struggle made the essential or pivotal point in the development of the action. In *A Farewell to Arms,* the decision was made quite naturally and as a matter of course. Discouraged by the anarchy of the retreat at Caporetto, Frederick Henry escapes with his mistress into Switzerland.

> I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice and the expression in vain. We had heard them . . . and had read them, on proclamations that were slapped up by billposters over other proclamations, now

> for a long time, and I had seen nothing sacred, and the things that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done with the meat except to bury it.

With such a philosophy, Frederick Henry could not possibly have returned to the front, perhaps to be shot by his own compatriots. Yet there was the same confusion in the fighting in Spain that there had been in Italy, perhaps more, because the Spanish armies were composed of a great many divergent forces united only temporarily by a common hatred of fascism, and the hero of *For Whom the Bell Tolls* did not desert. If the situation is identical, but the resultant action dissimilar, then there must have been some fundamental philosophical change taking place in the minds of the characters of the two novels. The point is that Hemingway's feeling for Republican Spain (we might even say his feeling for humanity since it first struggled for conviction in the case of Harry Morgan) has led him away from his earlier impressionism.

> He fought now in this war because it had started in a country that he loved and he believed in the Republic and that if it were destroyed life would be unbearable for all those people who believed in it.

Morals are no longer the things you feel good after; they are the things you believe in. One does not, as Hemingway well knows, "feel good" in death, and there is the implication all through *For Whom the Bell Tolls* that the result of Robert Jordan's mission, the blowing of the bridge, will result in death for him. The suggestion is, then, that Hemingway has found some value in Robert Jordan's death that was not present in the death of Catherine, an idea that was neglected by the "lost generation" philosophy of the 1920's.

Perhaps the most expertly drawn character in *For Whom the Bell Tolls* is Pilar, the wife of the wavering guerrilla leader, Pablo. It is she who facilitates the hurried courtship of Robert and Maria. From her mouth we get the detailed portrait of the early days of the revolution. But above all, we get from her a wedding of the frankly realistic with the supernatural. At first, Robert Jordan is inclined to accept only the former:

> 'Don't be mysterious,' Robert Jordan said. 'These mysteries tire me very much.'
>
> 'So?' Pilar said.
>
> 'I do not believe in ogres, soothsayers, fortune tellers, or chicken-crut gypsy witchcraft.'

'Oh,' said Pilar.

'No, and you can leave the girl alone.'

'I will leave the girl alone.'

'And leave the mysteries,' Robert Jordan said. 'We have enough work and enough things that will be done without complicating it with chicken-crut. Fewer mysteries and more work.'

'I see,' said Pilar and nodded her head in agreement. 'And listen, *Ingles,*' she said and smiled at him. 'Did the earth move?'

'Yes, God-damn you. It moved.'

Pilar laughed and laughed and stood looking at Robert Jordan laughing.

'Oh, *Ingles, Ingles,*' she said laughing. 'You are very comical. You must do much work now to regain thy dignity.'

Robert Jordan has already accepted the mystery of sex — suggested in the figure of the earth shaking. But the mystery of death is unresolved, though it is indicated that Pilar has an answer. She has read in Robert Jordan's palm that he is not to survive the blowing of the bridge.

However, if this were all there were to it, we could lay the fortune-telling incident simply to literary expediency. The possibility of death is brought to our attention, through which device the ethical question of whether Robert Jordan should continue with his mission or return to Madrid with Maria is highlighted. The fact that Jordan *is* killed does not necessarily make a case for clairvoyance. It does, however, serve as a symbol for all mystery, and is brought back into the novel in a later scene.

The most pressing problem connected with the destruction of Robert Jordan is the question of how the two lovers are going to react to it. An answer is suggested, of course, in the fact that Jordan, despite the danger of the mission, has determined to see it to completion. There is, therefore, this justification for his death (a not unusual one) that he has shown the value of each man doing his duty to the whole of society when that duty would seem to conflict with his duty to himself or to individual members of the group. That this was a common dilemma of Greek tragedy is attested in the cases of Antigone and Orestes. Its justification, though illustrated by the obverse of the same coin, is suggested through the quotation of John Donne, from which the author obtained his title:

Any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.

But this does not suggest a satisfactory solution to the specific relationship between Robert and Maria. If each man is a "peece of the continent," a segment of all mankind, there is also a more intimate, a more personal relationship in the case of a man and a woman in love. This was a problem that had specifically perplexed the seventeenth-century poet, who had found his answer in the dualism of Renaissance Humanism:

> As virtuous men pass mildly away,
> And whisper to their souls to go,
> Whilst some of their sad friends do say,
> The breath goes now, and some say, No;
>
> So let us melt, and make no noise,
> No tear-floods, nor sigh tempests move;
> 'Twere profanation of our joys
> To tell the laity our love.

The first reaction to physical absence must be, then, decorum. Donne continued to say that it is only dull, sublunary lovers who admit absence of the senses, because their love is elemented by the senses. "We," he says, "care less eyes, lips, hands to miss."

> Our two souls therefore, which are one,
> Though I must go, endure not yet
> A breach, but an expansion
> Like Gold to airy thinness beat.

Had such an explanation been satisfactory to the Hemingway of the 1920's, it is obvious that the two early novels would have been entirely different books, yet it is not dissimilar to the resolution of *For Whom the Bell Tolls*. In the final scene of the novel, Robert Jordan has been wounded by the fascists, and any attempt by his own people to remove him from danger would jeopardize the entire group. He is determined to remain, not only to decrease the danger of the escaping compatriots, but also to delay the fascists in their pursuit.

> *'Guapa,'* he said to Maria and took hold of her two hands. 'Listen. We will not be going to Madrid . . .'
>
> Then she started to cry.
>
> 'No, *Guapa,* don't,' he said. 'Listen. We will not go to Madrid now but I will go with thee wherever thou goest. Understand?'
>
> She said nothing and pushed her head against his cheek with her arms around him.

> 'Listen to this well, Rabbit,' he said. He knew there was a great hurry and he was sweating very much, but this had to be said and understood. 'Thou will go now, Rabbit. But I go with thee. As long as there is one of us there is both of us. Do you understand?'

Maria finally does go, and as though to erase any doubt that he has meant what he said, Hemingway has Robert Jordan consider the problem again while he is awaiting the fascists:

> Try to believe what you told her. That is the best. And who says it is not true? Not you. You don't say it, any more than you would say the things did not happen that happened. Stay with what you believe now. Don't get cynical. The time is too short and you have just sent her away. Each one does what he can. You can do nothing for yourself but perhaps you can do something for another.

And this leads him to a contemplation of the general question concerning the supernatural, the denial of Pilar's knowledge of death:

> Listen, one thing. Do you remember? Pilar and the hand? Do you believe that crap? No, he said. Not with everything that's happened? No, I don't believe it. She was nice about it early this morning before the show started. She was afraid maybe I believed it. I don't, though. But she does. They see something. Or they feel something. Like a bird dog. What about extra-sensory perception?

Though there is doubt in Hemingway, just as there was in John Donne, this is a long way to have traveled from the certainty and the futility of the "lost generation." If, at the present, one thing is certain, it is that the present belief of Ernest Hemingway is the result of something other than "microscopic examination." We have not yet learned how a bird dog "feels" things, though we have subjected him to the most exacting of scientific examinations. If Ernest Hemingway agrees with John Donne that there are values beyond those dull, sublunary loves of a Brett Ashley and a Jake Barnes, he seems also to have come to an almost complete agreement with the arch-humanists of our century: Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. "There are more things," More said to the pragmatists with whom Hemingway was allied during the 1920's, "in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy." Babbitt might have told Hemingway as early as 1919 that a belief in love alone, as was the case with Catherine and Frederick, led only to an unsatisfactory futilitarianism: ". . . it cannot properly be put in the supreme and central place for the simple reason that it does not involve

any adequate conversion or discipline of man's ordinary self to some ethical center."

If the "ethical center" is not clearly defined in "The Short and Happy Life of Francis Macomber," it has something to do with courage and the mastery of physical weakness. The symbolism of "The Snows of Kilimanjaro" suggests something very similar to the Christian's return to Grace — repentence and salvation — though on a doubtful level which precludes acceptance of it except for the exigencies of the story. Both faith and mysticism, however, are wedded in *For Whom the Bell Tolls,* and while there is still a wholesome regard for the natural senses (as there is in all art), there is also provided a common meeting-place for characters as divergent as Maria and Pilar, Robert Jordan and the wavering Pablo. They are united finally by a common goal above their ordinary selves: the fulfilling of a mission which they have imposed upon themselves. Robert Jordan does not die unaware of this solution.

> I wish there was some way to pass on what I've learned, though. Christ, I was learning fast there at the end.

One is tempted to say that Mr. Hemingway also has been "learning fast." If it is a long road from "A Natural History of the Dead" to *For Whom the Bell Tolls,* as great as the distance between Naturalism and Neo-Humanism, who would think that it would return to the point from where Neo-Humanism claims to have originated: the Renaissance? Perhaps this is what Gertrude Stein meant when she made the remark that while Ernest Hemingway spoke like a modern, he smelled of the museum.

THE MISPLACED MODESTY OF SCIENTISTS

By ALBERT G. RAMSPERGER

THE ACHIEVEMENTS of modern science are wonderful to behold, but any scientist who takes to boasting of what science has done for the world is likely to have thrown up to him the evils that science has brought to mankind, the horrors of modern war, and the deadly routine of factory labor engaged in producing gadgets which are often dubious contributions to good living, complicating our lives, and keeping us in fear of the instalment collector.

Numerous writers on social problems and some scientists who have become sensitive to the charge of having visited more evil than good upon the world, have undertaken a defense of science. The argument most often used is fairly familiar. It proceeds from a humble admission of the limitations of science. The function of science is to describe nature, to formulate the laws of her behavior, to predict what events will follow when certain conditions are set up. It is not the function of science to say what events we ought to bring about nor to evaluate events that occur. Science can tell us how to sustain and prolong life, but it cannot tell us what the purpose of life is. Science can tell us how to make motion pictures and radios, but it cannot tell us whether it is better to watch a motion picture than to listen to the radio. Science can tell us which are the most poisonous gases, but it cannot tell us whether we ought to use them on our fellow men to win a war. In short, science has nothing to say about values. Judgments of value must be based on some other method than that of science.

Having admitted these alleged limitations of science, the conclusion is evident. The scientist, as scientist, knows nought of either good or evil. The scientist is not to be held responsible for the bad uses to which his discoveries are put. Responsibility for the evil use of the powers which science has put into the hands of men lies with the one who uses those powers, for it is he who takes the moral step of choosing which of the

alternatives that science has shown to be possible is to be made actual. It will readily be conceded, of course, that as a citizen in his community, the scientist has the same responsibility as anyone else to act in accord with moral principles of right and justice and to support the civic and religious agencies whose function it is to determine what is good and what is right.

I believe that there are fallacies in this argument which not only foster a misunderstanding about the nature and supposed limitations of science, but which hinder the application of scientific intelligence to the problems of humane living. The argument ignores the fact that the direction of scientific inquiry is largely determined by decisions already made as to which ends are desirable. It is simply not true that science first discloses all the alternatives that might be realized and that then men choose the good or the bad, according to their moral characters. Now to choose some goal is one thing, and to find out by scientific inquiry if and how it can be attained is another, but we cannot say that science has nothing to do with the former, unless what is good and the circumstances under which men are motivated to pursue it are not natural events subject to investigation by scientific methods, just as the means for achieving that good are subject to scientific investigation.

There are historical reasons for the exclusion of values from scientific consideration. The traditional interpretation of science conceives its task to be the discovery of the real nature of things behind the merely subjective appearances. To this end, everything that is relative to particular circumstances is discounted as not truly belonging to nature. The odor and the color of the rose do not really belong to it because these are relative to the special sense organs of the observer. Much less is its beauty really there for that is still more clearly dependent upon the person who finds it beautiful. As for the judgment that roses are more to be desired than violets, that is so obviously relative to the apparently groundless whims that strike one at the moment that it sounds ridiculous even to ask for a scientific answer to the question whether roses are really better than violets. Better and worse are not predicable of nature because (to paraphrase a familiar line) nothing is good or bad if personal experience makes it so.

Now the flaw in this argument is that if a true description must be in terms of properties and qualities that belong to the object inde-

pendently of its relations to the observer and to the rest of nature, then nothing we can say of the object is really true of it, for *all* scientific descriptions are true only relative to assumed or specified circumstances. One of the important disclosures of the Einstein theory of relativity is that even quantitative characters such as distances and time intervals have unambiguous meanings only in relation to specified operations, with specified instruments, used by observers at specified standpoints.

Either of two different conclusions may be drawn from this. On the assumption that there is a reality whose properties are not relative to the circumstances under which they come to be experienced by an observer, the conclusion would be that science can never give us the truth about ultimate reality, but can only describe the phenomena as they appear to our human faculties and in relation to our humanly devised and operated instruments. The scientific quest, originally conceived as a search for the absolute nature of things, must therefore be reinterpreted in more modest terms as the discovery of the relationships between mere phenomena.

The alternative conclusion that may be drawn is that the discovery of relativity is proof that reality *is* relative, not that knowledge, being relative, cannot grasp reality. To find the truth about things is to find what they are in various relationships and contexts—contexts which, in all human knowledge, include the physiological organism of the observer and the instruments he uses. Such relativity need not be interpreted as falsification if we drop the arbitrary assumption that there is an intrinsic nature to things in and by themselves and that true knowledge must penetrate to that real nature.

The bearing that these two interpretations of scientific knowledge have upon the question of whether values must be excluded from scientific consideration is this: Values were first ruled out because it was supposed that anything that is relative, or merely "subjective," cannot be part of an objective body of scientific knowledge. If, now, the relativity of all characters and properties becomes evident, the study of values as we actually find them in experience should not be on a different basis from the study of any other content of experience. If relativity proves that science does not inform us about ultimate reality then, by similar reasoning, science, though it may describe what appears to men to be valuable in relation to their environment and heredity, cannot tell us what is

really valuable. On the other hand, if relativity proves that any existing real thing is what it is only by virtue of the context in which it stands, then values, though relative, are real in the contexts in which they are found.

Now anyone who is predisposed to a belief in absolute realities and absolute truths about such realities will also cling to a belief in absolute values. And just as such a person concludes from the relativity of all observable fact that there is a deeper reality not accessible to science, so he concludes that apparent values, because of their relativity, are not necessarily real values. Consequently he turns to some other source for a standard of value in terms of which specious values may be accredited or discredited. This implies that no fact of experience is, on the face of it, a value—that the pleasures of food and drink, the joy of friendship and love, or the thrill of beauty are, as such, neither good nor evil. They acquire the status of *real* values only if they meet the test of some supra-experiential (and usually supernatural) standard and it is not the business of science either to set this standard or to apply it to concrete situations. Thus the scientist is absolved from any responsibility for making judgments upon the comparative value of two experiences, or two ways of life, or two civilizations.

The whole position hinges on the standard which is above all experiences and in terms of which experiences are to be judged. No satisfactory account has ever been given of what that standard could be, or why it — whatever it may be — should carry authority to veto one's actual experiences of better or worse. That so many philosophers, theologians, and professional moralists have professed a belief in such a standard is not as strong an argument in its favor as their inability to define it intelligibly, or to agree upon its definition, is an argument against it. The belief in a supernatural standard of value seems to be the expression of man's lack of confidence in his own ability to chart a course of action that will resolve his difficulties.

One might have supposed that the more empirically minded scientists and philosophers, who concluded from the relativity of all natural events and qualities, not that reality must be sought in some supernatural realm, but that reality *is* the world as we find it in the various relationships and contexts in which we observe it, would have allowed experiences of good and evil a place in the subject matter for scientific inquiry along

with any other observed data. For if terms like "good," "satisfactory," "preferable" have meaning in the same sense in which common-sense terms like "heavy," hot," and "red," or scientific terms like "weight," "alkaline," "wave length," and "neurosis" have meaning, namely, by referring directly or indirectly to certain properties which nature discloses to experience, then there is no legitimate reason for excluding the former from scientific consideration. Anything that occurs in spatial or temporal relations to other experienceable items is proper subject matter for science.

Unfortunately this reasoning is seldom carried through consistently and scientists, who should be the first to encourage the application of empirical methods to all possible fields, all too often join the chorus deploring the fact that the solution of moral and spiritual problems has lagged behind progress in the natural sciences. This very wording, contrasting moral and spiritual with natural, betrays the underlying assumption that the experience of good living or of miserable living is not made up of natural occurrences like the growth of a tree or the path of a projectile whose conditions and consequences may be observed, described, predicted, and controlled. As though we did not also observe the happiness or misery, the hopes and frustrations, the pain and death that follow upon the conflicting aims and ideals that men now set themselves! Why have not these problems enlisted our best scientific efforts and methods: critical examination of the consequences of current ideals, experimentation with new aims, and testing their results in terms of greater or less human satisfaction? Part of the answer may be found in history.

According to an intellectual tradition that stems from Plato and Aristotle and continues through the scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages, that which is most perfect is also most real, for the value or good of a thing is the "final" cause of its actualization. Hence whatever comes to be in the world does so because it fulfils some good end or purpose. In religious terms: God has designed a world in which everything plays a part in the fulfilment of the most perfect possible whole. With this teleological conception of the world as a starting point it should be possible to proceed from an idea of what is best, and infer what the world must be in fact.

Probably the most important difference between the intellectual attitude of the Middle Ages and the attitude of modern science is the

rejection of teleology as a basis for the interpretation of fact. One of the lessons learned by modern science was that we get no answers to our questions about fact by looking for their purpose. Preconceptions based on what we think the world ought to be or what we would like the world to be in order that it may serve our ends, stand in the way of discovering what the "cold facts" actually are. This lesson has not only been well learned; a false conclusion has been drawn from it. Because a preconception about what values the world ought to realize is no basis for inferring what the world in fact is, the conclusion is drawn that one cannot scientifically investigate the conditions under which value experiences in the form of concrete satisfactions do in fact occur. One can, however, make a factual inquiry about values without prejudging the facts in terms of values already assumed.

The distrust of teleology is not the only reason why scientific methods have been so rarely applied to the discovery of better ways of living and to the reformulation of ideals and moral codes so that they will lead to that end. Most of the problems that need to be answered in terms of what is better or worse for human living fall in the fields of psychology, the social sciences, and education. It is perhaps unfair to suggest that scholars in these fields have not been doing their job, for much information has been gathered that can be used in choosing between different values. Nevertheless, it remains true that the social scientist has usually adopted the view that a description of experience which includes the fact that something is found to be better than something else cannot be scientific. When the psychologist or sociologist discovers the needs whose fulfilment or frustration bring joy or misery, he carefully refrains from making judgments of their comparative value. This is partly due to his desire to achieve the quantitative precision of the physical sciences, which are not complicated by variables so difficult to describe and compare as are human desires, motives, and enjoyments. We can give numerical expression to qualities like hot and cold because we find that they vary concomitantly with the height of a mercury column. But satisfactions vary with so many circumstances and in no regular proportion with any of them, that no measurable process can be taken as a measure of satisfaction. Eating food is good but eating twice as much food cannot be said to be twice as good. This inability to compare values in quantitative terms is largely responsible for value problems being shunned by

science. Value is a vague term whose primary reference is to something common in the content of various actual experiences which we describe as good, enjoyable, satisfying, preferable. We cannot say what it is except by recognizing instances of it, just as we cannot say what red is or sour is except by presenting one with an instance of it. But while it is possible to specify the conditions of occurrence of red with considerable precision (finally in terms of wave length) the conditions under which experiences of value occur are so various and so complex that they fall at the extreme of what are called subjective qualities. The result is that, instead of using their influence to bring scientific method to bear upon problems of human value, both physical scientists and social scientists have avoided the difficult task of thinking scientifically about what is, after all, the most important subject for humanity. A misplaced modesty about the inability of science to deal with values has led them to pass the responsibility to other agencies in society: the church, the professional moralist, or the writer of semipopular essays and books on social problems, on the supposition that morality, the study of good and evil, must have a nonempirical and therefore nonscientific basis and sanction.

We have rules of conduct as guides to the good life. If these rules are put on the same basis as any other scientific hypothesis, as they should be, they are subject to rejection or revision if they fail to result in the intended consequences. In science it is the generalizations and theories that must be changed to fit the facts; we do not deny or pretend to change the facts to make them fit our theories. Similarly, if behavior according to accepted moral rules does not work out satisfactorily, it should be the occasion for reconsideration of the rules. To hold to the moral *status quo* in the face of human misery and frustration implies that conduct in conformity with these rules is intrinsically good whether or not such conduct is experienced as satisfying, or that such conduct is the means to a higher good for the sake of which human satisfaction should be sacrificed.

This whole subject has traditionally been the province of the philosopher. What have philosophers been doing about it? No single answer applies to all of them, but some have been clinging to the dubious doctrine that there are certain dimensions (the term "dimensions" is a good example of a philosopher's red herring) of reality, other than that investigated by science, which constitute the domain of philosophy — a

domain which must be guarded against the encroachment of science. The special sciences have gradually taken over much of what was once natural philosophy, leaving to philosophy those problems whose solution is assumed to involve a reality more ultimate than the phenomena with which the sciences deal and to require sources of truth other than empirical inquiry. The philosopher's task is to determine what is really good, what is really right, what is really real.

Critical examination of this view would require lengthy logical analysis, but the scientist need not wait upon the answer. If a day comes when scientific methods fail to throw light on any domain of experienceable fact, it will be time enough to set limits to science which can be crossed only by the moralist, the theologian, or the metaphysician.

A practical question remains: Whose responsibility is it to carry the light of scientific inquiry into the field of values? It would be absurd to suggest that the specialist in quantum theory, or physiological chemistry, put aside his work to undertake the study of human values. It is perhaps not so absurd to hope that the social scientist and the psychologist will overcome their reluctance to devise tests and criteria to judge whether one social institution or pattern of living is better than another, once it is recognized that better and worse are definable in terms of the satisfaction of actually felt needs which are no less objective, identifiable, and subject to controllable conditions than is a pain or a fever that is scientifically dealt with by the physician. All knowledge about experienceable fact, including the experience of value, is the discovery of the conditions under which that fact occurs and of the relationships of that fact to the occurrence of other facts.

But aside from the question of who is to undertake the actual investigation of values, there is a responsibility that falls upon all scientists alike. It is the responsibility of understanding what it is to have scientific knowledge, of encouraging efforts to increase that knowledge in every field, and, above all, of opposing all movements which hinder the scientific search for the good life on the specious ground that values, unlike other natural events, require a nonscientific certification. This last point is all the more important because scientists themselves are often guilty of discarding their scientific attitude as soon as they turn away from their special fields, and some even give addresses and write articles which give the impression that science, by its very

nature and method, precludes inquiry into values. The prestige of science thus comes to be used, not to lift the study of human values out of the dark ages from which the physical sciences and biology have emerged, but to keep man in that state in which he is the master of all things except his own welfare.

THE ECONOMIC EQUIVALENT OF WAR

By LEO BARNES

COLLAPSE of our military enemies is now eventually certain. But if the peace that is coming is to last, the world must find the full economic equivalent of war.

That equivalent has not yet been achieved in this country. In our present stage of social development, war creates and maintains full employment in a way in which no peacetime device has been able to accomplish it. There is as yet no shred of empirical evidence that *any* economy—capitalist, fascist, or communist—can continue to maintain full employment in other than a war-changed environment. A dozen years of nazism shows only that it is relatively easy for a ruthless economic management to restore full employment after a long and severe depression by deliberately preparing for mechanized world domination. Similarly, the gigantic prewar military expenditures of Soviet Russia—the wisdom of which is now receiving so satisfying a confirmation—serve to indicate the substantial military basis of full employment under communist management.

It is sad but true that war is the most dynamic factor in the improvement of our industrial techniques, in the enlargement of our industrial capacities, and, most ironical of all, in the expansion of consumer demand. Unless we find the complete economic equivalent of war, the epitaph of our civilization will be that its income and wealth achieved their highest levels only so long as its peoples were systematically engaged in making the instruments of their mutual destruction.

In searching for the economic equivalent of war, we must not forget that the American goal is not simply "full employment," but rather the highest standard of living attainable in a social environment of freedom and democracy. This means jobs for all who want them, a satisfactory reward for business, labor and the farmer, adequate social insurance—all with a minimum loss of vital human liberties. If we must choose

between unfortunately incompatible aspects of security and liberty, most Americans would sacrifice a little of the latter—but only up to a certain point. Totalitarianism teaches us that work without freedom can be as horrible as freedom without work. The twentieth-century American dream is that full employment and adequate freedom can both be attained.

To make that dream come true after the war, we must provide steady jobs for about 59,000,000 Americans who will want them. We must also have work for the young men and women who will be entering economic life at a rate of about half-a-million a year faster than our old workers will be leaving it. The magnitude of this combined operation is measured by the fact that in our best peacetime year, 1940, we were able to employ an average of about 46,000,000 persons.

Employment for 59,000,000 people does not, in the immediate post-war period, require 59,000,000 civilian jobs. Anywhere from 3,500,000 to 4,000,000 men will be needed to fill the ranks of the world's largest navy and air force, as well as a respectable standing army. In addition, "frictional" unemployment—the irreducible minimum of jobless due to workers in the process of changing positions, temporary and seasonal layoffs, etc.—would account for another one or two million workers. Accordingly, it is estimated that 59,000,000 persons could be employed most of the time with about 54,000,000 civilian jobs—a goal which is 8,000,000 jobs higher than our prewar best performance.

It is important to stress that the goal is to *maintain* full employment, not merely to *achieve it*. There is a real danger that this country is going to be fooled by the intoxicating possibility of simply achieving full employment once again without substantial government control of business. This is, indeed, a postwar possibility which liberals and radicals would be shortsighted to deny. It is no great economic achievement to reach a high level of employment after five years or more of durable goods starvation. With billions of dollars available in stored-up purchasing power, it is not out of the question that we might talk ourselves into a tremendous consumers' goods buying spree and a correspondingly great producers' goods replenishment boom. The cumulative effect might well create almost the number of jobs equivalent to full employment. But all recent economic experience teaches us that such an uncontrolled boom could not long maintain itself and—unless the government stepped

in vigorously—would wind up in a crash and depression as severe as that of the '30's.

We must learn from the war. The only way to maintain full employment once it has been achieved is to utilize the planning and control techniques which have been so laboriously acquired in developing our present war economy. It would be a sorry waste to throw this accumulated knowledge overboard when our military enemies are defeated, and return to our haphazard, chronically under-utilized pre-war economy. Advance planning on a co-operative basis by industry, labor, and government has, on the whole, worked well in achieving maximum output for war. Less rigorous but essentially similar planning to abolish poverty could be equally successful in peace.

It may require another depression to make the United States take this course. Because of the danger of fascism (under another name, of course) all of us hope that this can be avoided. But, sooner or later, we must learn the economic lessons of war if we are to escape disaster. With a prayer for speed on our lips, let us see what they are.

II

First, before getting down to the brass tacks of specific techniques suggested by our war economy, there are several matters of general economic theory and approach that deserve brief clarification.

A basic lesson of war economics is that, except for war, there is no easy road to full employment. Even in war, with millions of workers out of the labor market, peak employment takes time to achieve for a nation dulled by economic stagnation. In peace, when most of those millions have returned to the economy, the task is enormously magnified.

War highlights the multi-barreled nature of our economy. The six M's—men, machines, materials, money, markets, and management—all must be properly handled. Loading one or two of these barrels while neglecting the others is a certain way to miss the mark of full production. The tantalizing manner in which production bottlenecks have shifted from machines and management to materials and manpower since the start of the defense program four years ago is eloquent testimony to this truth. The moral for the postwar period is that putting too much weight on one part of the economy almost always results in upsetting the whole.

At the present time, the economic theory that most needs this corrective is the popular view that a more equitable distribution of purchasing power is the cure for unemployment—which, it is held, results from inadequate spending by the masses and overadequate saving by the classes. But war shows with startling clarity that money alone is not the key to full production and employment. It is the nonmonetary elements of our economy that are primarily responsible for the mass production that is winning the war—men, machines, and planning, not the almighty dollar.

All this may seem obvious. But the point is important for our postwar economy. Redistribution of purchasing power may be highly desirable on moral grounds, but it is not the basic answer to our economic problems. Even unlimited purchasing power doled out by a beneficent government will not make for full employment unless it is both properly channelized and supplemented by other controls.

Avoiding one-sided panaceas, however, is far from the whole story. For another major lesson of war economics is that, no matter how multi-barreled our techniques, we must fact the fact that *full employment means a continuously unbalanced economy*. Our economy is too big and complicated to have near-perfect economic balance *and* full employment *and* the minimum of economic and social liberty that is the American birthright. While a high degree of economic balance remains a desirable goal, the *fetish* of economic equilibrium for the sake of equilibrium must be discarded.

Consider for a moment what equilibrium at full employment reuires. A perfectly balanced full employment economy would mean just enough factories and machines and tools in them, of exactly the kinds that could be used by just the right number of men who wanted to work them, turning out just the quantities and varieties of merchandise that all types of consumers want to buy and for which they have just the right amount of money to spend or invest.

Under the ideal system of competitive capitalism, such perfect balance was supposed to be achieved "in the long run" by automatic economic adjustment. It never worked except in books. At the other extreme, such equilibrium might theoretically be attained under an economically omniscient dictatorship which exercised absolute control over every factor of production, distribution, and consumption. But short

of this monolithic "one-man" economy, permanent economic equilibrium at a high level of employment is a will-of-the-wisp.

Such equilibrium is more improbable in postwar America than in any other major national economy. Apart from the greater size and complexity of our industrial system, there are two major reasons why it will be especially difficult for us to achieve both equilibrium and full employment after the war.

First of all, we are likely to keep a greater degree of individual and group liberty in economic affairs than any other major power. But, paradoxically, the more economic freedom there is, the greater the amount of economic *immobility*. In a dictatorship, workers can be shifted rapidly from one end of the country to another, as economic or military conditions demand. In postwar America, workers will probably continue to be free *not* to move out of their home towns, even if it is to their purely economic advantage to do so. In a regimented economy, a manufacturer can be ordered to produce farm equipment instead of machine tools. In an unsuppressed economy, a businessman may stubbornly go on losing money in his regular line. Economic equilibrium calls for making almost instantaneous adjustments to continually changing factors of supply and demand. This cannot be done if—as most of us would like—labor and capital retain considerable freedom of action.

In the second place, the durable goods sector of our economy, normally the largest in the world, has been made even larger by our becoming the arsenal of the United Nations. It is now common economic knowledge that durable goods production is the most unstable part of a capitalist economy. Booms and slumps are chiefly due to fluctuations in the output of durable goods, particularly of so-called producers' durable goods. War's expansion of this sector of our economy will make the achievement of postwar equilibrium more difficult.

Why not, then, change the structure of our economy to reduce its capacity to make durable goods? There are at least three stubborn realities which will work against such a change.

The first is, of course, the great economic and political power wielded by the owners and managers of heavy industry. They will resist most proposals to curtail capacity for the same reason that, early in the

war, they fought most suggestions to expand capacity: the fear that such action will diminish their future profits.

An even more decisive factor is the dependence of our military strength upon a big reservoir of capital goods facilities. Any peace settlement that now seems likely will still leave us in a world in which actual and potential force is the dominant arbiter of international affairs. In such a world, no country could markedly curtail its capital goods productive structure without inviting national suicide.

Finally, making a sizable cut in our durable goods capacity without increasing unemployment requires an equally sizable boost in the output of nondurable goods, mostly in consumer items. If this extra output is to be absorbed, national consumption must be increased at the expense of national saving. But this is a much more complicated task than is usually realized. It implies the reversal of a number of strong recent institutional developments which are dependent on savings—such as the growth of life insurance, the expansion of social security payments, the growing insistence on full amortization in real estate loans and mortgages, and, probably most important, the considerable increase in corporate savings in the form of depreciation reserves nad undistributed profits.

The moral of the preceding analysis is important. Lacking both the magic of automatic economic adjustment and the power of economic tyranny, any democratic, progressive program for the social control of business must accept as nievitable a considerable amount of economic unbalance. *The economic goal of postwar America cannot be economic equilibrium at the full employment level. It must rather be a full employment economy in which inevitable economic unbalance is channelized into the least harmful direction.*

What is the least harmful direction? The interdependence of the six M's is a clue to the fact that we can take our economic unbalance in a number of ways—in manpower (unemployment), in machinery (excess capacity), in materials and merchandise (surplus supplies), or in money (inflation or deflation). In wartime, the danger of military defeat simplifies our choice. We gladly take our economic unbalance in the form of excess capacity and surplus supplies—to the postwar tune of an estimated 103 billion dollars in surplus war property of all kinds. Better that much too much, so long as we get what we need in time.

It is a simple step from this lesson of the war to its postwar implications. Why not take our peacetime economic unbalance in the same way? Surplus commodities and excess capacity are far less harmful than unemployment; and much less dangerous than inflation or deflation, either of which is likely to result in unemployment. Why not have "Uncle Sam: customer for surplus production" replace "Uncle Sam: customer for *war* production"?

Acceptance of this alternative is predicated on the proposition that the social costs of full production, however unprofitable such production may be from the standpoint of private accounting, and whatever surpluses such production may create, are incomparably smaller than the social costs of chronic, large-scale unemployment. Unemployment can spraed through the economy with feverish speed; surpluses merely glut our warehouses. Accordingly, even if there were no answer to the problem of what to do with surpluses, the latter would be better than unemployment.

Of course, no one wants the continued economic waste of surpluses piling up indefinitely, year after year, as the price of full employment. This, too, can be a one-barreled panacea. The economic unbalance which surpluses represent can be reduced by the skilful operation of the specific techniques proposed in the following sections of this article—devices like inter-industry advance planning, more effective distribution of purchasing power, training workers to perform multiple jobs, and, last but not least, socially-controlled leisure through planned reduction of the working day and week. Whatever surpluses remain after these controls have been put into operation must be marked up as the price of full employment in a democratic industrial society. The most effective outlet for such surpluses would probably be to help Uncle Sam play the role of international good Samaritan.

III

To achieve a lasting economic equivalent of war, we must establish procedures which will make booms permanent; even if, as the preceding section has maintained, this can be done only at the price of continuous economic disequilibrium. In describing the recommended procedures, the following sections also indicate how that price should be paid and, if possible, minimized.

Many American, British, and Scandinavian economists have made contributions to the theoretical requirements of a democratically controlled capitalism that could make for a permanent boom. However, the organizational and functional experience of the American and British war economies gives, for the first time, real body to these theories. The following program combines some of the theoretical work of men like Lord Keynes, J. M. Clark, Mordecai Ezekiel, and Alvin Hansen, with the administrative lessons derived from American participation in the war.

Our principal mentor is the War Production Board. Even now, its hundreds of regulations and thousands of records constitute an invaluable storehouse of economic wisdom about every industry and almost every business activity in the United States. In them, if anywhere, we can find the administrative blueprints for the economic equivalent of war.

Correspondingly, the War Production Board should, after the war, be transformed into a permanent agency, the major body of a revitalized Department of Industry and Commerce. Its peacetime name could be the Production Control Administration, or some euphonious variation. Its function would be to control and expand production for peace as the WPB now controls and expands production for war. Business would remain in private operation; wages and salaries, profits and dividends would be earned and paid in the usual way. The result would be neither socialism, communism, nor fascism, but socially controlled capitalism.

A crucial practical problem, of course, is whether such centralized planning is constitutional. This question is squelched by universal consent in time of war, but it will not be kept down when the war is over. There comes to mind the precedent of the Supreme Court's unanimous vote against the NRA. However, ever since the political battle over its enlargement, the Court has shown considerable flexiblity in accepting social legislation favored by a Congressional majority. In view of the strong political pressures that, sooner or later, will exist for abolishing unemployment by social action, there is every possibility that Congressionally approved centralized planning will be accepted by the Supreme court as constitutional.

Undoubtedly, there is substantial conflict between the co-operative action demanded by central planning and the present antitrust laws. This also would have to be eliminated by Congressional action.

The administrative structure of the Production Control Administration would be essentially similar to that of the WPB. However, there would be industry divisions or administrations only for the major basic industries. These would include: steel, copper, aluminum and magnesium, automobiles and automotive products, aircraft, shipbuilding, construction, rubber products, refrigeration and air-conditioning equipment, radio and electronics, machinery and machine tools, chemicals, petroleum and coal. Other industries may have to be included or may themselves ask permission to participate.

Subsidiary industries, trade, the services and professions would remain largely unregulated. Their expansion would come as a consequence of the planned expansion in the basic industries. Similarly, participation of smaller units in the controlled industries (in most fields, those employing less than 100 workers) would also be on an optional basis.

If the plan worked smoothly, it is likely that many smaller firms in the controlled industries would apply for permission to participate. The prospect of guaranteed markets would also be a strong inducement for noncontrolled industries, and might well result in the paradox that noncontrolled business would accuse the government of "favoring" controlled business. Decisions to include or exclude noncontrolled industries or firms would have to be made chiefly on the basis of administrative feasibility. Detailed production control over the whole range of the economy is too enormous a job to permit unlimited extension of the Production Control Administration's authority.

Each industry administration of the PCA would have an executive committee composed of an equal number of industry, labor, and public representatives. The PCA itself would have a similarly constituted executive committee appointed by the President. Management and labor members of the industry administration committees would be democratically selected by management groups and labor organizations, respectively, in the industries affected. Public representatives on such committees would be merit appointees from the higher brackets of government service. All committee actions would be by majority vote, with procedures available for minority appeals up to the PCA executive committee.

Elections to industry administration committees would be for two-year terms. The problem of representation for workers who are not members of labor unions and for employers who are not affiliated with management associations is more academic than real, since unions and employer groups already dominate almost all the controlled industries. However, the results of controlled industrial expansion would benefit both organized and unorganized workers and employers.

In order to avoid political disputes, presidential appointments to the PCA executive committee would be for a longer term. Five years might be the most desirable length. While a membership of nine would be adequate for industry administration committees, the PCA executive committee should consist of fifteen members in order to provide adequate representation for all sections of industry, labor and the public.

Positions on both industry administration committees and the PCA executive would be full-time jobs. To obtain the necessary calibre of administrator, the range of present executive salaries in the various war control agencies would have to be substantially increased. Salaries up to $25,000 and more would undoubtedly be necessary to obtain competent industrial executives. No additional compensation from private firms would be permitted. Also, substantial ownership of stocks or bonds of firms that might be affected by PCA actions would be banned.

IV

Operating procedures under the jurisdiction of the PCA would be along the following lines:

(1) The PCA executive committee would prepare an over-all plan for expansion of production in the basic industries calculated to achieve substantially increased employment and national income in the year ahead.

(2) On the basis of this tentative plan, industry administrations would work out more detailed programs for expansion of the industries under their supervision, in terms of estimated prospective markets for their products at the projected level of the national income.

(3) These industry administration plans would be checked against each other by the PCA executive committee, which would make the adjustments necessary to guarantee that they fit together properly. The main function of this over-all review of industry programs would be

to correct proposed schedules which seem to be unrealistic in terms of the available supply of the factors of production — materials and components, facilities and labor. This review, of course, would not be confined to data presented by controlled firms and industries. Statistical information from noncontrolled business would continue to be collected and used.

(4) The revised plans would then be returned to industry administrations for assignment to individual firms on a quota basis. Annual production schedules, similar to those drawn up during the war under the Controlled Materials Plan, would be issued to concerns in each controlled industry. A firm's quota would be based on its existing capacity, past sales, available new equipment, and its own desire for expansion. There would be two chief differences between PCA quotas and CMP authorized schedules: First, PCA quotas would not be accompanied by allotments of materials, as is now the case under CMP. More important, PCA quotas would be flexible, with upper and lower limits separated by as much as fifteen or twenty per cent. This flexibility would permit moderate changes in the competitive position of firms in a controlled industry without defeating the purposes of industrial expansion.

(5) A certain percentage of each industry's total quota, to be determined by the industry administration on the basis of past records of new entrants into the industry, would be reserved for allocation to new firms (including concerns from other industries seeking diversification or expansion). The quota percentage for new entrants would be adjusted annually on the basis of the previous year's experience. Thus, if new firms did not apply in sufficient numbers to absorb the full quota, it would be lowered for the next period. However, if too many new firms applied, the quota would not necessarily be raised. Instead, this undue eagerness might be taken as an indication that prices in the industry were too high, and might call for investigation by the Price Branch of the PCA.

(6) To stimulate the production of new products, the present Office of Scientific Research and Development would be affiliated with the PCA in the Department of Industry and Commerce. Discoveries and inventions made under its auspices would have to be available to all applicants on a royalty basis. The same thing could be done with

discoveries and developments of the Bureau of Standards or any other research body affiliated with the government. In addition, enemy patents now controlled by the Alien Property Custodian would continue to be freely available at nominal cost.

(7) The basic incentive for a firm to produce up to the full amount of its quota would be a guarantee that any part of its authorized production not sold through its customary commercial outlets would be purchased by a Surplus Adjustment Corporation at either producer's cost or a stipulated industry-wide price.

(8) The Surplus Adjustment Corporation should be the same agency to which the task of disposing surplus war property has been assigned. Like war surpluses, peacetime surpluses would be either stockpiled, exported, or gradually released in the domestic market. If feasible without creating significant unemployment, subsequent production quotas would be readjusted to prevent the formation of similar surpluses. Losses of the SAC would be met either out of the general revenue or by a special processing tax.

(9) A Price Branch of the PCA, which would inherit OPA's wartime accumulation of cost and price data, would help in setting fair acquisition prices for surplus commodities. More important, it would also make recommendations from time to time whether greater volume of production or increased technological efficiency in any controlled industry should be reflected in lower prices rather than in higher wages or profits. In effect, the Price Branch of the PCA would be the consumers' advocate in the perpetual contest for larger incomes that will go on between labor and industry in setting industry prices, quotas, and wages. Frequently, labor and management in a particular industry may join forces to maintain unnecessarily high prices. In such cases, it would be the duty of the Price Branch to appeal to the PCA executive committee for a price revision.

The problem of handling surplus commodities brings us to the crux of our production control plan. To what extent will surpluses pile up? How will they be disposed of? Will guaranteed saleability encourage inefficiency and quali' deterioration? Such specific problems cannot be answered in advance with any accuracy. But certain general observations are possible.

In the first place, as has already been indicated, while surpluses may be economically wasteful, they are both economically and morally preferable to unemployment. Under unregulated capitalism, the gap between production and consumption due to excess savings or other causes results in surplus labor or unemployment. Under the proposed plan, it would result in surpluses of commodities only. Moreover, if some of the other actions proposed in the next section of this article are taken, handling surpluses will not prove to be an insuperable problem. A fiscal policy that produced a more equitable distribution of income would encourage consumption. On the other hand, incentive taxation would promote investment and create further purchasing power. Public works would make an additional contribution to employment and purchasing power. All these supplementary aids in producing the economic equivalent of war would help prevent the piling-up of excessive surpluses.

V

The work of the PCA could be considerably speeded by collateral action by other government agencies. While not absolutely necessary to achieve the economic equivalent of war, the following instrumentalities would certainly be helpful:

(1) An expanded Federal Housing Administration to help private construction satisfy the huge postwar need for low-cost, modern housing.

(2) A Public Works Administration to take up some of the slack in employment by means of large-scale public projects and improvements, and to co-ordinate the efforts of state and local public works agencies.

(3) A Reconstruction Finance Corporation to provide capital for worth-while private and local public projects at suitable interest rates. Carrying charges for housing projects should be particularly low. In practice, both flexible and selective interest rates should be employed by the RFC and other government lending agencies. For example, when it would be desirable to stimulate housing, the interest rate could be lowered to an almost nominal figure. However, when additional plant capacity should be discouraged, the appropriate interest rate would be raised to the necessary level. In general, rates would almost always be lower for nonprofit activities like hospitals and schools than for commercial enterprises.

(4) A strengthened United States Employment Service to furnish the basic mechanism for bringing jobs and workers together.

(5) An enlarged Social Security Administration which, by means of adequate social insurance, would prevent the accelerated spreading of whatever unemployment does occur.

(6) More progressive tax legislation, with the double aim of increasing consumer demand by graduated taxation of personal incomes rather than ungraduated taxation of consumption, and of stimulating private investment by taxing dormant money hoards rather than the risk capital of business enterprise. Progressive taxation in the postwar period should probably include at least the following features: (a) only slight modification of the wartime personal income tax structure; (b) correspondingly severe reduction in the yields of sales taxes and other consumption levies; (c) similarly sharp reduction in corporate income tax rates, with the possible elimination of the tax for corporate incomes of less than $25,000, and with increasingly graduated rates for higher incomes; (d) complete elimination of the excess profits tax; (e) to stimulate investment by individuals, a new tax on liquid funds above a fixed ratio (say 1/10) of anticipated annual income; and (g) a similar tax on business liquid holdings above a fixed ratio to customary cash reserves, designed to take the place of the unworkable undistributed profits tax.

VI

Maintaining full employment after it has been achieved is the final phase of assuring the economic equivalent of war. This is a radically different problem from restoring full employment after a period of depression, stagnation or semi-boom.

With the preceding plan in operation, several years of industrial expansion should result in approximately full employment. When this occurs, expansion on the same scale as previously is no longer possible. Most industry and individual firm quotas will have become relatively stable, and the problem of unemployment will take on a different character. Instead of having to provide work for large numbers of unemployed, the main task will now be to prevent unemployment from developing and spreading. Even in the industries under PCA supervision, unemployment could result from either (1) technical improvements

making it possible for a manufacturer to produce his quota with fewer workers; or (2) industry administration decisions to reduce quotas because of excessive surpluses produced in previous periods. Particularly in the case of durable goods, pressure may be great to reduce output eventually to replacement levels, with quotas well below those of previous periods of expansion.

Control of unemployment at this stage involves the three concurrent phases of prevention, localization, and elimination.

(1) *Prevention* can best be achieved through advance planning by the PCA. Market research could indicate fields in which sales declines should be expected in the period ahead. The Office of Scientific Research and Development should have plans continuously available for production of new products to offset diminishing demand for existing products. Similarly, a roster of needed public projects should always be ready to forestall any substantial slackening of employment. Where unemployment is due to increased technological efficiency, planned reductions either in the prices of the commodities involved or in the length of the work week (with no decrease in take-home pay) will sometimes be indicated rather than expansion of production in other fields.

As has already been suggested, a progressive tax policy could help prevent unemployment by increasing both consumers' and producers' demands for goods and services.

In addition to all the preceding steps, prevention of unemployment calls for the practical measure of requiring at least three weeks' notice to both workers and the United States Employment Service before a lay-off can become effective. In conjunction with an efficient re-employment service, the measures suggested could prevent most unemployment.

(2) *Localization* of unemployment, when it does occur, is primarily the task of adequate unemployment and other forms of social insurance. Since unemployment would be comparatively infrequent, much more liberal benefit rates than the present ones would easily be feasible.

(3) Methods of *eliminating* unemployment would be essentially similar to those of preventing it, except that they would be taken after rather than before the event. Some combination of further industrial expansion, lower prices and shorter hours could always be achieved

that would eradicate localized unemployment which had not been prevented by the techniques previously suggested.

VII

To a visitor from a more rational planet, the question whether a nation like the United States could afford full employment would seem rather bizarre. His natural reaction would be, of course, "How can such a nation afford perpetual, sizable unemployment?" Yet, probably only readers who accept deficit spending as a permanent part of our economic life will have thus far refrained from wondering how the economic equivalent of war is to be financed.

We have already spoken of the incomparably lower *social* costs of full production compared to those of chronic underproduction. Now, however, it is a matter of demonstrating that full employment is profitable to us, the taxpayers, in hard cash and not merely in the insubstantial coin of ethical and social values. To do this most convincingly, the monetary cost of the program of production controls previously suggested should be estimated on the unfavorable hypothesis that the recommended techniques work poorly as well as on the more pleasant supposition that they perform effectively.

The latter task is, of course, the easier one. If the Production Control Administration functions smoothly, approved industry production programs would be realistically geared to the probable markets for the whole wide range of American productivity. The result would be a minimum of surpluses as the economic price of full production. Under these ideal conditions, taxpayers would undoubtedly save far more from reduced unemployment insurance charges and relief costs than they would lose from selling surpluses at less than cost.

On the other hand, suppose that, in the first few years of its operation, the Production Control Administration made some bad mistakes. For example, incompetent economic research, internal administrative strife, or bickering between labor and management representatives might result in an unexpectedly high degree of economic unbalance. Large quantities of surpluses would then begin to pile up in government warehouses. Let us take the extreme view. Suppose the original value of unsaleable surpluses each year were equal to the combined annual sales of every single department store, dry goods, general merchandise and mail order

house in the United States. In an average year, these sales add up to about five billion dollars. Let us further assume that this staggering accumulation of surpluses is a total loss, and that the government must therefore pay the whole five billions.

Even on these improbable assumptions, it is quite clear that five billion dollars in additional taxes, at a full production national income level of more than 150 billions a year, would be far easier on the taxpayers' pocketbook than five billion dollars in unemployment and relief costs at a national income of 90 or 100 billions a year. At $14 per week per unemployed person, five billion dollars would give unemployment insurance or relief to about 7,000,000 jobless each year. If we remember that for the dozen years before America entered the war, average monthly unemployment practically never fell below this 7,000,000 mark, we should particularly appreciate the fact that even an annual loss of five billion dollars on surplus commodities would be a cheap price to pay for full employment.

In actuality, it is improbable that the loss on surpluses would rise above a billion dollars annually. Full employment would create enormous money income, the potency of which as purchasing power would be enhanced by the lower prices made possible by steady production at full capacity. This broad, continuous stream of purchasing power alone would be able to prevent surpluses from accumulating beyond manageable levels.

In the light of this analysis, it is safe to say that full employment at the price of surpluses is cheaper than unemployment of the magnitude and duration typical of our prewar economy. To be sure, it would be ideal to discover a means of achieving and maintaining the economic equivalent of war that, without destroying democracy, would be even less of a burden on the taxpayer than the proposals here advanced. As we have seen, however, part of the price of economic and social freedom of action is an inevitable minimum of economic unbalance. It is, therefore, hard to escape the fundamental conclusion of this article: that the proper shock absorber for economic dislocation in a democracy is the accumulation of inert commodities, not the living frustration of unemployment or the perilous experiment of inflation and deflation.

CO-OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS

By MURRAY D. LINCOLN

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT has firmly established itself on the main street of the American business community. It has, in the past decade, achieved a stature which clearly indicates its place and potential force in the pattern of national economics.

While present co-operative influence in our economy offers no total solution to the limitations of capitalism, co-operatives have clearly indicated their ability to meet certain of these limitations. They have augmented the real income of urban and rural members. They have demonstrated an effective challenge to monopoly. They have created durable and intelligent functional groups. And they have emphasized self-help rather than greater dependence upon state aids. In an economy which promises to solve more of its problems on the state level, co-operatives will be distinguished not only for their self-reliance, but for their practical devotion to genuinely free competition and enterprise.

The past several years have found mounting endorsement of co-operatives in many important segments of American life. Indeed, current attacks on certain types of farm co-operatives by the National Tax Equality Association give additional evidence of increasing public awareness of co-operative institutions.

Co-operatives, then, have come of age. There is every indication that they will continue to grow in both size and influence. What directions may such growth and development take? Some trends are already clearly indicated while others are admittedly conjectural.

GENERAL DIRECTIONS

The co-operative movement in America is predominantly a rural phenomenon. Agriculture accounts for all important producer-marketing activity (annual volume over three billion dollars) and for three-fourths of the nation's consumer co-operative activity. Conservative estimates indicate that one out of four farmers participate in one or more farm co-operative enterprises.

Farm co-operatives (other than service types) fall into three general categories. They include: groups which perform marketing services alone; groups which perform purchasing services alone; and general purpose organizations which provide both marketing and purchasing services.

Producer-marketing co-operatives, representing approximately one-third of our farm co-operative organizations, are moving consistently in the direction of general purpose co-operatives. Indications further suggest that they, along with other marketing organizations, will process more raw products for ultimate consumption. The strictly purchasing type of co-operative, in turn, appears to be directing interest toward marketing services, so that the over-all farm co-operative trend is toward the general purpose organization.

General purpose co-operatives performing both marketing and purchasing services represent approximately one-half of our farm co-operative organizations. The spectacular purchasing volume of this group has not only attracted wide attention but its entrance into production of farm supplies has been cause for concern in many American business circles.

There is no clearly defined pattern of emphasis on either purchasing or marketing in this group but seventeen such organizations had co-operative purchasing volumes of over two million dollars in 1943. The convenience and efficiency of integrating marketing and purchasing operations through one co-operative organization suggests that such associations will dominate the farm co-operative scene of the future. Indeed, in twenty-five years such organizations may represent the strongest and most vocal agricultural voice in the nation.

Co-operative marketing of farm products faces its most promising era. The relative simplicity and low cost of quick-freezing and dehydration will influence the marketing operations of all co-operatives in the period ahead. These new processes make possible decentralized on-the-spot preparation of foodstuffs for the ultimate consumer. Co-operative exploitation in this field will bring wider margins to the farmer. Still greater gains may be realized when farm co-operatives relate their output to growing co-operative consumer demands in our cities. Such relationships may benefit both farmer and consumer. The city consumer will become more and more familiar with the word "co-operative" on the packaged foods he buys in the future.

Farm purchasing co-operatives have clearly indicated their usefulness to members and will expand, both in areas of service and in ownership of production facilities. Towards greater self-sufficiency farmers have through their regional organizations secured ownership of a number of factories. While there is no indication that co-operatively owned production units are more efficient than old-line firms, substantial savings have been effected in distribution. The entrance of farm co-operatives into the manufacture of tractors and farm implements is a fundamental step toward the solution of a vital problem. Co-operative farmers have long realized the disproportion between manufacturing costs and sales price in this field. Co-operative production of farm machinery should, as it has in other areas, influence the costs downward. The path of monopoly in farm factors of production will be challenged increasingly by co-operatives. Farmers have already indicated their determination and ability to produce for themselves. The ownership, for example, of a tractor factory in Indiana by a number of strongly financed regionals both here and in Canada suggests a pattern which can have tremendous implications for American agriculture.

If present signs are significant we may expect purchasing co-operatives to move into still another important field of member service. Recognizing that he spends as much as fifty per cent of his income for food, clothing, and other consumer needs, the farmer is showing increased interest in this phase of consumer co-operation. While some few purchasing associations already provide general consumer services, most do not. The ramifications of such a development are many. Farm co-operatives offering complete consumer services may attract many urban members. Not only can this strengthen the enterprise but it may facilitate rural-urban relationships. Farmers will then be encouraging urban co-operative development, which development may in turn provide a more direct and profitable outlet for raw and processed food products.

In some cases, certainly, the farmer will choose to limit membership to his occupational group. It remains to be seen how the over-all trend will develop. But farmer interest in more directly meeting his consumer needs is already established and the next decade should witness considerable enterprise in this field.

Urban consumer co-operatives. In our cities, co-operative development has been limited by a number of factors. Keen competition in the retail field has kept margins low and exploitation at a minimum. Successful

invasion of the anonymity and heterogeneity of cities by the co-operative philosophy has been a slow and uphill task for organizers. Progress, however, is constant and current signs are more promising than at any other time in the past twenty-five years.

We can reasonably expect urban membership and volume to double in the next ten years. Organization techniques are reaching a new level of realism and effectiveness. Broad endorsement of consumer co-operation by labor union groups is "softening" resistance in many urban centers. Greater responsibility for organization is being taken by regional wholesale units in the East and Middle West. Streamlined techniques for financing from the "top down" are receiving attention in some sections of the country. Methods of advertising and publicity are approaching competitive quality. Physical plant and equipment, likewise, are more nearly meeting the high standards of competitors.

The attitude today is no longer one of waiting until the public spirit moves. It is one of aggressive and intelligent organization, limited only by the availability of competent staff organizers. Realistic appraisal of present co-operative groups is giving the cue to a more effective education of similar groups. New housing units, public and private, have lent themselves with particular ease to co-operative organization. The postwar trend toward suburban housing units is a promising field for co-operative penetration.

With a myriad of services offered by consumer associations the food co-operative continues to receive major emphasis. While co-operative production of strictly consumer items represents less than seven per cent of total co-operative manufacture, we may reasonably anticipate expansion of consumer production in the next few years. Such a trend will be augmented by the increasing consumer interest of our farm groups.

Urban consumer development is the number one co-operative problem today. Progress is being made but at few points do we find the spontaneous and natural enthusiasm which so often characterized the rural development. Expansion will take place but it will require tireless and intelligent organizational effort.

Service co-operatives. Because of their specialized functions, service co-operatives too often receive less attention than their more glamorous associates. These units do, however, play an important role in the over-all co-operative picture. From barbering to burials, these enterprises serve

several million rural and urban Americans. By their almost infinite variety they indicate that co-operatives can adapt themselves to a wide range of consumer experiences.

Co-operatively sponsored insurance now services nearly a score of states. Expansion in all lines is indicated with special emphasis on the extension of health protection. Rural electric co-operatives are growing likewise and have already established a sound basis for the trend toward public ownership of such utilities. Credit unions servicing over three million members have deposits of more than one quarter billion dollars. The small decline in loans and membership during the war is not significant in the long-run development of this enterprise. It is hoped that the future will indicate methods of relating this important service more directly to other areas of consumer co-operation.

The efficiency and quality of service which these service co-operatives are displaying will doubtless stimulate the trend towards greater public control and ownership in these fields.

Operational Directions

Three operational areas, including finance, personnel, and national integration, appear to merit special if brief attention. These trends relate themselves to the rural-urban co-operative pattern as a whole.

Finance directions. Financial stability of co-operative organizations on both local and regional levels is generally the best in their histories. Member equity in ratio to capital structure is at a new high. While war-born prosperity has made this possible in many cases it also reflects the determination of most organizations to prepare for possible slumps ahead.

While much of this capitalization has resulted from plowing savings back into the various organizations, a considerable amount has come from member subscription. This appears to indicate a rising level of confidence by members in their own institutions. With the existence of strong and well-financed regionals which provide technical assistance to local associations, co-operatives are reaching a new level of business stability.

Few large co-operatives, however, have yet been able to meet all of their credit demands. Short and long term credit requirements are being met largely by commercial and government co-operative banks. It is in this field that a promising direction is indicated. In process of organization

is the National Co-operative Finance Association. At the outset this institution will meet credit demands of its affiliates by providing discount services. In the long run it may provide banking services for the movement as a whole through a local, regional, and central bank structure. Co-operatives today are paying for credit they are clearly able to provide themselves. Such credit bears strategic relation to the safety, stability, and financial independence of the co-operative movement.

Personnel Directions. In the formative years most co-operatives were long-hour and low-pay institutions. Skilled personnel was difficult to attract under these conditions. Familiarity with and devotion to the co-operative philosophy was too often the first requisite of employment. While such conditions still prevail in many areas, the over-all personnel picture is improving.

War pressures on labor supply plus the improved financial structure of most co-operatives probably account for increased attention to the general personnel problem. Most regional organizations now employ personnel officers. The national League has put into operation a Personnel Committee. Job instruction and job relations are receiving greater staff attention.

Regional and national training programs for employees have improved in quality. Greater emphasis is given to techniques and less to ideologies. Wage levels for employees have generally advanced to meet higher wartime living costs. Hiring of technically skilled staffs is becoming more commonplace. And the movement as a whole is gradually outgrowing the conviction that top employees must take half their salaries "in the good of the cause." Such an attitude plus the reluctance of co-operatives to pay for the services of technically skilled personnel has generally retarded co-operative development.

The entire field of labor relations is opening up for co-operatives. This area will present many practical problems in the future. Co-operative commitment to broad social goals will constantly influence its relation to the employee. Co-operatives in the long run have the responsibility of not being merely "good" employers, they must be "better" employers.

National integration. There exists in co-operative circles today certain pressures toward the integration of all co-operatives into a functional national movement. This implies an organization of sufficient size and scope to integrate the operations of the wide range of producer, market-

ing, consumer, and service co-operatives. From a practical point of view such a national organization has much to recommend it. There is no present indication, however, that such an organization will develop in the near future. It will take considerable time and effort.

If European and Scandinavian precedents were to apply here in America we might ultimately expect a strong federation of consumer co-operatives—with marketing co-operatives relating themselves to, but not becoming a part of, such a federation. But even this situation cannot be accurately forecast. Co-operative integration in America is still too much in process to predict what national directions it will take. There is as yet no clearly defined national consumers' movement. Farm groups with basic loyalties on the producer-marketing side are dominant factors in American co-operation. Their strong purchasing programs have related specifically to their own producer interests (i.e. the purchase and production of producer supplies). As earlier stated, these groups are gradually turning their attention to the consumer aspects of farmers' own needs. When and if the activities of these strong co-operative groups should reach a balance between consumer and producer interest, we may expect the greatest possible national integration. But whether this should or should not happen, we may anticipate a growing number of economic and operating relationships between these two groups.

The fact that the urban consumer movement today is not yet strong enough to provide marketing co-operatives with general outlets for their products is in itself a curb on national integration. The hope is that with (1) the emergence of a stronger urban consumer development, (2) with farm marketing groups relating their products directly to such groups, and (3) with the growing number of economic relationships which appear likely between the two groups—we may some day find ourselves woven into an effective pattern of friendly and purposeful relationships. National integration is a goal we strive for. We cannot help reaching it if our basic co-operative groups will consider first the areas in which they may serve each other effectively. In the long run their differences will merge into a vital pattern of service, both to themselves and to the American community.

Social-Political Directions

Social directions. We have in the preceding discussion considered principally the economic and structural aspects of the co-operative move-

ment. As co-operation in America grows and expands, so will its moral force contribute to the changing social fabric of our national community.

Co-operatives have brought meaningful integration to thousands of American communities. They have brought dynamic group relationships into the vacuum of twentieth century individualism. They have given to individuals the sense of belonging, the values of participation, and the fact of ownership. They have related millions of citizens to the social and economic world about them. And they have brought Christian idealism into practical focus with daily living.

We seek here in America to maintain the fact and values of democracy. But democracy is not a static quantity which perpetuates itself. It is a process demanding constant and effective participation. The man on the street must be able to relate his voice as a citizen to the very halls of Congress. Today, our danger lies in the fact that too many have too little understanding of this vital two-way relationship. The problems we face and the decisions we as a nation must make in the near future will severely test the quality and strength of American democracy. The existence of thousands of co-operative organizations throughout America with informed members who both know and practice democracy, will serve us well in the period ahead.

Wherever co-operatives operate they are providing, at least in part, the fundamental grassroots organization which America needs today. They are providing practical education. They are building a more responsible and moral citizenry. And they are relating those citizens to their local and national communities as well.

The total influence of these co-operative "by-products" is admittedly small in terms of the over-all national community. But as the movement grows, and as it invades our great urban areas, we may expect to find less and less of the helpless and apathetic individualism we see there today. The strong cohesive forces of co-operation have yet to demonstrate themselves in an American emergency. But in the stormy political and military chaos that is Europe today, we are learning that co-operative structures—in spite of invasion and suppression—still stand strong and ready to assist in the reintegration of people and nations. The whirlwinds of war and political upheaval have not destroyed them.

Political directions. Co-operatives traditionally maintain strict neutrality in the political sphere and there is no present indication that such

a policy will change. This does not preclude, however, united co-operative action in legislative matters relating to co-operative welfare. The current National Association of Co-operatives, for example, has been organized in defense against possible legislative changes which would affect farm co-operatives adversely. Co-operatives must, at any moment, be prepared to enter the legislative arena on their own behalf.

In the current field of political pressure the National Council of Farm Co-operatives is our strongest co-operative voice in Washington. This organization, composed of a wide variety of farm co-operatives, primarily reflects farm producer interests. Regardless of increased consumer activities in the farm co-operative field this organization is likely to continue its emphasis on producer problems. And if current expansion of farm co-operatives continues we may expect this organization or its counterpart eventually to present one of the strongest and most effective agricultural voices in the nation.

A new political direction for co-operatives, however, is indicated. Pressure for adequate consumer co-operative representation in Washington is growing. Not only will such an organization represent the co-operatives, but it will tend to represent the broad interests of all consumers as well. Such an organization is needed today. The Co-operative League through its office and staff in Washington is equipped to perform some of these services, but genuinely effective consumer representation will come only when it has the backing of a great consumer movement.

International Directions

Before this war national federations of co-operative societies in forty countries throughout the world were united in the International Co-operative Alliance. This organization brought together over one hundred thousand societies and a hundred million members. With the successful conclusion of the war we will make another effort at world peace. The continuation and expansion of these co-operative relationships can augment the common understanding and friendly relationships necessary for such peace.

International co-operative trade among the many countries in Europe before the war was an important factor in continental commerce. Co-operative imports from the United States involved upwards of thirty million dollars annually. American co-operatives, coming out of this

war the strongest in their histories, are making plans to relate at least part of their production to this form of international trade.

At the outset, petroleum will represent the principal factor of trade. It is further hoped that raw and processed foodstuffs may be exchanged. As co-operative production increases, especially in the machinery and farm supply field, it may be possible to relate part of such goods to foreign co-operatives. Multilateral trade agreements are indicated. Under such a plan American co-operatives might, for example, ship processed foodstuffs to Britain, Britain sending shoes to Brazil, with Brazil in turn shipping coffee to our own co-operative organizations.

Delegates to the Conference on International Co-operative Reconstruction held in Washington in 1944 recommended the establishment of an International Co-operative Trading and Manufacturing Association which would facilitate the exchange of food and petroleum. Farm supply commodities were to be added as soon as possible. Whether such an organization will actually emerge and operate is not clear at this time. American co-operatives, however, can be expected to turn increasing attention toward international co-operative exchange in the future.

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Bulwark for democracy — and wholesome force in the American social and economic community—co-operatives will contribute substantially to the redefinition of democracy in this country and its re-establishment in the world.

THE GREAT UNEASINESS

By PAUL BIXLER

One of the more remarkable phenomena of this war has to do with the word "democracy." In public discussion and debate we are frequently told that "democracy is at stake" or that "democracy must be preserved." In a war in which ideology has taken so prominent a place that one of the leaders of the Allied cause has felt called upon to deny its importance, it is only natural perhaps that we should become conscious—at times even self-conscious—of our political faith. That faith, whatever its implications and confusions, is surely democracy. And yet from the beginning of the war the word "democracy" has been missing from our popular slogans.

This absence is the more remarkable in that we have had no dearth of efforts to symbolize or sum up the meaning of the war. One of the earliest attempts and the most dignified, was the Atlantic Charter. The long, carefully worded sentences had their special values, but among them were no short handles which the people could lay hold of. Decidedly better were the "Four Freedoms." That by themselves they were not good enough, however, President Roosevelt later recognized when he stepped momentarily out of his role of Commander-in-Chief and personally solicited a popular name for the war. The gesture of going to the people for advice failed of result. Hundreds of phrases drifted in, including a number that were isolationist or defeatist in intent, but none of them came to anything.

More outstanding than all other efforts was Henry Wallace's "century of the common man." The words breathed inspiration and imagination. They lifted the horizon of all who heard or read them. They dramatized time and the space which Wendell Willkie afterward called One World. Without the eloquence of the former Vice President, we should be much poorer today.

Yet I doubt that the words encompass the whole American feeling about the war and the peace. Who, after all, is the common man? Is he you or me? I think not. The common man is a Frenchman, an Indian,

a Hottentot, perhaps an American we have never met and only vaguely heard of. Most Americans do not think of themselves as "common," and the psychological barrier to thinking so is too tall to be hurdled quickly by a new idea. Inadequacy of our wartime slogans and the absence of "democracy" from those we have, have come under scrutiny before. Usually they are set down to disillusion. We remember too well, it is said, what happened to the battle cries of an earlier war. We remember that in the two decades after 1919, "war for democracy" and "war to end wars" became bitter objects of the utmost in scorn and ridicule. Hence our reluctance toward popularizing or glorifying the present conflict.

There is some truth in the contention. But the real truth, I believe, cuts far more deeply. It goes to the roots of our society. After all, the many connections between the two wars cannot be denied. And we have been engaged in mortal combat now for three years and no lack of conviction has prevented us from producing the greatest war effort in our history.

The truth lies not only in our reluctance to go to war. It lies in the misgivings with which we look toward the peace. It lies in our fundamental uncertainty which no stress or demand of war has blotted out.

We find a clue to our state of mind in our feeling about "democracy." The fact that we are unwilling to use the word in a slogan is a token of our regard for what it ultimately means. Our discussions are full of references to it. Democracy is O. K. There's plenty of life in the old girl yet. But the question is: What is the old girl up to?

We used to know what democracy meant. Now we're not so sure. The essence of our uncertainty is a great uneasiness about what is going to happen after the war.

Before going further, let me note two limitations about this discussion, both of which may already be apparent. First, I am principally concerned with the state of mind of the ordinary, garden variety of American. I am thinking particularly of the man who considers himself "practical-minded" and "not much on theory." Although this "average" American may be abashed in the presence of ideas when they are presented as such, it is obviously unfair to take his embarrassment at face value. If you ask him a question about democracy or some other popular concept, he will, if you give him time, return an answer. And although the words may be halting and confused, he means them and often lives by them.

Also, let me restrict the discussion to domestic impressions. Partly because of our recent isolationism, we are much concerned about America's relations to other countries after the war. Yet our concern is pretty vague and far removed from specific knowledge. What the American looks upon with a sense of personal immediacy is his job, his relations to his employer, to his fellow workers, to his friends, to his community, to his congressmen (possibly), and to his wife or his girl friend—all that might be summed up in the category of personal happiness and effectiveness. The most disturbing problems—the ones that can get him down—are close to home.

II

If you turn to the dictionary, you find that the primary definition of democracy, arising from its Greek roots, is rule by the people—whether that rule be direct or by representation. As an idea and a tradition popular rule is too well founded in the American system to be lightly disturbed. We not only believe in it as a principle, but we have it in practice—more of it, in fact, than most other peoples in the world. Our practice is not perfect (consider the poll tax and even in national elections an incomplete voting electorate in comparison to the *possible* electorate), but where there is specific violation of the tradition, as often as not the cause is something outside the theory or practice of government. Popular rule, however, has come increasingly to be called political democracy, thereby indicating that it is only one aspect of what might be a total situation.

The only other fundamental definition to be found in the dictionary is the idea of equality. Here, too, in what has been called social democracy, we have a well founded tradition. Constant streams of immigration gave us the name of the world's melting pot. From the anarchistic life of the frontier and out of the ease with which we exploited the continent's resources has grown the widespread, though sometimes superficial, informality of our society. The corner grocer, the executive, the farmer, the college professor, the workman still talk to each other and transact business together with a minimum of fuss and form. Status has remained relatively flexible.

And yet social democracy has scarcely touched some areas of our national life. Racial and religious antagonism have not vanished by being transferred to the new world; they have simply become more mixed up (which in the long run may not be totally bad). Furthermore, the roots

of our society are European. Ours is a white man's civilization which knows little of Asia or of any of the colored peoples of the world. It is not only that we have withheld social democracy from the Negro. The barriers we have thrown up against color and racial differences of microscopic dimensions no longer seem contrived but normal and biologically correct. True, the war has shaken some of the deepest of our prejudices; it could hardly be otherwise when on one side of the world we face the race theories as well as the guns of the Nazis and when on the other side millions of "yellow" Chinese and many thousands of Filipinos help us drive back the Japanese aggressor. But on the long road to racial tolerance most of us have traveled no more than the first mile.

Another aspect is economic democracy. This concept arises not so much from a theory as directly out of the clash of economic forces. We think of economic democracy as something recent and associate it directly with the rise of labor unions, particularly industrial unions, and sometimes with the growth of producer and consumer co-operatives. When unions and co-operatives become more generally accepted as institutions, then perhaps economic democracy—the right and the strength of the individual to have a hand in his own economic destiny—may become a tradition and a fact. To date it has been neither.

Popular discussions of democracy sometimes turn up other aspects and ideas. Some, instead of shedding light, obscure the central issue. Recently, for example, it has been said with considerable frequency that democracy means "the freedom of the individual." Fundamentally this begs the question and is by itself no definition at all. For what does freedom mean in the modern world of machines if it is not altered or redefined? General references to freedom undoubtedly reflect some popular interest in the "four freedoms." But they reflect still more an interest in the *status quo*. When a year ago the Army ran a contest for G.I.'s on the topic of "Why I Fight," the prevailing sentiment was "for freedom," but whenever freedom was defined it usually turned out to be "my home," "my girl," "weekends at the beach or ball park, evenings at home, and the kids in my lap," or "to keep America America!" Furthermore, "freedom of the individual" too readily associates itself with rugged individualism, free enterprise, and old-style capitalism. Thus we are confused and the effort to discover what has been happening to us and to our ideas of democracy is frustrated.

Democracy is too great an idea to be subdivided or broken up into bits and pieces. It is too important a concept to be blocked off by ignorance or ancient fixations. The time is now due for total envelopment and attack. I suggest that democracy fundamentally means *effective participation*—effective participation, that is, by individuals in their community and by extension, in society. This notion is now new, but it has not been generally understood nor fairly acted upon.

Most of us want to participate in exciting enterprises with our peers. We want a sense of social accomplishment. We want our efforts with others to count. The urge to democracy is as simple as that—and as all-inclusive. Democracy as effective participation embraces the political, the economic, the social, the personal, the psychological. It includes marriage and the nursery school as well as politics and the labor union. Nothing less will do.

Democracy as effective participation with others. Is it some inkling of this idea which underlies our uncertainty and our uneasiness about the postwar period? And what of our uneasiness more specifically?

III

The average American—the person the news writers sometimes call John Q. Citizen—has a well founded suspicion that he is being asked to fight this war in the interests of democracy. To this proposition it is doubtful that he has any fundamental objection. And yet the word democracy may stick a bit in his throat. For when he looks about at what is happening in the world at large and more specifically at what seems to be happening in the smaller world of his own personal relationships, the picture is hardly reassuring.

Everywhere the main trend is toward centralization of power. For all men the seat of authority and prestige has moved further and further away. The individual's effect on events and even on his own welfare grows less and less. Once, if you needed a job, it was necessary only to go next door or at most downtown; today, to bring about the same result you may have to petition someone in Washington. Yesterday there were relatively few restrictions on the activity of a law-abiding citizen; today there are many, and in order to discover their meaning or gain some necessary relief from them, you probably have to appear before an impersonal board or commission. Interpret the world-shaking events which

take place in Washington, Moscow, or Timbuctoo as you will, their personal meaning can all too easily turn out to be a feeling of individual helplessness. And it is not only that we are at war. The war has merely accentuated a trend which has been visible for some time.

How, John Q. Citizen asks himself, are you going to get democracy out of that?

His idea of democracy runs deep in him, but it flows out of a simplicity not now so abundant. It frequently means little beyond three things—a neighborly relationship in a small community, the vote, and the right to protest. In the very nature of modern technological change the first is not so possible or so widespread as it once was. And the vote and the right to protest, both still intact, are hardly strong enough to bear more than their proper weight. John Citizen is not likely to find that his deepest personal needs are answered by recourse to the ballot box, by application to the law courts or by writing letters to the editor or to his congressman. These activities have their own importance, but they are hardly positive or powerful enough to contribute much to his feeling of security and independence or to relieve him of the weight with which great modern institutions and their accompanying restrictions press upon him.

The popular press, of course, has hammered home the "evils of federal bureaucracy"; and although bureaucracy as an argument was not strong enough to elect a Republican President on last November 7, everyone has personally experienced the stringency of war-time regulations emanating from Washington. Wartime or peacetime, however, the argument is partial and partisan. Confusion is part of it, and if Democratic "confusion" were replaced with Republican "order," the trend toward centralization would not thereby be broken. Much less is said of bureaucracy in big business, but John Citizen is bound eventually to catch up with the truth. Mere size which once provoked his admiration and awe is now quite as likely to suggest intimidation or even fear.

To one who feels helpless in the midst of forces he cannot control, old ideas of democracy lose their meaning and new interpretations are not easily born. Let me quote from the letter of a soldier in the South Pacific. He is looking back at the America he has known and now reads about:

> You speak of the returning servicemen and their voice in the political future. The voice of the overseas servicemen will be little heard, I'm afraid. The

> average man over here is, I believe, gaining an entirely new sense of values. He is completely disillusioned. He finds that Democracy doesn't mean what he thought it did. He has a certain feeling that he is fighting *for* the very thing he enlisted to fight *against*. Like the Spanish Loyalist he is—he is finding his ideals torn to bits before his eyes—strikes, high wages at home, political discord and lack of solidarity on the home front. Just where and what is this Democracy he is fighting and sacrificing for? He can find no answer to that, consequently he has changed his viewpoint. He is fighting now for himself. All he wants now is to be able to come home and live his life in his own way. He wants no part in politics, for over here he can see what a foul, filthy mess it all is. He is becoming an individualist. For his part, the demagogues can have their politics, the capitalists can weave their economic cobwebs—he will pay any price to be left alone. . . .

As his reference to Republican Spain suggests, this young man is more politically minded than most. The psychological rejection, under stress, of the familiar idea of democracy is not often made so sharply; usually it grows imperceptibly under a succession of blows and pressures. But the point of rejection is crucial. Intensify this disillusion and frustration in the postwar period, multiply it by several millions among both veterans and civilians, and we shall have something strongly tending toward fascism.

It is often said that we suffer today from a general feeling of economic insecurity. By which is usually meant the fear of another depression. Narrowly considered, the proposition is not only sound but has come to have widespread acceptance. According to public opinion polls, eighty-five per cent of the American people want a fundamental and broad social security. The President has said that the government will work toward a postwar goal of 60,000,000 jobs. We are to have "full employment."

Prosperity is important, perhaps even basic to the larger problem I am tracing here. But by itself it is not enough. After all, Germany has had full employment for several years, and during war time, we have had so many available jobs that some have gone begging. Economic security is only good for the chance it may give us to make democracy—a new democracy—work. By itself it could conceivably lead back toward the complacency, the gadgetry, the superficiality of the 1920's or eventually to something worse.

Just as our uneasiness is total, so must any solution be total. We begin with a knowledge that the idea of democracy as effective participation with others is not generally understood and that many of those who do

have some inkling of the idea are at present either ignorant of its methods or incapable of applying them. We proceed with the proposition that because the individual feels more and more dwarfed by the mysterious, complicated mechanisms of modern technology and their far-reaching effects, he has never before stood in such desperate need of feeling himself important and his efforts effective. We promote the new idea of democracy as effective social participation; and, most important of all, we work toward giving every individual the opportunity of earning a stake in the new democracy.

The problem has received far too little attention of late. We have been too busy trying to rescue and preserve the saving remnants of an older civilization to build more than temporary structures for the new. But the problem is basic, and it is, I am convinced, the task of this generation.

The change called for in our way of living is revolutionary, although that is not to say that it must happen all at once or with general violence. We have to develop new methods and new patterns in economics, in politics, in education, in social institutions, in personal relationships. But rather than pursue a general discussion of these new methods and patterns, let me briefly trace two phases of change which may illumine more specifically what could happen.

IV

The inability to change our ways of living or the disinterest in changing them has been called "cultural lag." It is as though something like the automobile was about to be invented in our social relations but was prevented from appearing and being reproduced because most people still preferred the horse and buggy—and not only preferred the horse and buggy but were intent on seeing that everyone else preferred them. Modern machines are complicated, but social relations are much more complicated. They are so complicated and at the same time so intimately meshed with personal and institutional habits that, short of being blown up by the dynamite of a social crisis, they can thwart normal progress. Yet there are social agents which, properly administered, will eat away at the vitals of even the most immovable of "immovable objects." One of these agents is education.

Education, someone will say, is itself an institution often used to prevent change. But I am not thinking here of the three R's, the little

red schoolhouse, or the indoctrination of Americanism. I am even less interested in the formal school system (first grade to college) than in informal learning. And if democracy means social participation, then how people learn and under what conditions they learn can be more important than the factual content of their learning.

In the colleges of liberal arts, for instance, there is now taking place a good deal of heart-searching. Much of the discussion is concerned with the content of learning, whether the curriculum should be focused on the problems and conditions of the modern world or whether it should be built around the "hundred best books" and a so-called liberal education which was fixed during the Middle Ages and has scarcely changed since. To the extent that the modern world wins out over the Middle Ages, this controversy is all to the good. But I submit that even more important is the fact that in prewar years the college population included only half the young men and young women in the general population who could profit from advanced learning. Studies have shown that, for lack of sufficient funds, fully as many intellectually competent young people fail to reach the campus as do reach it. Even if American colleges were doing the best teaching job in the world, which they are not, this condition would give them considerably less than a fifty per cent efficiency rating; for those who now attend on the higher learning already have an economic advantage and, if deprived of college, presumably they could more easily make up the deficiency in other ways. Most trustees and officers of privately endowed colleges fear the encroachment of "federal aid," but if federal aid is the only way by which these institutions can offer their wares on a basis of democracy instead of privilege, then surely no one can look down his nose at it for long.

Not too dissimilar is the situation in the secondary school. Superintendents and teachers, stimulated by the findings of the New York *Times,* now conclude that their pupils need better training in American history (including the history of our democracy). More basic problems, however, are the segregation of Negro from white pupils, high school fraternities, and similar antidemocratic patterns of behavior widespread in the public school system.

Moreover, if we are really getting down to grassroots democracy, one of the newer developments outside the public school system, the nursery school, should eventually be incorporated within the system.

There would be no need to make attendance compulsory, for if such schools were freely available, the rush to take advantage of them would be phenomenal. The nursery school has been developed on progressive lines, and during the war it has spread in response to the need of young mothers to work in industry or elsewhere. Both of these elements have their own importance, but neither has such significance as the fact that the school usually gives youngsters from two to six years old their first opportunity to work and play together with others of their own generation. At no other age can the basis for democratic co-operation be so easily or so lastingly learned. The chance to experience grassroots democracy has grown somewhat less as America has become bigger technologically and socially; millions of Americans today do not know how effectively to participate in any large common enterprise except possibly in time of disaster or war. The necessity for early experience or training in democratic techniques will be greater tomorrow than today.

And what of adult education? In the early days of the Adult Education Association, formed almost twenty years ago, there was much fumbling about for tools and methods. There need be less fumbling from now on. Not only are there more readable books and more informative pamphlets flowing from the presses but the radio program and the motion picture film can be and are being harnessed to more serious puposes.

Most of us, I predict, will never discover the truth about Wendell Willkie's One World until we see the people of other lands going about their daily work on the screen before our eyes. The same might be said for other unfamiliar conditions closer home. The normal learning process is for us to read and think about a situation or a problem *after* our interest has been aroused—which the film, and to a lesser extent, the radio program does to a T.

We are learning something about technique. The tendency, fostered by the commercial move theatre, to sit inert like so many Humpty Dumpties absorbing emotional punishment has, of course, to be overcome. A documentary or educational film requires a short introductory explanation, and when it has been shown, the ideas it suggests need discussion.

A good deal of nonsense has been spoken in radical circles about the stupidities of public discussion. It is said that such an institution as America's Town Meeting of the Air is only a popular symbol and not

a very good one at that[1] and that the day of the New England town meeting is over. Experience with group discussions and radio and film forums deny such defeatism. Discussions can take place wherever there is the will and the interest to have them.

I am not suggesting that public discussions be run in a laissez-faire manner by which the blatant reactionary or the town crank can monopolize the floor. Competent leadership is necessary and a favorable environment. One of the little appreciated tragedies of the war is the general failure of efforts to establish block discussion groups under Civilian Defense. The failure came more from without than within. In San Francisco the groups were attacked by the Hearst press as dangerous to the war effort and in Chicago were ridiculed as "communistic" by the *Tribune*. Film forums under other auspices were, on the other hand, a success in Michigan, in Colorado, and elsewhere.

We have barely tapped the beginning of the possibilities in the 16 millimeter educational movie. During the war the armed services have discovered very specific educational values in it never before suspected. In the postwar period its possibilities will be expanded, its costs drastically cut, and its availability vastly increased.

In radio we stand at the threshold of a whole new development, which offers unlimited possibility for education of the broadest and most various kind within a small area. Frequency modulation makes possible new radio stations with a sending distance of twenty-five to a hundred miles; when these stations multiply, local programs can be sent out from almost any community without fear of interference with or from large networks. If local leaders in adult education fumble this opportunity, they will not deserve another. Let me quote Clifford Judkins Durr of the Federal Communications Commission:

> In thinking of radio, we are too much inclined to think in terms of what radio can bring to the people—a one-story pipeline of news, ideas, and entertainment—and too little in terms of its value as an outlet through which the people may express themselves. Democracy thrives more on participation at its base than upon instruction from the top. FM [frequency modulation], and

[1]The effectiveness and fairness of some of the Town Meetings may be questioned but the value of others is quite as clear. Witness the carefully prepared and illuminating discussion, about a year and a half ago, of whether the federal government or the states should control the problem of race relations.

> particularly educational FM, offers an opportunity for community participation. Round-table discussion of local problems by local people, and town meetings in which local people participate, may be as exciting and as important as similar types of programs on national and international affairs participated in by authorities of national or international reputation. Moreover, while programs by the local music society, the college department of music, the policeman's band, or the local little theatre may not reach the technical perfection of similar performances by a national symphony orchestra or Hollywood professionals, they bring to the community a sense of participation and an awareness of cultural values that can never be piped in from studios in New York or Hollywood.[2]

Who dares say that the day of the town meeting is gone forever? This technique could carry the discussion of public issues to every crossroads in America. And as Mr. Durr implies, along with it would go the almost equally important participation of local community groups in other forms of expression.

V

Given a fluid situation, education can, particularly by such informal methods as those of adult education, cut new paths of experience and develop new democratic satisfactions. What it usually cannot do is give immediate results or provide direct action.

Our dilemma is the individual's smallness in the midst of growing bigness and complexity. Usually this means, quite specifically, a loose, irresponsible relationship between the individual and some such institution as the federal government or a big corporation—a relationship which often exists whether or not the individual votes or otherwise seeks to control the actions of the government and whether or not he works for the large corporation or buys its products. Big institutions and organizations—whether in business, government, the church, or elsewhere—all originate in some essential need or demand on the part of great numbers of people. But if they just grow like Topsy (as most of them have), they tend, in the very laudable pursuit of efficiency, to attract technicians and specialists, and the pattern of their administration becomes set. In the long run the administration of a large organization can easily find itself more and more doing things to or for the individuals it serves or deals

[2]"Freedom of Speech for Whom?" *Public Opinion Quarterly,* VIII (fall, 1944), 391-406.

with and less and less acting in response to the individuals' expressed wishes.[3]

When a good share of an organization's time and effort is put into perpetuating its administrative purposes at the expense of relations with its clients or the outside world its condition is said to be, in its bad sense, bureaucratic. The condition is closely associated with the problem of how to make use of the expert in modern organization. Harold Laski has said that the expert should be kept "on tap and not on top," but the phrase has always been more felicitous than the performance which it suggests.

Significantly, the experts themselves have attacked the problem which their own presence has in part created. A few years ago, as one example, the Department of Agriculture inaugurated a number of practices designed to bring its efforts closer to the people whom it was serving. As one device, it used the public opinion poll so that the experts might learn what the farmers were thinking and thereby realistically adjust their plans. For another, typical laboratory and workshop areas were set up in the field where new ideas could be tried out under the critical eyes of layman and specialist alike. For a third, county agricultural planning committees of local farmers were elected or appointed to draw up their own programs. Only the last of these could give the grassroots farmer much personal feeling of participation and it is not a device which can be generally copied by other large organizations. The experience of the Department of Agriculture is not unusual. For most of this type of experimenting with administration, though it has its importance and is in the right direction, seems to date more designed to give the expert rather than the layman a feeling of validity.[4]

John Citizen may well ask if there is any method by which he can take the initiative or apply direct action himself.

Depending on the degree of his desire, there is at least one positive answer. He can join a popular pressure group. This, of course, is opposed to our traditional ideas of "good citizenship." Pressure groups are supposed

[3]The organization may be efficient but nondemocratic; hence a notion that democracy cannot be efficient. But if the lack of democracy is permanent, it is doubtful if the efficiency will also long continue. In a changing world efficiency must be flexible.

[4]There are other possibilities, however. For suggestions on this point see Alfred Bingham's *Techniques of Democracy* and J. Donald Kingsley's recently published *Representative Bureaucracy*.

to be a menace to sound government; they promote very narrow interests of their own, and operating with single-mindedness, they sometimes "put over" changes in government and elsewhere which are presumed to subvert the public welfare.

Much of this may be admitted. Yet there has never been any real effort to do away with pressure groups. One concludes that the feeling against them is inherently a holdover from the general prejudice of the middle class that "politics is too dirty a business for any honest, self-respecting man to take part in." The answer, really, is more and better pressure groups rather than less—more pressure groups, if necessary, in order to oppose those whose purposes are deemed bad. In fact, the idea that one of the prime jobs of government is to act as a kind of broker for pressure groups is an old one to students of politics. Pressure groups, then, may be taken as an integral part in the democratic process, and the chief legitimate restriction on their activity would seem to be simply adequate publicity about their sponsorship and sources of revenue.

The most undemocratic type of powerful organization in our society is undoubtedly the large corporation which has a monopoly or which has entered into agreements protecting itself from competition. The administration of big government can be voted out of office, and nearly all other private organizations of any size have some type of internal machinery by which their policies and leadership may be changed or sharply influenced. But the internal control of the monopoly corporation is nil or at a minimum; even the overwhelming majority of its stockholders—who themselves make up but a tiny minority of all those affected by the corporation's policies—have no power. Such control as is exercised must come from without: from government regulation, bargaining with a union, or general propaganda.

The big corporation has long had its own pressure groups, either directly, or through its trade association or through such an organization as the National Association of Manufacturers. It is only in the interests of the common welfare that we have powerful pressure groups whose purposes are in general opposition.

Let me define pressure groups very broadly. They can include organizations which are in their own right institutions with purposes much broader than political or economic action. A pressure group can be a labor union or an organization merely including labor representation.

It can be a co-operative association-part of whose purpose is economic pressure against high prices and excess profits. It can be a consumers' organization. It can be groups like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People or the Union for Democratic Action. Or it can be the League of Women Voters, which limits much of its pressure voluntarily.

Although a pressure group cannot afford to scatter its fire like buckshot, the common, and frequently its own, welfare is best served when it broadens its purposes and even its base of membership. Whatever the criticism of labor unions during the war, for instance, there has been no answer to the fact that they have been among the few organizations (the only powerful ones) who have steadily fought for price control. In the sense of promoting the public welfare, the Political Action Committee of the CIO was a happy invention. And the National Citizens Political Action Committee, if it can attract an effective number of members from outside the labor movement, could become an even happier one. Unions, the most powerful of popular pressure groups today, have an obligation to broaden their field of operations.

And the individual's part in the pressure group?

In a world of growing bigness, the organization or group must itself be larger. And yet in even the largest (but democratic) institutions, the most satisfying and effective unit can be the local one. Let the individual join a union, a co-operative association, or some other national organization working for popular and progressive ends, and he will find himself related not only to the strength of the many but in the local group he will discover companionship.

For the pressure group can be a fair substitute for the small community. It can give a person a sense of "belonging." It can give him a feeling of going somewhere and accomplishing something. It can bring him usefulness, effectiveness, wholeness. And all this he will not really "be given" but he will win it to the extent of his desire to participate—which is the democratic way.

VI

In the latter days of our own depression, Ernst Toller summed up the domestic appeal of the Nazi program by suggesting, significantly, that Hitler had given German young people and unemployed "a meaning

in life" and "hope for the future"—both of which, however perverted or vain, had been denied them by the Weimar Republic. Looking at America, the German poet and dramatist noted that we too had our millions of young people at loose ends, and remarked that we must not simply keep them from starving but must give them "hope for the future, knowledge, and a share in the cultural achievements of American civilization."

Toller's words carry the unmistakable flavor of truth. And in America today we should only amend them to read: We must give everyone the *chance* to know and to share in our cultural achievements. For participation is something to earn and if need be to fight for.

We may earn it partly through education and partly by working in pressure groups. Furthermore, if we are to have a new democracy, we shall certainly need to change many aspects of our economy, inevitably we must "do something about race," and we shall have to develop new social institutions. But if I were to trace a round dozen of the ways by which we might arrive at a democracy of effective social participation, there would still be some to say: Tell us more. This is a revolution, they would say. Where do we come out? What are we working toward? Is it to be socialism or communism or what?

There are those who have to know all the answers beforehand. It may well be that the over-all result will be called socialism or communism though, knowing America, I should expect either one to appear in some blurred or protestant form. But John Citizen cares no more about socialism or communism than he did fifty years ago about capitalism. What he wants is results. What he wants is democracy that means a hand in his own destiny and a feeling of effectiveness. And if he can participate all along the way, neither he nor anyone else need be disturbed over the final destination.

WE NOTE . . .

TOWARD A SOCIAL PROGRAM AND ACTION

Pragmatism, as the philosophy of liberal democracy, drives toward social action. Yet pragmatists are, on the whole, backward in the social application of their philosophy (except in education).

Pragmatists write glowingly of scientific method and the liberal values; some of the finest of these writings are appearing in *The Antioch Review*. But they proceed almost wholly on the general methodological level, and at some point application to concrete problems of social program and action must begin. What light does scientific method throw on the revolution of our times? How can the liberal values survive and grow as their old capitalist supports crumble?

Scientific method is indispensable in the social sciences. It is indispensable in the formulation and implementation of a social program and action. But it is only relatively true to say that "method is more important than conclusions." And it may become disastrous, as much so as means becoming more important than ends. Marxists emphasized that *method* was the most important thing in Marxism, and there was a kernel of truth in the claim; but now communist-Marxism so completely emphasizes method that "Marxism" is used to justify proposals, objectives and means—conclusions — beyond the dreams of earlier Marxists.

One of the suggestive developments of our age is totalitarian misuse of techniques developed by liberal democracy. Planning is one of these. For planning is a technique; it may be stripped of its liberal-democratic values and made to serve their fascist opposites. So, too, with "full employment," which is achievable under nondemocratic systems, and which in this country might come under a new type of military-monopoly state. What is all-important are values, the class-economic and institutional arrangements to promote the values, and the accompanying social program and action.

The same limitations apply, I think, to scientific method, which in final analysis is the understanding and use of effective means to achieve desired ends. True, pragmatists insist their scientific method includes more — it means rational, critical values, it presupposes democracy. But scientific method can be stripped of those values and remain as a method usable by fascism to promote its predetermined reactionary values. In the measure that fascism uses effective means to set up the new tyranny it uses intelligence, the rational and scientific as *method*.

But, the pragmatists will again insist, pragmatism and scientific method presuppose and accept democracy. But democracy is a value. It is endangered by monopoly capitalist reaction against democracy. This finds intellectual rationalization on a number of philosophical levels, and pragmatists are doing a magnificent job fighting the reaction on those levels. But the reaction originates, and is given strength, in

basic social-economic changes that drive beyond capitalism. Hence the decisive struggle is on the level of social action. What social program and means are called for to beat down the reaction? For unless democracy lives and grows the values of pragmatism are doomed.

Pragmatists make a magnificent defense of the liberal values. They understand the cultural aspects of liberalism much more fully than Harold Laski, whose mechanical Marxism narrows liberalism down to being simply the ideological expression of bourgeois class-economic interests. This kind of mechanical Marxism drives toward rejection of democracy as simply another expression of bourgeois interests. It is a perversion of Marx, who recognized that ideas and values may transcend the particular class-economic interests that gave them birth and become permanent contributions to civilization. One such contribution is the values of liberal democracy, which need to become broader and deeper to fulfill their truly revolutionary nature.

But how can that be done? Liberal democracy is on the defensive. The liberal pragmatist needs to answer a number of questions. What institutional relations called into being and nourished liberal democracy? What were its limitations, and why? What changes in institutional relations now endanger liberal democracy? Which of the old institutions must we retain and what new institutions are necessary so that liberal democracy may survive and grow anew? The answers must draw conclusions on the level of social program and action.

Pragmatism emphasizes the rational, scientific, experimental approach. The approach, expressed in the program and action of bits-and-pieces liberal reform, worked measurably well in the period of the upswing of capitalism. But now the decline of capitalism, with its universal crisis, begets intolerance of the rational, scientific, experimental approach to social action. When liberal democracy was still on the up and up, and the progress of meliorism appeared to be inevitable, the pragmatic approach was workably fine: "critical thinking, provisional hypotheses, the specific — and perhaps piecemeal — handling of specific problems." We still need critical thinking and the use of hypotheses to avoid those social absolutes that bring God-knows-what totalitarian nightmares. But the specific and the piecemeal — in terms of political action, bits-and-pieces liberal reform — must merge into a deep-going social program and action to master the breakdown of capitalism and the violent reaction it throws up. The struggle is, in many ways, a race against time. Bits-and-pieces liberalism plugs up a hole here in the social dyke of our institutional arrangements, and the dyke springs ten holes elsewhere. That's what happened in the German republic of 1920-30. The economic crisis of the 1930's moved into the still greater World War crisis of the 1940's. What is now needed is a synthesis of social understanding and imagination to specify the basic changes and action to bring the new institutional arrangements which can give a new impetus to liberal democracy and bring a climate of opinion favorable to "provisional hypotheses, the specific—and perhaps piecemeal—handling of specific problems."

Finally, what does "revolution" mean? Almost every piece of liberal writing nowadays uses the word "revolution." But few writers define the word, and the definitions seldom agree.

What is going on? The crisis of the social order originated in the corporate revolution, in which nothing is predetermined, however, except that it moves beyond the old capitalism. There are a number of revolutions: communist, national - imperialist, fascist, democratic - socialist. And a new one, the military - monopoly, begins to appear. We need, I think, a more concrete, specific understanding of "revolution" in terms of values, social program and action. Or it will become *their* revolution, not ours; after which liberal democracy, reason and scientific method, as pragmatism understands them, will become a memory that totalitarian masters despise and the people neither recall nor understand.

L. C.

EDUCATION FOR VETERANS

The Army has recently released a study made last summer of the postwar plans of white enlisted men which merits a little analysis. Twenty thousand men stationed abroad as well as at home composed the sample though the foreign theatres were not all represented. There were about 6¾ million white enlisted men at the time.

Only about 7 per cent or about a half million men are definitely planning to return to full-time school. Another 4 per cent may return and 18 per cent are planning more-or-less vaguely to study part time. Of the latter group about a third say they would prefer full-time schooling. Altogether less than 18 per cent (1¼ million men) express a desire for full-time schooling and many of them recognize that their age, marital status, or other circumstances will rule it out.

When the study was made, the opportunities under the G.I. law were imperfectly understood so that a larger proportion of men may come to regard further full-time schooling as feasible. Also if employment conditions are unfavorable when men leave the service, schooling may be not only a good alternative but in some cases another and most undesirable form of unemployment compensation. On the other hand, a longer war than was anticipated last summer or favorable employment conditions would influence many to pass up full-time training opportunities.

Of course it is the young unmarried men who furnish the greatest proportion of those with full-time educational plans. The most striking fact disclosed is that over 90 per cent of them have graduated from high school or already attended college, and that more than two-thirds want college education. Undoubtedly this is the ablest and most ambitious group and the fulfillment of their educational plans will be valuable socially as well as individually.

It is significant and discouraging, however, that while about one-fourth of all the college men plan to continue full-time education (half the single men under 23) less than 8 per cent of the high school graduates do. This figure would probably increase to 12 to 15 per cent if only single men under 23 were counted. Even so it is much below the percentage of high school graduates who normally go on to college and clearly shows the educational wastage caused by the war. Even a year of

college after the war would be immensely valuable to this great group of men to give them not only some further vocational skill but mainly to broaden their education and give them the perspective they need after years in the unnatural and limited military environment.

But what about the other six million men, and particularly what about the younger ones with only grade school or partial high school? Do we want them to face the postwar world as citizens and wage earners with no better preparation? Can we afford to let them? Few of them look forward to more education. One obvious reason is that to accomplish any worth-while objective would take too long. They think, no doubt, that several years of high school plus further training in a college or technical school will be necessary to accomplish anything.

Clearly there seems to be needed a program to stimulate these men as well as the high school graduates to want a better education and to show them that something worth while could be achieved without sacrificing too many years of their lives. A one- or two-year curriculum like that of the General College of Minnesota would enormously enrich their lives and would be valuable social insurance because it would give them time to understand the forces loose in the world which have been kicking them around. Vocational training could be introduced according to the needs and desires of the individual, but it should be borne in mind that the majority of modern vocational activities can be learned best and in a very short time on the job. A selection and counseling service of the highest order would be needed to steer into such courses men who could and would profit by them.

The government so far seems to be planning to subsidize only full-time education for veterans. Even if a larger proportion than the poll shows do avail themselves of full-time study opportunities, a far larger number will remain who will want, and many more yet who will need, the stimulation and personal enrichment that part-time study could give. Some imaginative and attractive plan of adult education for veterans needs to be devised and promoted by the Veterans Bureau both to give the veterans their due and to make them more intelligent and effective citizens.

W. B. A.

THE READER WRITES

Miss Thompson Agrees Too

To the Editor:

Mr. Guérard's "Can It Be World Democracy?" interests me greatly, but I find it impossible to contribute a thousand words of comment, because the comment would merely be a repetition of what Mr. Guérard has already said, eloquently, succinctly, and unanswerably. I have been trying for months to say the same thing in my column; to warn that all we are winning militarily we risk to lose politically; and I have been conscious of being against the stream. I am glad you are publishing this article, but I wish, if you will forgive me, that it were to appear in a publication with a much larger popular circulation. I wish what he says could be shouted from the housetops, and now, quickly, quickly, because it is already very late.

New York City. DOROTHY THOMPSON

Those Liberals

To the Editor:

Writing a fan letter is something new for me. But I was so impressed by *The Antioch Review,* on chancing upon it in our College Library, and especially by George Geiger's article in the Summer number, that I must let him and you know how I feel.

His article, "Liberals Don't Have To Be Tired," is, in my opinion, the most constructive contribution to Liberalism since the great work of John Dewey. It is precisely what we need.

Washington, Pa. NORMAN W. LYON

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ALBERT GUÉRARD, professor of general and comparative literature at Stanford University, has frequently written on European reorganization; his *Europe, Free and United* will be published early in 1945 by the Stanford University Press. LOUIS FISCHER is well known as a writer on international subjects. FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, professor of political science at Williams College, is author of a number of stimulating books on international politics.

We take more than the usual pleasure in introducing to our readers the literary criticism of ROBERT GORHAM DAVIS. He is a frequent reviewer for *The Nation* and other magazines, and is lecturer in English at Smith College.

JOHN T. HOWARD is a graduate of the Yale School of Architecture and has studied architecture in Europe. He is planning director of the Cleveland City Planning Commission.

AARON LEVENSTEIN, who makes superseniority seem not only an important but lively subject, is director of the Labor Division of the Research Institute of America.

JOACHIM JOESTEN has written a number of books on European affairs of which the most recent (1944) is *What Russia Wants*. He is assistant editor of the foreign news department of *Newsweek*.

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Included among his writings in this field is his important *Philosophies of Science* (1942).

LEO BARNES has studied and frequently written about wartime economic controls. The views expressed in "The Economic Equivalent of War" are his own and not those of The Research Institute of America, for which he is director of economic research.

MURRAY D. LINCOLN, who will be remembered for his "Agriculture in America's Crisis" in the Farm issue (Summer, 1944), is Executive Secretary of the Ohio Farm Bureau, President of the Co-operative League of the U. S. A., and a trustee of Antioch College.

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An Answer to Hayek's "Road to Serfdom"

The Unfinished Task

Economic Reconstruction for Democracy

By *LEWIS COREY*

Prof. Hayek shows that all-inclusive nationalization and planning of economic activity leads to serfdom. There is no alternative, he says, except a return to genuine competitive capitalism. "Yet I believe there is a third way, a democratic socialism in which collectivism and planning are employed in a carefully limited manner under forms that will prevent the emergence of totalitarianism. I refer my readers to the remarkable book by Lewis Corey, 'The Unfinished Task,' in which the case for democratic socialism is presented in a clear and effective manner. Corey's argument against unlimited collectivism and planning parallels Hayek's. Corey does not therefore conclude that the old competitive capitalism can or should be restored. He sees the real choice as a choice between *totalitarian* and *democratic* collectivism . . . a pluralistic economy, avoiding concentration of economic power in the state."—*From a review of Hayek's book by Will Herberg in "New Europe."*

When "The Unfinished Task" first appeared, Seba Eldridge, Professor of Sociology, University of Kansas, said: *"Lewis Corey's book is certain to have far-reaching influence in the years ahead."*

Comments on THE UNFINISHED TASK

A very valuable discussion.—*Bertrand Russell.*

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